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Abstract: In June 2010, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bilski v. 
Kappos, a case that had the potential to rewrite the landscape for determin-
ing what types of computer-related and business method inventions would 
receive patent protection. Just six weeks earlier, the European Patent Of-
fice’s Enlarged Board of Appeal delivered a decision on the same subject 
matter that had the potential to produce similar change in Europe. Yet, 
given these two opportunities to overhaul imperfect patent systems, nei-
ther decision provided more than incremental change. This Article ex-
plains why neither jurisdiction is able or willing to produce comprehensive 
reform in this area, and seeks to illuminate the nature of patent reform 
that is possible on the two continents. 
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Introduction 
 The status of business methods and software as patent subject mat-
ter is one of the most controversial debates in patent law.1 These pat-
ents, or a subset thereof, are considered to be overly broad in scope,2 
sources of many “patent troll” lawsuits,3 unlikely to advance the prior 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent 
Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 729, 
736–38 (2006) (analyzing the PTO’s Second Pair of Eyes Review and concluding that pat-
ent reform efforts are inadequate); John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Me-
thod Patent Myth, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 987 passim (2003) (providing empirical evidence 
that the quality of business method patent claims are not significantly inferior to other 
patent claims); Wade M. Chumney et al., Patents Gone Wild: An Ethical Examination and Le-
gal Analysis of Tax-Related and Tax Strategy Patents, 46 Am. Bus. L.J. 343, 357–71 (2009) (ex-
amining the patentability of tax strategy business methods); David S. Olson, Taking the 
Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 
Temp. L. Rev. 181, 188–90 (2009) (citing software and business methods as fueling the 
“continuing high volume of bad patents”); Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic 
Analysis and Critique, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1017, 1018 (2004) (noting criticism of the 
quality of computer software and Internet business methods); Robert E. Thomas, Debug-
ging Software Patents: Increasing Innovation and Reducing Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of 
Software Patent Law, 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 191 passim (2008) (ar-
guing that business method and software patents may discourage rather than promote 
innovation); Robert E. Thomas & Larry A. DiMatteo, Harmonizing the International Law of 
Business Method and Software Patents: Following Europe’s Lead, 16 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1, 
45–46 (2007) (recommending adoption of European treatment of business method and 
software patents). 
2 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 
1688 (2003) (arguing that the Federal Circuit has encouraged broad drafting of software 
claims where narrow claims are optimal); Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope 
and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2001) (concluding that broad 
software patent scope is not optimal). 
3 John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-
Litigated Patents, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2009) (providing empirical evidence that the most 
2011] Software & Business Method Patents in Europe & the United States 229 
art due to lax disclosure requirements,4 and generally undeserving of 
patent protection.5 Due to the questioned legitimacy of these patents, 
there has been resistance to the unqualified ratification of business me-
thod and software patent subject-matter status on both sides of the At-
lantic.6 Nevertheless, solutions to the perceived problems of business 
method and software patents have been ephemeral. Like shifting sand, 
proposals and approaches have been accepted and rejected at a seem-
ingly increasing rate on both continents.7 
                                                                                                                      
litigated patents are held by non-practicing entities—so called “trolls” —and dispropor-
tionately cover software inventions). 
4 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1688–89 (arguing that weak disclosure require-
ments allow broad claims that can stifle “subsequent incremental improvements”). 
5 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Methods Patents Bad for Business?, 16 Santa 
Clara Computer & High Tech L.J. 263, 275–77 (2000) (arguing that the limited benefits 
from business method patents do not exceed their social costs); Thomas, supra note 1, at 
210–11, 218 (extending Dreyfuss’ social welfare analysis to software patents). 
6 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1689–90 (recommending policy changes to limit 
the scope of software patents); see also Philip Leith, Software and Patents in Europe 
154–55 (2007) (describing the highly organized opposition from open source and SME 
groups that made moving forward on a software directive to liberalize treatment of soft-
ware claims difficult); Reinier Bakels & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, The Patentability of Computer 
Programs: Discussion of European-Level Legislation in the Field of Patents for Software 26 (Euro-
pean Parliament, Comm. on Legal Affairs and the Internal Mkt., Working Paper, 2002), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/juri/20020619/Software 
Patent.pub.pdf (noting that “the crucial question” for EU legislation is “not whether software 
patents should be allowed, but what software patents should be permitted”); Press Release, 
Charlie McCreevy, European Comm’r for Internal Mkt. & Servs., Statement to the European 
Parliament on Computer-Implemented Inventions (Mar. 8, 2005), available at http://europa. 
eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/151&format=HTML&aged=0& 
language=EN&guiLanguage=en (“The Commission’s intention in making its proposal 
was to avoid patenting of pure software and clearly differentiate the EU from the US.”). 
7 See Tanya Aplin, Patenting Computer Programs: A Glimmer of Convergence, 30 Eur. In-
tell. Prop. Rev. 379, 382 (2008) (arguing that the U.K. courts’ reluctance to follow the 
EPO approach represents an elevation of form over substance); Rosa Maria Ballardini, 
Software Patents in Europe: The Technical Requirement Dilemma, 3 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac. 
563, 565–73 (2008) (tracing shifting standards and tests in the EPO, United Kingdom, and 
German courts); Christopher Laub, Software Patenting: Legal Standards in Europe and the US 
in View of Strategic Limitations of the IP Systems, 9 J. World Intell. Prop. 344, 366–67 (2007); 
Christopher de Mauny, Court of Appeal Clarifies Patenting of Computer Programs, 31 Eur. In-
tell. Prop. Rev. 147, 150 (2009) (discussing Symbian case and its move towards seeking 
compromise with EPO); Noam Shemtov, The Characteristics of Technical Character and the 
Ongoing Saga in the EPO and English Courts, 4 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac. 506, 506–12 (2009) 
(examining the differences in approaches in EPO and U.K. courts and noting that U.K. 
decisions are irreconcilable with those of EPO and EPO decisions are often irreconcilable 
with each other); Helen Wallis, Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions: The Changing 
Landscape in 2008, 14 Comm. L.J. Computer Media & Telecomm. 4, 4–7 (2009). 
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 The shifts have been so dramatic that the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (CAFC) reaffirmed a seemingly discredited8  subject-
matter test for business method and software patent claims.9 This reaf-
firmation left the Supreme Court with the unenviable task of either ra-
tifying a test that previous courts refused to embrace or developing a 
viable solution that has eluded courts for decades.10 During oral argu-
ments in Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court seemed willing to explore 
all avenues for a possible solution to this conundrum.11 Justice Gins-
burg queried whether the tied-to-technology requirement upon which 
European patents rest could provide a workable subject-matter test for 
business methods and software patents in the United States.12 Justice 
Ginsburg’s query suggests that at least some members of the Supreme 
Court did not find any of their options inviting and held some hope 
that European law might provide a remedy that the Supreme Court 
could use to rescue the United States’ patent system from its subject-
matter malaise. 
 In this Article, we address Justice Ginsburg’s query by examining 
United States and European patent law to determine whether there is 
viable legal or policy support for a patent subject-matter test that pro-
vides the patent law community with clear guidelines for distinguishing 
“deserving” patents from “undeserving” patents. Now that the Supreme 
Court has issued a decision that basically orders the CAFC to “reboot” 
its patent process subject-matter approach—with little more than the 
exclusion against abstract ideas and 1980s-era Supreme Court prece-
dents—-the need for clear guidance in this area of patent law is even 
more pressing.13 The European Patent Convention (EPC)14 appears to 
contain provisions that address this problem. Courts have consistently 
                                                                                                                      
8 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 978–83 (2008) (Newman, J. dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Bilski 
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227–31(2010). 
9 Id. at 963–66 (reaffirming use of the machine or physical transformation test to de-
termine whether processes are valid statutory patent subject matter). 
10 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223–25; In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 978–985 (Newman, J., dissent-
ing). 
11 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) 
(No. 08-964). 
12 See id. 
13 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225–26, 3229. 
14 Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 254, 
as revised Nov. 29, 2000 [hereinafter EPC 2000], available at http://www.epo.org/patents/ 
law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ma1.html. 
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interpreted the EPC to require that all patents be “technical,”15 and to 
exclude explicitly business methods and “programs for computers” 
from patent subject-matter coverage in Article 52(2).16 The strong ex-
clusion is chimeric, however, offering less hope for a solution than pre-
viously considered U.S. approaches. 
 The clarity of the EPC exclusion is severely muddled by modifying 
language in Article 52(3)17 and by the complexity and fragmentation of 
the European patent system.18 Unlike the centralized United States pat-
ent system, national patent systems in Europe coexist with the European 
Patent Office (EPO), both of which apply and interpret the EPC.19  
There are no pan-European courts that correspond to the CAFC and 
the U.S. Supreme Court.20 In Europe both the EPO and national courts 
have jurisdiction over patent subject-matter appeals.21 As one commen-
tator put it, “[t]he resulting edifice is byzantine in complexity.”22 Al-
though national courts strive to harmonize their decisions with EPO 
Technical Board of Appeal decisions, significant conflicts have, nonethe-
less, developed. For example, the potential exists for a computer soft-
ware patent granted by the EPO to be invalidated under current U.K. 
law because of that country’s more restrictive interpretation of the 
EPC.23 Realization of this potential would render one of the EPC’s main 
tenets meaningless: namely, that patents granted at the EPO are valid in 
contracting states as if they were granted by the national office.24 
 Elevating the probability of legal discord is the EPO Enlarged 
Board of Appeal’s denial of the existence of conflicting decisions within 
the EPO and the Board’s refusal to clarify the meaning of “technical” as 
                                                                                                                      
15 Thomas & DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 17 (“While there is no explicit requirement in 
the EPC for technical character or a ‘technical contribution,’ the patent courts initially 
interpreted the EPC as including such a requirement.”). 
16 EPC 2000, supra note 14, at 271–72. 
17 See id. at 272 (limiting Art. 52(2) exclusions to the extent that a patent or patent ap-
plication relates to the excluded subject matter or activities “as such”). 
18 William Cornish & David Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copy-
right, Trade marks and Allied Rights, 114 (6th ed. 2007) (describing the EPO and UK 
patent systems and their interaction); infra Part IV(B). 
19 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, at 258–59, 294–96. 
20 See id. at 259–71 (outlining the structure of European institutions of patent review). 
21 Cf. Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 114 (describing the EPO and U.K. pat-
ent systems and their interaction). 
22 Id. 
23 See Guy Tritton et al., Intellectual Property in Europe 86 (3d ed. 2008). 
24 Shemtov, supra note 7, at 514. 
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applied to European patent subject matter.25 Therefore, in addition to 
shaping patent subject-matter policy for business methods and software, 
Europe must also resolve conflicting approaches within the EPC and 
between countries with disparate and sometimes inconsistent ap-
proaches to patent policy. Europe cannot take these steps until there is a 
European patent court with jurisdiction to settle these interpretive dif-
ferences. 
 Another impediment to European reform is the extremely liberal 
U.S. approach to software and business method patents. Implementing 
clear guidelines and boundaries could handicap European inventors 
and businesses relative to their U.S. counterparts, which enjoy the lib-
eral U.S. treatment of software and business method claims. Hence, 
clarity and well-defined constraints in Europe may occur only after the 
United States has shifted its patent policy to include clear limitations on 
software and business method patents. Thus, it appears highly unlikely 
that Europe can provide the U.S. patent system with the guidance it 
apparently seeks. 
 This Article’s analysis of U.S. and European approaches to the pat-
entability of business methods and software supports this rather pessi-
mistic conclusion. Conceptually, the only significant differences be-
tween these invention types and mental processes that do not receive 
patent protection are speed, capacity, and accuracy. There is nothing 
that computer software controlling an electronic device cannot per-
form that a human mind cannot also perform using paper and pencil 
and sufficient time. Nevertheless, these differences coupled with tech-
nologically advanced computer equipment make software valuable and 
capable of performing tasks that cannot be done practically by the hu-
man mind alone. 
 Part I of the Article discusses the nature of software and business 
methods.26 Parts II, III, and IV, respectively, examine the development 
and present state of patent law in the United States,27 European Patent 
Office,28 and United Kingdom.29 The Article concludes by identifying 
the implications of this discussion. Our analysis shows that there is no 
unequivocal legal support for a patent subject-matter rule that excludes 
                                                                                                                      
25 Case G-3/08, Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O 17, 19–30, 31 (Enlarged 
Bd. Appeal, May 12, 2010), available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj011/01_11/ 
01_0101.pdf. 
26 See infra Part I. 
27 See infra Part II. 
28 See infra Part III. 
29 See infra Part IV. 
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all inventions that include software or business methods under either 
patent system.30 There is also no unequivocal support for recognizing 
software and business methods as patent subject matter.31 The problem 
lies in the absence of clear, unambiguous legislative direction on either 
continent.32 The manifestation of this lack of a solid policy foundation 
in the United States has been the repeated adoption and rejection of 
different judicial approaches.33 In Europe, on the other hand, the lack 
of legislative direction combined with the absence of a centralized 
court system has resulted in conflicting and shifting approaches in the 
judicial treatment of software patent subject matter.34 
I. Software and Business Method Patents 
 To appreciate the dilemma that courts and policy makers face in 
addressing the software and business method patentability question, 
understanding the nature of software is critical. Therefore, we begin 
our analysis by discussing the general nature of software and business 
method patents and their treatment under U.S. law. Conceptually, soft-
ware and business methods are closely related. 35  Both are abstract 
processes that do not independently produce tangible results.36 An ad-
                                                                                                                      
 
30 See infra Parts II–IV. 
31 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (rejecting prior test for patentable subject matter and per-
mitting the Federal Circuit to develop a new test based on the abstract ideas exclusion); Case 
T-208/84, Computer-Related Invention/VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. 14 (Technical Bd. Appeal 
3.5.01, July 15, 1986) (noting uncertainty in claims involving business methods or software and 
additional variables), available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj1987/p001_046.pdf. 
32 See infra text accompanying notes 166, 366–406. 
33 Compare Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (rejecting prior test for patentable subject matter 
and permitting the Federal Circuit to develop a new test based on the abstract ideas exclu-
sion), with State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (recognizing the patentability of a computer algorithm that produces a “useful, 
concrete and tangible result”). 
34 See, e.g., VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 14 (noting uncertainty in claims involving busi-
ness methods or software and additional variables). 
35 See Allison & Tiller, supra note 1, at 1012 (arguing, in a section entitled “A Bit of 
Software Patent Déjà Vu,” that most criticisms of business method patents have already 
been applied toward software patents); Thomas, supra note 1, at 193 n.6 (arguing that 
“[b]usiness methods are part of the continuum [of patents] that includes software and 
computer-implemented inventions”). 
36 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–73 (1972) (distinguishing between software 
and traditional process claims, which do produce tangible results); Robert P. Merges, As 
Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent Sys-
tem Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech L.J. 577, 578–79 (1999) (recounting that business method and 
software inventions were previously considered too abstract for patent coverage); James 
Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 2000, (Magazine), available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2000/03/12/magazine/patently-absurd.html?scp=2&sq=Patently+Absurd&st=nyt (arguing 
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ditional similarity is that business methods are often implemented 
through computer software.37 Under the “machine-or-transformation 
test” championed in In re Bilski, business methods that are not com-
puter or machine implemented are unlikely to survive a subject-matter 
challenge.38 Whether business methods or computer software are statu-
tory subject matter when “computer implemented” is a more difficult 
determination. When “computer implemented,” the business method 
is computer software.39 A major question that courts on both sides of 
the Atlantic have struggled with is whether implementing software or a 
business method through a computer or other machine is necessary or 
sufficient to render such claims valid statutory subject matter.40  Or, 
more generally, under what circumstances are business methods or 
computer programs capable of becoming patentable inventions? 
 Therefore, determining whether and under what circumstances 
software should be valid statutory subject matter under U.S. law, or sta-
tutorily excluded subject matter under European law, requires an un-
derstanding of the nature of computer software. Modern computers 
consist of tangible physical components including one or more process-
ing units, graphical and input-output subsystems, memory chips, stor-
age devices, and other support systems.41 Software provides the means 
                                                                                                                      
that business method and software patents had crossed into the realm of thought and ab-
straction with nuts and bolts that are “vaporous and intangible”). 
37 See Rebecca A. Hand, eBay v. MercExchange: Looking at the Cause and Effect of a Shift 
in the Standard for Issuing Patent Injunctions, 25 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 461, 470–71 
(2007) (“Many business method patents are, in fact, patents on the transfer of a known 
business method to a software and/or Web-based implementation.”); see also Gregory A. 
Stobbs, Business Method Patents § 3.01 (2002) (“Virtually all of the e-commerce pat-
ents, by their very nature, involve electronic communication technology, or Internet tech-
nology.”). 
38 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 964–66 (2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 
3218 (2010). 
39 See Hand, supra note 37, at 470–71. 
40 See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72 (analyzing whether a computer program useful only 
in connection with a computer is not a patentable process); Ex parte Carl A. Lundgren, No. 
2003–2088, (B.P.A.I. Apr. 20, 2004) (noting that business methods performed by a machine 
have long been considered patentable subject matter); Case T-931/95, Controlling Pension 
Benefit Systems Partnership/PBS PARTNERSHIP, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. 441, 450 (Technical Bd. 
Appeal 3.5.01, Sept. 8, 2000), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-
appeals/pdf/t950931ep1.pdf (finding that the use of a computer in application of a method 
does not change the essential nature of the claim nor does it endow a “purely non-technical 
purpose with a technical character”). 
41 See Jack M. Haynes, Computer Software: Intellectual Property Protection in the United States 
and Japan, 13 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 245, 247(1995); Robert Plotkin, Fight-
ing Keywords: Translating the First Amendment To Protect Software Speech, 2003 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. 
& Pol’y 329, 369 n.149. 
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by which human users interact with and control these myriad computer 
systems.42 Software allows computer users to give instructions to com-
puters to perform a variety of tasks.43 The term software also applies to 
information stored on, used, and manipulated by computers.44  The 
term software additionally includes the internal routines that allow dif-
ferent parts of the computer to interact with each other and to trans-
late human input into instructions that computers understand.45 
 Conceptually, there is little to distinguish software patent claims 
from claims involving abstract ideas, algorithms, and mental processes 
that courts consistently rejected prior to the 1998 case before the CAFC, 
State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group.46 Computers and the human 
mind operate similarly by processing algorithms.47 Mathematical algo-
rithms, computer programs, and mental processes are ways of “defining 
abstract relationships among concepts and [with] defining rules about 
how those concepts should be manipulated.”48 Thus, for example, the 
area of a rectangle can be characterized by the relationship between the 
base and height of the geometric figure and defined as the product of 
those two elements.49 There is no conceptual difference between calcu-
lating this area in one’s mind, with pencil and paper, and calculating 
this area through the use of a programmed computing device. Many 
psychologists model human thought processes as a series of computa-
tional steps.50 According to these psychologists, human thought proc-
                                                                                                                      
42 Gregory A. Stobbs, Software Patents, § 2.02 (2000) (“[S]oftware is what em-
powers a computer to handle information and to control information flow.”). 
43 Haynes, supra note 41, at 247 (“A computer is useless without software.”). 
44 Stobbs, supra note 42, § 2.02 (“[S]oftware is information that is fed into the input, 
placed in storage, and then delivered from storage to the computer.”). 
45 Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply? 
35 Emory L.J. 853, 867–68, 868 n.57 (1986) (noting that the term “software” is confusing 
because it applies to many different aspects of the computing process including internal 
and external computer functions). 
46 See 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
47 See Ben Klemens, Math You Can’t Use: Patents, Copyrights, and Software 26 
(2006) (suggesting that computers and the human brain operate similarly by following cer-
tain paths from problem statement to solution); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The 
Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 
Emory L.J. 1025, 1123 (1990) (reporting that computer scientist Allen Newell concludes that 
“no meaningful distinction can be made between algorithms and mental processes”). 
48 Samuelson, supra note 47, at 1123. 
49 See id. 
50 Id. (quoting Professor Newell as stating, “humans think by means of algorithms. Sequences of 
mental steps and algorithms are the same thing.”). 
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esses, mathematical equations, and computer programs are algorithms 
that have no conceptual difference.51 
 The difference between computer processing and human mental 
processes is thus more quantitative than qualitative. The computer is 
faster, more capacious, and more accurate than the human mind.52  
These improvements allow computers to accomplish tasks that cannot 
be accomplished by humans working alone. Managing and manipulat-
ing scientific experiments, rocket launches, and graphical representa-
tions all require the speed, precision, and tremendous storage capacity 
of computers.53 The 1981 Supreme Court case Diamond v. Diehr provides 
a useful illustration of the value of computer technology.54 The Diehr 
patent claim provided a novel way of curing artificial rubber.55 The ma-
thematical formula for completing this process, called the Arrhenius 
equation, was well known before submission of the Diehr application.56 
Applying the formula in an industrial context was difficult, however, be-
cause it required continual monitoring and adjustments to determine 
the precise time to terminate the curing process.57 Without computer 
aid, humans could not collect process data and perform the required 
constant calculations to determine the optimal time to terminate the 
curing process.58 The Diehr patent claim included a computer that was 
capable of accurately completing the repetitive calculations required by 
the Arrhenius formula and applying adjustments to the industrial proc-
ess.59 
 Mixed processes such as the Diehr method for curing rubber are at 
the crux of the subject-matter problem. EPC law and U.S. commenta-
tors who wish to limit patent subject matter agree that pure mental 
                                                                                                                      
51 See id. at 1123–24 (“[A]n algorithm for representing how a legal problem can be 
solved is just as ‘mathematical’ as an algorithm for addition, for finding the lowest com-
mon divisor for two numbers.”). 
52 Laura R. Ford, Alchemy and Patentability: Technology, “Useful Arts,” and the Chimerical 
Mind-Machine, 42 Cal. W. L. Rev. 49, 53 (2005) (explaining how modern computers are 
able to carry out tasks traditionally performed by human mental processes at a speed and 
level of accuracy that far exceeds human capabilities). 
53 See Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. O’Rourke, A False Start? The Impact of Federal 
Policy on the Genotechnology Industry, 13 Yale J. on Reg. 163, 166–67 (1996) (observing how 
“[t]he Human Genome Project . . . advanc[ed] more rapidly than originally predicted” 
due to “[i]nnovations in computer technology that enhance[d] the speed and precision of 
research and decrease[d] human error”). 
54 450 U.S. 175, 177–78 (1981). 
55 Id. at 177. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. at 178. 
58 See id. at 178–79. 
59 See id. 
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processes and inventions without industrial or technical applications are 
not valid patent subject matter.60 European courts and these commenta-
tors have trouble answering the question of how much more than a 
mental process is needed for an invention to receive a patent.61 In Diehr, 
the Court ruled that an invention that employed a mathematical algo-
rithm was patent subject matter in large part because it was part of an 
industrial process.62 Such industrial processes, while employing software 
and mathematical algorithms, satisfy the Bilski machine or physical 
transformation test because the process as a whole takes industrial raw 
materials as input and produces a finished manufacture as an output.63 
 Computers primarily interact with information when not con-
nected to an industrial process.64 Most computer end-users employ ap-
plication programs, either purchased or custom-made, to perform de-
sired tasks.65 Common computer uses include word processing, data-
base management, statistical and financial analysis, photograph and 
video editing, and game playing. 66  A program that solely applies a 
mathematical formula to data and delivers a result does not qualify as 
statutory subject matter.67 Nevertheless, if the computer running the 
program is connected to a plotter or computer monitor that draws a 
graph of the calculation results, at least one court has held that the 
physical output is enough to render the entire process valid statutory 
bje
                                                                                                                     
su ct matter.68 
 If providing physical manifestations of data analysis is sufficient to 
qualify a process containing a computer program as statutory subject 
matter, however, there are virtually no constraints on software subject-
 
60 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, at 108 (excluding business methods and computer pro-
grams as patentable subject matter); Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligi-
bility, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 855, 860–61 (2007) (arguing that the disfavored mental steps 
doctrine still has merit). 
61 See, e.g., Case T-208/84, Computer-Related Invention/VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. 14, 
14–23 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, July 15, 1986), available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/ 
pubs/oj1987/p001_046.pdf (interpreting the “as such” modifier in EPC Art. 52 in the con-
text of a computer-aided design program whose only contribution over the corresponding 
mental process was speed, and remanding case to Examining Division to consider redrafted 
claims). 
62 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192–93. 
63 See id. 
64 See Stobbs, supra note 42, § 2.02. 
65 See id. § 1.04. 
66 See id. § 2.02. 
67 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72 (noting that granting a patent on such a claim would 
amount to granting a patent on a mathematical formula or pure idea). 
68 See Arrhythmia Research Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1060–61 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
238 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:227 
matter patentability. The nature of computers and software engineer-
ing means that most software can include output capabilities.69 Modern 
programming and computer design employ a modular approach to 
manage the complexity of large programs. 70  Analogous to automo-
biles—which are built with tires, engines, brakes, and other compo-
nents that perform specific discrete tasks—computer application pro-
grams are also built from multiple components that perform discrete 
tasks.71 Software functions may specify how the program handles data 
input-output routines or may provide methods for performing mathe-
matical and statistical operations.72  These functions are offloaded to 
specialized systems that handle input-output and other functions. The 
programmer only needs to know the commands required to evoke the 
subsystems to produce desired results: there is no need to know exactly 
how the specialized subsystems achieve such results.73 The program-
mer’s ability to ignore redundant or highly specialized tasks is facili-
tated by the availability of off-the-shelf and generic function libraries.74 
These libraries can be used to provide capabilities for any program that 
requires the included tasks.75 Programmers only need to understand 
the operation and syntax of library functions.76 In fact, it is possible to 
create a word processor and other common computer applications us-
ing function libraries and just enough programming code to integrate 
the functions into a cohesive whole.77 Most software programs thus run 
on “generic” computers and utilize standard methods for interacting 
with the external world that are available in off-the-shelf libraries, such 
as input-output, printing, and audio-visuals.78 Thus, it seems that pro-
grammers need to focus on solving discrete problems rather than en-
gaging in elaborate software engineering, unless available libraries are 
inefficient or deficient in some significant respect. Therefore, much 
so are innovation is at the abstract information or algorithmic level.ftw
                                                                                                                     
79 
 
69 See Stobbs, supra note 42, § 2.02. 
70 Thomas, supra note 1, at 219. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Klemens, supra note 47, at 41. 
74 Id.; see, e.g., Walter Savitch, Absolute C++ 92 (1st ed. 2002) (“C++ comes with li-
braries of predefined functions that you can use in your programs.”). 
75 See Thomas, supra note 1, at 219. 
76 See id. 
77 Id. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
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 Additionally, software patents suffer from excessive breadth.80 Soft-
ware patent applications do not include source code—the program writ-
ten in a human language—and the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) often approves claims consisting of little more than a 
rudimentary flow chart.81 As a result, software patent holders lay claim 
to broad areas of software practice without well-identified claim bounda-
ries, with virtually no implementation details, and with few clues about 
the quality of claim implementation.82 This practice appears inconsis-
tent with patent law, which requires a claim’s application to provide suf-
ficient detail such that someone of ordinary skill in the relevant art is 
le
ftware source code or detailed outlines of how a 
og
                                                                                                                     
ab  to practice the invention.83  This is the quintessential means by 
which knowledge is disseminated through the patent process.84 
 The relaxation of disclosure requirements for software patent 
claims in the United States, codified in U.S. Code chapter 35, section 
112,85 is due to necessity.86 Ironically, merely providing software source 
code would more fully satisfy the Section 112 disclosure requirements 
than the current practice. Source code consists of human-readable in-
structions that, when translated into a computer-readable format, give 
the computer detailed instructions that set forth the order in which the 
computer executes program steps and functions. 87  Source code is 
equivalent to a detailed blueprint of the program’s construction and 
functions. Including so
pr ram operates would easily satisfy Section 112 enablement and best 
mode requirements.88 
 Nevertheless, the CAFC has ruled that disclosing outcomes—or 
“functions” —without identifying detailed procedures—or “means” —
meets the Section 112 burden for computer software.89 Section 112 dis-
closures, in addition to creating a publicly accessible record of the in-
vention, provide a check over the breadth and scope of claims.90 To 
avoid overly expansive claims, patent law provides protection solely for 
 
ra note 47, at 73. 
ablement and best mode requirements). 
ote 2, at 17–19. 
1543, 1549 (1997). 
06 (b)–(c). 
tion graph Six?: O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 6 J. Intell. Prop. L. 189, 194–95 (1999). 
80 See Klemens, sup
81 See id. at 21–22. 
82 See id.; Cohen & Lemley, supra note 2, at 24–25. 
83 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (setting out the en
84 See Cohen & Lemley, supra n
85 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
86 See Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 
87 See Stobbs, supra note 37, § 2.
88 Thomas, supra note 1, at 234. 
89 See Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1548–49; see also Cohen & Lemley, supra note 2, at 24 n.87. 
90 See Fidel D. Nwamu, Does Your Claim Conform to Means-Plus-Function Format Under Sec-
 112, Para
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the means of achieving identified functions—the “means-plus-function 
test.”91 But requiring software patents to meet the means-plus-function 
criteria limits their efficacy.92 In programming, there are usually many 
different ways to accomplish a desired result.93 Programmers may use 
different routines, approaches, and languages to accomplish the same 
programming task.94 Different programmers will address a given prob-
lem in many—often significantly—different ways reflecting style, em-
phasis, priorities and skills.95 Nonetheless, each of these programs pro-
duces the same result—or function—while employing a distinctly dif-
ferent means. 96  Requiring software claims to satisfy the means-plus-
function test would mean that software patents would only be infringed 
when the source or machine code of the alleged infringing program is 
identical to the patented program.97 The myriad ways to replicate the 
patented program’s function without duplicating code would not be 
infringing. 98  Therefore, limiting software patents with a means-plus-
nc
larities between U.S. and European courts 
struggling with determining the patentability of software patent claims 
is particularly enlightening. 
                                                                                                                     
fu tion test would substantially reduce the value of patents meeting the 
means-plus-function standard. 
 The discussion in this section has identified some of the dilemmas 
software patents create. In particular, allowing limited software patent 
disclosure results in overly broad patent scope, which is anti-
competitive.99 Although excluding computer software from statutory 
subject matter would appear to address these problems, the European 
experience indicates that such a prohibition is extremely difficult to 
implement.100 In the next section, we examine how U.S. courts have 
dealt with software patent claims and why the issue presents such a co-
nundrum. The striking simi
 
91 See id. 
92 See Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1548–49 (discussing how source code is not sufficient to allow a 
software engineer to replicate the code because source code is machine-specific and it is 
more “important . . . to have a description of what the software has to do”). 
93 See Klemens, supra note 47, at 43. 
94 Thomas, supra note 1, at 235. 
95 See Klemens, supra note 47, at 43 (“In view of the astounding number of choices 
available in such an exercise, the two programmers’ solutions could be vastly different.”) 
96 Id. 
97 See Thomas, supra note 1, at 234–35. 
98 See id. at 235–36. 
99 See Klemens, supra note 47, at 73; Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1688–89. 
100 See infra Parts III–IV. 
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II. U.S. Judicial Treatment of Software Patents 
A. The Exclusion of Abstract Ideas From Statutory Subject Matter 
 Whether software and business methods can be classified as statu-
tory subject matter depends on the location of the boundaries of pat-
ent protection. The constitutional authorization for patents envisioned 
boundaries by granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress 
of . . . Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”101 Initial U.S. patent legislation identified statutory subject 
matter, but did not enumerate any subject-matter exclusions.102 The 
courts accepted the responsibility of defining the limits of patent pro-
tection.103 They were cognizant of the dangers of allowing inventors to 
obtain overly expansive coverage of their claims and designed tests to 
curtail the scope of overreaching patent claims.104 In particular, courts 
understood that allowing overly broad statutory subject matter could 
impede industrial innovation.105 These tests precluded patent claims 
for abstract ideas, functions and effects, and mental steps,106 and the 
exclusions lasted well into the twentieth century.107 In 1972, the Su-
preme Court included “laws or principles of nature, mental processes, 
mathematical expressions and formulas, and abstract intellectual con-
cepts” among excluded subject matter because “they are the basic tools 
of scientific and technological work.”108 
 The primary policy objective behind the early judicial approach to 
statutory subject matter was to limit the anti-competitive impact of pat-
ents while maintaining innovation incentives.109 Because granting ex-
clusive rights is anti-competitive, the courts attempted to limit the sub-
ject area of patent coverage to technological-industrial innovations.110 
Exclusive rights and the concomitant competitiveness losses are the 
                                                                                                                      
101 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
102 See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1 (1790) (identifying statutory subject matter as 
“any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not 
before known or used.”). 
103 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195–98 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describ-
ing tests used to identify valid statutory subject matter). 
104 See id. 
105 See LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (noting that excessive patent scope 
would retard innovation and development in a manner contrary to patent policy). 
106 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
107 See id. 
108 Id. 
109 See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text. 
110 See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
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costs that society incurs in return for encouraging innovation in the 
useful arts and furthering rapid dissemination of new knowledge.111 If 
the patent grant is overly expansive, however, the anti-competitive ef-
fects of granting exclusive rights impede innovation without signifi-
cantly increasing the volume of knowledge in the public domain. 
 Early cases illustrate this judicial sensitivity. In 1852, the U.S. Su-
preme Court provided detailed rules and rationales for limited patent 
protection in LeRoy v. Tatham based on patent policy from the United 
States and England.112 The Court, in correcting the trial court’s jury 
instructions in a patent infringement case, enunciated policy principles 
that limited the scope of patent law.113 The trial court had instructed 
the jury that a patent claim for producing lead pipe should be validated 
regardless of whether the machine used was novel because the innova-
tion consisted of “bringing a newly discovered principle into practical 
application.”114 The Court stated as a foundational rule that inventors 
could not patent abstract principles and natural laws.115 To prevent in-
ventors from overreaching with respect to abstract principles and laws 
of nature, the Court stated what has since been termed the means-plus-
function test.116 In essence, an inventor could not obtain a patent on 
the result or effect of a process—in this case, the production of lead 
pipe by exploiting a particular property of lead—but could obtain ex-
clusivity solely on the means by which the process achieved its effect.117 
The Court reasoned that this limitation was needed to keep the abstract 
principle in the public domain.118 Allowing such exclusivity would dis-
courage rather than promote advancement in the useful “arts and 
manufactures.”119 
                                                                                                                      
111 See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 Berkeley Tech. 
L.J. 1009, 1010 (2008) (“The rationale for patenting long favored in judicial opinion is the 
‘quid pro quo’ theory: that patents are a bargain of sorts, between the inventor and the pub-
lic, exchanging public disclosure of the claimed invention in return for the grant of a pe-
riod of exclusive rights.”). 
112 See Leroy, 55 U.S. at 175–76. 
113 See id. 
114 Id. 
115 See id. at 174–75. 
116 See id. at 175; see also Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1853) (“[I]t is well settled 
that a man cannot have a patent for the function or abstract effect of a machine, but only 
for the machine which produces it.”). 
117 LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 175–76. 
118 Id. at 175. 
119 Id. 
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 The ruling in LeRoy was not unanimous.120 In a strong dissent, 
three justices argued that inventors who discover a way to exploit a nat-
ural law for a particular purpose should be entitled to exclusivity over 
all uses of the natural law to achieve the useful outcome.121 The dissent 
argued that the true innovation was in recognizing the application of 
the natural principle for a useful purpose, and thus, limiting exclusivity 
to the method or mode was contrary to patent policy.122 The implicit 
assumption in the dissent was that inventors should be rewarded for 
their ingenuity. The majority opinion’s limitation of exclusivity pro-
vided inadequate incentives or rewards.123 The dissenting opinion also 
dismissed the majority’s concern about social welfare losses, arguing 
that exclusivity would be limited both in scope and term.124 Inventors 
would be free to use the abstract principle for any other function, and 
inventors could use the principle for any function at the conclusion of 
the patent term.125 Thus, according to the dissenting opinion, welfare 
losses would not be significant. 
 Despite the LeRoy dissent’s argument for broader patent scope, 
subsequent courts adopted the more restrictive subject-matter re-
quirements of the LeRoy majority. The 1853 Supreme Court case 
O’Reilly v. Morse exemplified this trend.126 The Court in O’Reilly was par-
ticularly concerned with the over-expansive nature of claims based on 
abstract ideas.127 Henry O’Reilly challenged the validity of patents held 
by Samuel Morse on the invention and improvement of telegraph 
technology.128 The specific patent in question contained eight claims, 
the eighth of which was the subject of the controversy. 129  Morse 
claimed as follows: 
                                                                                                                     
Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific ma-
chinery, or parts of machinery, described in the foregoing 
specifications and claims; the essence of my invention being 
the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic cur-
rent, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed, for 
 
120 See id. at 177. 
121 Id. at 187. 
122Id. 
123 See LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 187. 
124 See id. 
125 Id. 
126 See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 passim (1853). 
127 See id. at 135. 
128 See id. at 63–65. 
129 See id. at 85–86. 
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making or printing intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at 
any distances, being a new application of that power, of which 
I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.130 
The Court invalidated the claim due to its excessive breadth.131 The 
Court reasoned that validating the claim would mean that “it matters 
not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished.”132 Morse 
would nonetheless have the exclusive right to that new invention or 
improvement. The Court, identifying social welfare-reducing implica-
tions of granting Morse exclusivity, stated that a competitor’s improved 
“invention may be less complicated—less liable to get out of order—
less expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is cov-
ered by this patent the inventor could not use it nor the public have the 
benefit of it without [Morse’s permission].”133 Therefore, if the Court 
had granted Morse such broad exclusive rights, other inventors would 
have no incentive to conduct research in this area because the Morse 
patent would prevent the inventor from exploiting and profiting from 
the broad invention without Morse’s permission.134 Thus, unless Morse 
had the capability and willingness to duplicate the efforts of such inven-
tors, there would likely be less innovation in the field of the Morse pat-
ent for the duration of the patent term, leaving society worse off.135 
 Additional social welfare losses result from broad patent scope. As 
the O’Reilly Court noted, not only would it have a chilling effect on 
competing inventors, but a patent grant for Morse’s eighth claim would 
reduce the flow of knowledge into the public domain.136 Morse would 
be free to improve and advance the subject matter of the patent with-
out revealing such advancements to society. He would “need place no 
description of the new manner, process, or machinery, upon the re-
cords of the patent office.”137 Moreover, at the end of the patent term, 
“the public must apply to [Morse] to learn what it is.”138 Therefore, 
validating the expansive eighth claim could provide Morse with both 
patent protection during the patent term and trade secret protection at 
patent expiration. This result, while benefiting Morse greatly, would 
                                                                                                                      
130 Id. at 86. 
131 Id. at 113. 
132 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 Id. 
138 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113. 
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leave society with no gain from incurring the costs of granting Morse 
exclusivity in this industrial area.139 
 In 1876, the Supreme Court revisited the question of identifying 
the boundaries of patentable subject matter in Cochrane v. Deener.140  
Cochrane remains relevant because of its characterization of patent 
processes. In the case, claimant Cochrane had multiple patents on a 
process and machinery to produce refined flour.141 His process patent 
claim covered the entire process of grinding and filtering flour with the 
use of air current to remove impurities.142 Similar to Morse’s broad 
process claim,143 Cochrane did not limit his claim to any particular ma-
chine. He claimed priority for any process employing the collective 
elements of his claim to refine flour.144  The defendant had an im-
proved method of refining flour that used a different type of machin-
ery to effectuate the same function.145 The defendant believed that this 
difference was sufficient to avoid infringement.146 Unlike O’Reilly, how-
ever, the Court did not conclude that Cochrane’s claim was overly 
broad.147  In ruling that the defendant’s method was infringing, the 
Court concluded that any alternative process that duplicated the steps 
of the patented process would infringe that patent regardless of wheth-
er the steps were accomplished in a different manner.148 The particular 
method used to accomplish the function was irrelevant.149 This conclu-
sion encouraged broad patent claims in its aftermath. Nevertheless, if a 
claim was too broadly drawn, the O’Reilly ruling would disqualify the 
claim from statutory subject matter.150 
 The Cochrane Court addressed the patent scope concern by provid-
ing a narrow definition of patent processes. The Court reasoned as fol-
lows: “[A] process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to pro-
duce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the 
subject matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or 
thing.”151 Under this reasoning, a claim would describe a patent quali-
                                                                                                                      
139 See id. 
140 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 786–88 (1876). 
141 Id. at 781–85. 
142 Id. at 785. 
143 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 85–86. 
144 Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 784–86. 
145 Id. at 785–86. 
146 Id. at 786. 
147 See id. at 787–88. 
148 Id. at 788. 
149 See id. 
150 See O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113. 
151 Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788. 
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fying process so long as the claim was sufficiently detailed to describe a 
series of steps or actions taken to physically transform a material object 
to a different state or thing.152  Abstract ideas and mental processes 
would not satisfy this test, nor would computer programs that were not 
part of some larger process.153 Thus, the Cochrane physical transforma-
tion test provided a safe harbor for claims that might be subject to chal-
lenge for being abstract or overly broad. 
 For some time, the Cochrane process definition limited the scope of 
process patent claims.154 Interestingly, at least one recent commentator 
has dismissed this interpretation of Cochrane as relying on incorrect dic-
ta.155 The basis for such criticism, however, appears to stem solely from 
the fact that contemporary federal court decisions have rejected the 
Cochrane physical transformation test.156 An alternative view is that the 
courts have adopted a policy mandate to limit the scope of statutory 
subject matter due to the anti-competitive nature of patents.157 Thus, 
limiting statutory subject matter to the types of inventions Congress 
conceived of when enacting the first patent act would be consistent 
both with this policy objective and congressional intent.158 The physical 
transformation test furthers this objective by limiting patent protection 
to industrial and manufacturing innovations.159 Whereas the test is flex-
ible enough to accommodate new types of innovations within estab-
lished categories, it does not allow protection for innovation in differ-
ent or new categories of innovation such as business methods or com-
puter software. Arguably, expansion of patent protection to new 
categories of innovation is in the sole domain of Congress.160 Thus, lim-
iting the spread of patent protection is more emblematic of judicial 
                                                                                                                      
152 See id. 
153 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–93 (ruling that a process patent that contained a ma-
thematical algorithm as its sole novel element was valid subject matter because it was part 
of an industrial process for creating artificial rubber molds). 
154 See Samuelson, supra note 47, at 1037–38; Katharine P. Ambrose, Comment, The 
Mental Steps Doctrine, 48 Tenn. L. Rev. 903, 907–08 (1981). 
155 See Ambrose, supra note 154, at 907–08 (“[C]ourts interpreted dicta in the land-
mark case of Cochrane v. Deener to mean that patentable processes must operate on physical 
substances, and the courts therefore denied patents to methods requiring only the use of 
the human mind and writing implements.”) (citations omitted). 
156 See id. 
157 See Thomas & DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 6. 
158 See id. at 6–9. 
159 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–93; Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787–89; see also Thomas, supra note 
1, at 193–97. 
160 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. But see Thomas, supra note 1, at 194. 
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restraint than allowing the unfettered expansion of statutory subject 
matter that has occurred in recent decades. 
 The judicial policy of constraining statutory subject matter contin-
ued in the twentieth century. Until recent decades, patent claims that 
consisted of steps that take place in the human mind or require human 
intervention were excluded from statutory subject matter.161 “Mental 
steps jurisprudence,” which developed in a series of cases over several 
decades, construed valid subject matter as excluding claims that require 
human calculation, measurement, and interpretation.162 In 1951, the 
Court of Appeals in In re Abrams delineated the rules for applying the 
mental steps doctrine.163 The case identifies three possibilities: first, all 
steps of a process claim are mental; second, the claim consists of both 
mental and non-mental steps but the novelty lies entirely in the mental 
steps; and third, a mixed claim for which the novelty resides in non-
mental steps and the mental steps are incidental parts of the process but 
are needed to limit or define the claim.164 Under the doctrine, only 
claims that fall in the third category qualify as statutory subject matter.165 
B. The United States Supreme Court’s Cautionary Approach to Software Patents 
 The U.S. Congress has assiduously avoided addressing whether 
computer software is patentable, thereby leaving the judicial system to 
shape policy.166 With the rapid development of computer technology, 
the Supreme Court first considered the subject-matter question in 1972 
in Gottschalk v. Benson.167 The claim considered was for a “method for 
converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary 
numerals.”168 This sweeping method was not tied to any particular ma-
chine or programming language. In fact, the claim method could be 
performed mentally or on paper without a computer. 169 As a result, it 
was easy for the Supreme Court to dispose of the claim because it was 
                                                                                                                      
161 See Ambrose, supra note 154, at 903; Cotter, supra note 60, at 860–61; Samuelson, 
supra note 47, at 1037. 
162 See Samuelson, supra note 47, at 1034. 
163 See 188 F.2d 165, 166 (C.C.P.A. 1951). 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
166 See Benson, 409 U.S. at 73 (noting that “considerable problems are raised which only 
committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers of investigation are needed, includ-
ing hearings which canvass the wide variety of views which those operating in this field 
entertain.”). 
167 Id. at 64. 
168 Id. 
169 See id. at 66–67. 
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“so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of 
the BCD to pure binary conversion.”170 
 Although disposal of the BCD claim was straightforward, the Court 
was concerned about whether its opinion would be interpreted as 
standing for the proposition that computer software could never be 
patented. The Court stated that “[w]e do not hold that no process pat-
ent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior 
precedents,” and “[we do not hold] that the [Benson] decision pre-
cludes a patent for any program servicing a computer.”171 Nevertheless, 
the Court, observing that “pure” software patent claims had previously 
been denied, noted that there existed considerable practical confusion 
in dealing with some software patent claims camouflaged as “a process, 
or a machine or components thereof . . . rather than as a program it-
self.”172 In other words, whether or not Congress chose to extend statu-
tory subject matter to cover pure software programs, congressional ac-
tion was still required to give the USPTO and courts guidance on how 
to handle hybrid claims.173 
 The Court was clearly uncomfortable with accepting the reins of 
policy makers. Rather than give the public guidance as to how to treat 
patent claims, the Benson Court issued an impassioned plea for Con-
gress to accept its responsibilities to develop patent policy in the legisla-
tive forum.174 Thus, while identifying its machine or physical transfor-
mation test as the relevant precedent,175 Benson emphatically refused to 
assert that the test applies to all software patent claims.176 The Court 
intentionally left the decision ambiguous in the hopes of eventual con-
gressional intervention. 
 With the failure of Congress to accept the Court’s invitation to 
take action, the Supreme Court issued its second ruling on software 
patentability. In 1977, in Parker v. Flook,177 the Court considered a proc-
ess claim that calculated an alarm limit. In certain industrial applica-
tions, operators—whether human or machines—need to receive notifi-
                                                                                                                      
170 Id. at 68. 
171 Id. at 71. 
172 Benson, 409 U.S. at 72. 
173 See id. at 73. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. at 70 (“Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or 
thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular 
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cation when certain process variables reach or exceed a designated 
threshold—the alarm limit—in order to make adjustments to maintain 
efficiency or to avoid dangerous conditions. 178  The Flook claim, al-
though machine independent, provided a method for continually ad-
justing the alarm rate based on changes in process variables.179 The 
only novel element of the process was the use of an algorithm for calcu-
lating alarm rates.180 
                                                                                                                     
 In rejecting the patentability of the Flook claim, the Court did not 
directly consider whether computer software per se is patentable. The 
Court, acknowledging in a footnote that one could argue that Supreme 
Court precedent requires processes to change materials to a “different 
state or thing,” refused to apply those precedents to the Flook claim.181 
Moreover, the Court left open the question of whether it considered 
software as part of the category of unpatentable algorithms. Instead, the 
Court’s new test basically required examiners to remove the algorithm 
from consideration before evaluating the patentability of the claim.182 
Under this test, courts and examiners must first consider the algorithm 
“well known” in the prior art to avoid biasing the overall evaluation of 
the claim.183 Then, subject to this constraint, the reviewer must deter-
mine whether the process claim as a whole is new and useful.184 
 The respondent argued that this treatment conflated the Section 
102 and 103 novelty and usefulness requirements with the Section 101 
subject-matter determination.185 The Court deflected this claim by ob-
serving that certain discoveries such as laws of nature are outside what 
Congress intended to protect.186 Therefore, courts must refuse to allow 
patentability to be determined solely by non-patentable subject mat-
ter.187 Whereas inclusion of a law of nature or algorithm does not by 
itself disqualify a claim from patent protection, neither can it be the 
sole factor that is new and non-obvious. 
 In Flook the Supreme Court attempted to create limits for software-
based creations without violating its self-imposed constraint of not rul-
 
178 See id. 
179 See id. at 585–86. 
180 See id. 
181 See id. at 588 n.9, 594. 
182 See id. at 591–92. 
183 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 591–92. 
184 See id. at 591. 
185 See id. at 592. 
186 See id. at 593. 
187 See id. 
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ing on the patentability of computer software.188 The Court’s ruling, 
that any software that could be classified as an algorithm could not pro-
vide the claim element that met patentability requirements, provided a 
bulwark against clever claim drafters getting patents that would be re-
jected if framed differently.189  Nevertheless, this approach increased 
rather than reduced ambiguity. Without defining “algorithm,” it was 
unclear whether the term encompassed all computer programs or just 
a subset.190 Nonetheless, Flook was successful in putting limits, albeit for 
a short time, on the scope of patentable process claims.191 
 The Supreme Court quickly rejected the Flook constraints in 1981 
in Diamond v. Diehr.192 The Diehr process claim consisted of “a process 
for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision prod-
ucts.”193 The contribution of this claim was the ability to measure the 
temperature of the rubber inside the press continually, and to recalcu-
late the Arrhenius equation based on this data in order to determine 
the precise time to complete the curing process.194 Applying the Flook 
test to this claim required evaluating the artificial rubber-curing process 
under the assumption that the non-patentable Arrhenius equation was 
well known in the art.195 Employing this approach in his dissenting opi-
nion, Justice Stevens concluded that the claim contained no innovation 
other than the continual monitoring of the process, and was thus not 
statutory subject matter.196 
 The majority of the Supreme Court rejected this analysis based, 
ironically, on an application of the machine-or-physical-transformation 
test.197 The Court reconciled Benson and Flook by characterizing those 
claims as attempts to obtain patents on mathematical formulae.198 It 
distinguished the Diehr claim as a more efficient method for curing 
rubber, an industrial process of the type that patents were designed to 
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protect.199 Critical to the Court’s analysis was that this process, consid-
ered in its entirety, transformed the state of a substance.200 The Court 
refused to use physical transformation as a necessary condition for pat-
entability, but did recognize it as a sufficient condition to satisfy the 
subject-matter requirement.201 
 Most significantly, the Court rejected the Flook approach of not 
allowing patents for which a non-patentable algorithm was the sole 
source of innovation.202 This reversal made it significantly easier for 
patent lawyers to draft valid patent claims that were faster or more effi-
cient than—but the same in all other respects as—existing technol-
ogy.203 In a passionate dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Blackmun, castigated the majority opinion for in-
creasing uncertainty and ambiguity in the treatment of patent claims 
containing computer programs and mathematical algorithms. 204  Of 
even greater importance, however, was the Diehr dissent’s argument 
that the majority opinion eviscerated the holdings in Benson and Flook 
as well as “the settled line of authority reviewed in those opinions.”205 
Whereas the Supreme Court in Benson and Flook attempted to provide 
some limits to the patentability of software, the dissenting justices in 
Diehr argued that the majority’s approach essentially opened the flood-
gates to software patents. 
 Specifically, the dissenting justices saw little substantive difference 
between the alarm-limits patent claim invalidated in Flook and the rub-
ber-curing patent in Diehr.206 None of the process steps or components 
were unusual except the application of the Arrhenius algorithm to 
temperature readings in order to choose an optimal time to end the 
curing process.207 The novelty in this process consisted solely of “updat-
ing the original estimated curing time by repetitively recalculating that 
time pursuant to a well-known mathematical formula in response to 
variations in temperature within the mold.”208 The only noticeable dif-
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ference between this process and the alarms limit process in Flook is 
that the Diehr process automatically opened the rubber mold once des-
ignated conditions were made, whereas the alarms limit process claim 
did not include automatically setting off an alarm.209 
 It is hard to reconcile the different results in Flook and Diehr given 
the strong similarity between the two cases. Flook stood for the proposi-
tion that adding insignificant post-solution activity was insufficient to 
make a mathematical algorithm patentable.210 Yet it is difficult to ra-
tionalize Diehr’s implicit conclusion that signaling the opening of a 
rubber mold after obtaining the solution of a mathematic algorithm 
does constitute a significant post-solution action.211 The use of the Ar-
rhenius algorithm in an unequivocal industrial process clearly influ-
enced the Diehr Court.212 But perhaps the similar post-solution action 
of generating a signal in both cases makes the industrial application a 
distinction without substance.213 With the Diehr Court’s “entire process” 
approach it appeared easier to get patent approval for an algorithm 
embedded in a useful process.214 The most significant constraint was 
that the claim could not encompass all uses of the algorithm.215 Never-
theless, if a particular industry, such as rubber manufacturing, relies on 
a particular algorithm, this constraint does not prevent an inventor 
from preempting the automatic or computerized use of the equation as 
happened in Diehr. 216  Thus, the Diehr decision opened the door to 
broad patent claims that relied on algorithms. 
 The final, oft-cited Supreme Court patent subject matter case of the 
twentieth century had nothing to do with computer algorithms or proc-
ess claims. Nevertheless, the 1980 Supreme Court case Diamond v. Chak-
rabarty217 is sometimes misquoted as standing for the proposition that 
U.S. patent law holds no boundaries for human inventiveness.218 The 
defendant, Chakrabarty, invented a micro-organism that consumed 
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crude oil, a trait that presumably would be useful in oil spill cleanups.219 
The issue was whether or not a micro-organism was disqualified from 
statutory subject matter because it is a life form; or, alternatively, wheth-
er it qualified as statutory subject matter as either a manufacture or as a 
composition of matter.220 The Supreme Court reasoned that the micro-
organism, although a life form, was not a product of nature but rather a 
creation of man, and as such, was statutory subject matter.221 The Su-
preme Court cited Committee Reports published in connection with 
the adoption of the 1952 Patent Act, which indicated that Congress in-
tended statutory subject matter to “include anything under the sun that 
is made by man.”222 
 Although the language is sweeping, the context of the Court’s 
quote makes it clear that the Court did not intend to apply the language 
to computer software. The Chakrabarty Court clearly stated that statutory 
subject-matter scope is not unlimited.223 Citing their Flook decision, the 
Court reiterated that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas are excluded from statutory subject matter.224 It is quite telling 
that the Court cited Flook as the most recent authority for these limita-
tions.225 There is no contradiction between the two cases. Both cases 
purported to deal with new, unforeseen categories of creation: com-
puter programs in Flook226 and man-made organisms in Chakrabarty.227 
Although specific details may have been unforeseen, existing categories 
covered each of these claims. The Court classified the Flook computer 
program as a mathematical algorithm—an abstract idea 228—and the 
Charkrabarty micro-organism was either a manufacture or composition 
of matter. 229  Thus, the claims’ classifications—either a process or a 
manufacture or composition of matter—dictated the respective claims’ 
treatments. A manufacture or composition of matter claim is clearly 
valid patent subject matter even if the invention had never been antici-
pated. 230  Process claims, however, were subject to the more limited 
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treatment described in the Supreme Court’s Benson-Flook-Diehr line of 
cases. 
C. Federal Court Treatment of Computer Software 
 Federal courts’ expansive treatment of computer and software pat-
ents in the computer age contrasts strikingly with the Supreme Court’s 
cautionary approach.231 Prior to the 1960s, the U.S. judiciary was con-
sistent in limiting the scope of statutory subject matter.232 Nonetheless, 
the United States Court of Patent Appeals (CCPA) and its successor, the 
CAFC, delivered a series of decisions that rapidly removed the set of 
limitations that various courts adopted and followed during the nine-
teenth century and most of the twentieth century.233 The change can 
be attributed to a different interpretation of the policy basis behind the 
Patent Act. With respect to software, courts had interpreted Section 101 
narrowly prior to the 1960s.234 Courts interpreted “useful arts” to in-
clude processes that were “technological” in nature.235 Federal courts 
did not question prohibitions against abstract ideas and laws of nature 
because the potential for such patents to deter progress was clear.236 By 
contrast, the policy bases for other statutory subject-matter exclusions, 
such as the mental steps exclusion, were rather opaque. 237  Conse-
quently, starting in the 1960s, federal courts—perhaps adopting a more 
expansive view of statutory subject matter, or perhaps demanding 
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greater rigor in shaping decisions—reviewed such exclusions critically 
and rejected them for lacking legislative support. 
 One of the first rules to fall under this enhanced level of scrutiny 
was the mental steps exclusion. In 1968, in In re Prater, the CCPA con-
sidered a claim rejection based on In re Abrams’ “three rules” for deal-
ing with mental steps.238 The court noted that the defense attorney’s 
brief proposed the three rules and that the Abrams court had never 
adopted the three rules for testing claims containing mental steps.239 
The court continued by dismissing the Cochrane physical transformation 
test as dicta.240 This decision and the CCPA’s reaffirmation of its rea-
soning in its rehearing of In re Prater, put into question the continued 
viability of the mental steps exclusion. 
                                                                                                                     
 In 1970, in In re Musgrave, the CCPA answered this question by re-
jecting the mental steps doctrine and its point of novelty approach.241 
The CCPA reiterated its rejection of the Abrams mental steps rules.242 
The CCPA continued by specifically rejecting the “point of novelty” 
analysis incorporated in the Abrams rule as “logically unsound.”243 This 
rejection was particularly noteworthy because the Supreme Court in 
Flook had recently employed a point of novelty analysis in rejecting a 
patent claim containing an algorithm.244 In addition, the CCPA explic-
itly rejected mental steps as a statutory subject-matter exclusion.245 The 
CCPA reasoned that a claim that required subjective judgment would 
likely be rejected under other Patent Law provisions but would not be 
excluded from statutory subject-matter treatment.246 
 In dealing with claims that included algorithms, similar to those 
that the Supreme Court reviewed in Flook and Diehr, 247  the federal 
courts found substantial leeway in shaping the law. In 1992, in Arrhyth-
mia Research Technology v. Corazonix Corp.,248 the CAFC—the CCPA’s suc-
cessor court—faced the task of determining the validity of a mixed pat-
ent claim that was remarkably similar to the mixed claims in Flook249 
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and Diehr.250 The patent claim at issue in Arrhythmia Research dealt with a 
medical problem related to heart attack victims, who are at high risk of 
suffering from ventricular tachycardia, a condition which can lead to a 
large diminution in the flow of blood from the heart. 251  Although 
drugs are effective in treating the condition, these drugs have serious 
side effects and optimally should be taken only when absolutely 
needed.252 Based on well-known relationships between patients’ elec-
trocardiographic signals and heart conditions, treating physicians could 
identify patients who were at particularly high risk for ventricular tachy-
cardia. Specifically, patients with certain anomalous wave characteristics 
in the ventricular contraction cycle—referred to as “late potentials” —
were at high risk.253 The Stinson patent claim’s innovation was its ability 
to filter and isolate late potentials present in electrocardiograph read-
ings and set off an alarm if the late potentials exceeded a specified 
threshold.254 In summary, the invention consisted of reading electro-
cardiograph signals, converting the reading to a data format readable 
by a generic computer, and analyzing the data using mathematical al-
gorithms for the presence of late potentials by comparing the value of 
analyzed data to a predetermined level.255 
 The Arrhythmia Research process claim was analogous to the alarms-
rate process claim in Flook and the rubber-curing process claim in Diehr. 
In all three cases, the point of novelty resided entirely in the data-
processing component of the claim.256 The electrocardiograph read-
ings that indicate the presence of late potentials were well known, as 
were the threshold levels that warranted initiation of patient treat-
ment.257 The novelty in the Stinson patent claim, then, was processing a 
noisy digital signal to produce a reading that provided a more accurate 
measure of the level of late potentials.258 Analogous to the Flook alarms-
limit claim,259 the Stinson claim accepted input data, evaluated it using 
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mathematical algorithms and provided a reading of the target vari-
able.260 Unlike the rubber-curing claim in Diehr, the Stinson process was 
not part of a traditional industrial process that produced a physical end 
product.261 Thus, there was no significant difference between the Stin-
son process and algorithm-based process claims in Benson and Flook that 
the Supreme Court held were not statutory subject matter.262 
 Nonetheless, the CAFC held that the Stinson claim constituted 
statutory subject matter.263 In applying the physical transformation test, 
the CAFC erroneously concluded that the Stinson process transformed 
matter from one state to another.264 In referring to the electrocardio-
graph signals that provided input data for the analysis, the CAFC mis-
takenly asserted that such signals were not abstractions, but were “re-
lated to the patient’s heart function.”265 But such signals are absolutely 
abstractions. Although related to the patient’s heart function, these sig-
nals are simply a measure of that function, just as a digital thermometer 
measures temperature. Once translated into digital form, the electro-
cardiograph signal is much more akin to financial data in a spreadsheet 
than it is to the function of a patient’s heart. Just as the information in 
a spreadsheet provides an abstraction of financial information, the 
electrocardiograph signal provides an abstract representation of the 
patient’s heart function.266 The CAFC also concluded that manipula-
tion of electrical signals satisfied the physical transformation test. 267  
Thus, according to the CAFC, the act of converting readings from a 
measuring device into a form that a generic digital computer could 
recognize also satisfies the physical transformation test.268 
 Judge Rader’s concurrence in Arrhythmia Research provided a 
somewhat prescient insight into the direction that the CAFC was head-
ed. Rather than accept the tortured attempts of the Arrhythmia Research 
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majority to stretch the physical transformation test to cover the Stinson 
process, Judge Rader advocated dropping all subject-matter tests that 
had no statutory basis in Section 101 of the Patent Act.269 Judge Rader 
noted that most of the tests relied on “vague and malleable terms” such 
as “law of nature,” “natural phenomena,” “formulae,” or “algorithm.”270 
He noted that “[w]hen attempting to enforce a legal standard embod-
ied in broad, vague, non statutory terms, the courts have floun-
dered.”271 Judge Rader noted the specific difficulty courts had in inter-
preting and applying the prohibition against patenting mathematical 
algorithms.272 He identified two 1982 CCPA cases that had dramatically 
different interpretations of that term.273 In In re Pardo, the CCPA nar-
rowly defined mathematical algorithm, 274 whereas in In re Meyer,275 the 
CCPA broadly defined mathematical algorithm, “to include any mental 
process that can be represented by a mathematical algorithm.”276 In 
any event, Judge Rader argued that Diehr had already jettisoned the ma-
thematical algorithm exclusion, leaving laws of nature, natural phe-
nomenon, and abstract ideas as the only non-statutory subject-matter 
exclusions.277 Therefore, courts should look to the plain meaning of 
Section 101 to determine valid statutory subject matter.278 The CAFC 
soon followed Judge Rader’s exhortation.279 
 In In re Alappat, the CAFC began moving towards the complete eli-
mination of statutory subject-matter tests by jettisoning the Supreme 
Court’s physical-transformation test.280  The In re Alappat claim was a 
computer program that could run on any conventional digital com-
puter, known as a rasterizer. A waveform data sequence provided the 
input, which the rasterizer processed and filtered to produce output 
data that was amenable to display on a cathode ray tube.281 Consistent 
with Judge Rader’s concurrence in Arrhythmia Research, the CAFC reiter-
ated that Diehr recognized laws of nature, natural phenomena, and ab-
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stract ideas as the only exclusions from statutory subject matter.282 The 
CAFC then concluded that a claim that includes software is non-
statutory only to the extent that the claim as a whole “represent[s] noth-
ing more than abstract ideas.”283 Thus, unless a claim was unequivocally 
a mathematical algorithm, it qualified as statutory subject matter.284 To 
satisfy this standard for statutory subject matter, the inventor need only 
show that the claim produced “a useful, concrete, and tangible re-
sult.”285 The rasterizer in In re Alappat clearly satisfied this standard.286 
 In re Alappat’s “useful, concrete and tangible” test removed all re-
maining ambiguity as to whether claims must satisfy the Cochrane physi-
cal transformation test to be considered statutory subject matter.287 Al-
though the BCD claim in Benson would likely fail the useful, concrete 
and tangible test, the alarm-limits claim in Flook might satisfy the test 
based on In re Alappat’s broad definition of “concrete and tangible.”288 
In addition, In re Alappat made it easier for clever claims drafters to 
frame software programs employed in conventional digital computers 
as machines.289 Drafting a claim as a machine rather than a process 
makes satisfying the concrete and tangible requirement trivial. 
 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. and State Street Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. removed all remaining Section 
101 impediments to software patents.290 The State Street Bank claim was 
a computerized accounting system used to allocate returns for mutual 
fund shareholders.291 The AT&T patent identified a method for re-
cording certain information about long-distance telephone callers that 
was useful for billing purposes.292 These cases went a step beyond Alap-
pat in that the subject patent claims consisted entirely of business appli-
cations.293 Prior to State Street Bank, it was generally accepted that meth-
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ods for conducting business were not valid subject matter for patents: 
this exclusion was known as the business method exception. State Street 
Bank rejected the business method exception, reasoning that reliance 
on Section 101 and patent law in general are sufficient to evaluate such 
claims.294 Instead, State Street Bank employed In re Alappat’s useful, con-
crete and tangible result test to evaluate the mutual fund accounting 
method as constituting statutory subject matter.295 
 AT&T explicitly extinguished Diehr’s physical-transformation test. 
Excel Corporation based its defense to AT&T’s infringement claim on 
the patent’s failure to effect a physical transformation.296 Ignoring the 
physical transformation discussion in Diehr, 297  the CAFC instead fo-
cused on the use of the term “e.g.” in Diehr to infer that physical trans-
formation was only one of multiple ways software could satisfy Section 
101 statutory subject-matter requirements. 298  The court then pro-
claimed that the useful, concrete and tangible result test had sup-
planted the physical-transformation test, stating “[w]hatever may be left 
of the earlier test, if anything, this type of physical limitations analysis 
seems of little value.”299 Thus, software and business methods no longer 
receive special statutory subject-matter scrutiny. Any software claim 
drafted in terms of a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter may overcome the Section 101 hurdle.300 
 Support for the CAFC’s expansion of statutory subject matter was 
not universal.301 Whereas Congress and the Supreme Court stayed on 
the sidelines, the United States Board of Patent Appeals (BPA) at-
tempted to reign in patent coverage of business method patents. In 
2001 in Ex parte Bowman, the BPA considered an invention that claimed 
a “method of evaluating an intangible asset of interest.”302 A represen-
tative claim consisted of choosing relevant variables, plotting the vari-
ables on a two-dimensional chart and then using the chart to ascertain 
                                                                                                                      
294 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375–76. 
295 Id. 
296 AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1358. 
297 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182–84. 
298 AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1358–59. 
299 Id. at 1359. 
300 Id. at 1359–61. 
301 See Kevin M. Baird, Business Method Patents: Chaos at the USPTO or Business as Usual?, 
2001 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 347, 358 (discussing the “Business Method Patent Im-
provement Act of 2000,” a congressional bill proposing changes to current patent prosecu-
tion procedures when dealing with business method patents); Thomas & DiMatteo, supra 
note 1, at 8–9 (2007) (describing failed efforts by legislators to limit the patentability of 
business method and software patents). 
302 Ex parte Bowman, No. 1999-0583, 2001 WL 1646047, at *1 (B.P.A.I. June 12, 2001). 
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the value of the asset.303 Although it might appear that such an inven-
tion would be subject to a Section 112 challenge for being vague, the 
BPA ruled that the Bowman claims met the Section 112 disclosure re-
quirement.304 Instead, the BPA rejected the Bowman claims because 
the invention was not tied to any technological art and therefore “is 
nothing more than an abstract idea.”305 The BPA opined that the term 
“technological arts” was synonymous with the term “useful arts” that 
appears in the Patent Clause of the Constitution.306 
                                                                                                                     
  The technological arts requirement did not last. In 2005, in Ex 
parte Lundgren, the BPA, in determining whether “a method of com-
pensating a manager” is statutory subject matter, considered applying 
two tests: the technological arts test and the “useful, concrete and tan-
gible” test.307 The BPA rejected the technological arts requirement, not-
ing that Ex parte Bowman lacked precedential value, and the Board 
found no valid support for the requirement.308  The BPA then con-
cluded that the invention was statutory subject matter because it satis-
fied the three requirements of the useful, concrete, and practical 
test.309 
 Two BPA judges disagreed with this decision. Judge Smith inter-
preted the constitutional mandate for patents as restricted to inven-
tions associated with science or technology.310  Although he did not 
champion the technological arts test, Judge Smith noted that this test at 
least required an invention to be tied to a computer.311  He further 
noted that the method for compensating managers was a method that 
could have been executed at the time of the drafting of the Constitu-
tion.312 Judge Smith could not imagine that the drafters would have 
considered such an invention to be within the bounds of what they 
considered to be statutory subject matter.313 Judge Barrett, in agreeing 
with the majority that the technological arts test lacked validity, never-
theless disagreed that the Lundgren invention was statutory subject mat-
 
303 Id. 
304 Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (requiring patent claims to be sufficiently detailed in 
order to enable someone skilled in the art to replicate the invention). 
305 Ex parte Bowman, 2001 WL 1646047at *3. 
306 See id. 
307 Ex parte Lundgren, No. 2003–2088, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1386 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 28, 
2005). 
308 Id. at 1387. 
309 Id. at 1386. 
310 Id. at 1388 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
311 Id. 
312 Id. 
313 Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1388 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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ter.314 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Barrett embraced the previ-
ously discarded physical transformation test.315 In essence, Judge Bar-
rett agreed with Judge Smith that a disemboweled invention that could 
be executed separately and independently of any machine was not sta-
tutory subject matter.316 Thus, the two judges would not validate any 
business method patent claim that was not computer implemented. 
The judges’ position corresponds to the European approach under the 
EPC. In the parlance of the EPO, a business method not implemented 
on a computer would be a business method “as such,” and thus fail the 
technicality requirement of Article 52.317 
D. The Bilski Case 
 In 2008 the CAFC took up the statutory subject-matter question 
once again in In re Bilski.318 The CAFC’s Bilski decision was likely influ-
enced by dicta in two 2006 Supreme Court decisions that expressed 
doubts about whether CAFC rulings with respect to business method 
patents were correct. In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., Justices Ken-
nedy, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer voiced concern about granting per-
manent injunctive relief in business-method-patent infringement cases.319 
Their rationale was that such patents are potentially vague and of “sus-
pect validity.”320 In LabCorp v. Metabolite Laboratories, three justices ques-
tioned the validity of the State Street Bank holding.321 In a dissenting 
opinion, Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Souter flatly rejected the CAFC’s 
useful, concrete, and practical test because “[i]f taken literally, the 
statement would cover instances where this Court has held to the con-
trary.”322 Thus, the CAFC appeared to have a mandate to curtail patent 
coverage of business method patents. 
 The CAFC accepted this mandate in In re Bilski.323 The Bilski inven-
tion covered a method of hedging risk in commodity trading.324 Like 
                                                                                                                      
314 Id. at 1389 (Barrett, J., dissenting). 
315 Id. 
316 Id. 
317 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52. 
318 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 
S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
319 eBay Inc v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
320 Id. 
321 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs. Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
322 Id. 
323 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961. 
324 Id. at 949. 
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the Bowman325 and Lundgren326 claims, the Bilski invention did not re-
quire a computer for execution. It “merely manipulates [an] abstract 
idea and solves a purely mathematical problem.”327 The CAFC identi-
fied its task in examining claims that included mathematical algorithms 
to be that of determining whether the claimed use “would pre-empt all 
uses of that fundamental principle.”328 The CAFC considered this task 
daunting due to the complexity of modern claims.329 The CAFC, how-
ever, recognized that the machine or physical transformation test dis-
cussed in Diehr and earlier cases would be effective in rejecting over-
reaching patent claims.330 Moreover, the CAFC determined that the 
machine or physical transformation test was valid law despite the Su-
preme Court’s refusal to explicitly adopt the test in Benson, Flook, and 
Diehr.331  Thus, In re Bilski wiped clean several decades of CAFC and 
CCPA jurisprudence while taking a step that the Supreme Court 
seemed reluctant to take. On the appeal for In re Bilski, the Supreme 
Court would respond to the CAFC’s reasoning. 
 On June 28, 2010, nearly eight months after hearing oral argu-
ments in Bilski v. Kappos,332 the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited 
decision on the last day of its term. Although the justices were unani-
mous in finding Bilski’s invention not patentable, they divided on the 
legal reasoning and where to draw the line concerning the patentability 
of business methods. Five justices reasoned that Section 101 does not 
preclude the patentability of all methods of doing business, stating that 
“a business method is simply one kind of ‘method’ that is, at least in 
some circumstances, eligible for patenting.”333 Four justices concluded 
that “although a process is not patent-ineligible simply because it is use-
ful for conducting business, a claim that merely describes a method of 
doing business” is not patentable.334 
 The majority—while not rejecting the CAFC’s revitalized machine-
or-physical-transformation test—refused to endorse the CAFC’s effort 
to resolve the subject-matter question, and ultimately failed to articulate 
                                                                                                                      
325 Ex parte Bowman, 2001 WL 1646047 at *2. 
326 Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1387. 
327 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950. 
328 Id. at 954. 
329 See id. 
330 See id. 
331 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189–90, 191–92; Flook, 437 U.S. at 589–90; Benson, 409 U.S. at 71. 
332 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
333 Id. at 3228. 
334 Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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a test or set a clear standard.335 Rather, the Court returned responsibil-
ity to the CAFC to develop “less extreme means” than the machine or 
physical-transformation test to limit business method patentability. The 
Court advised the CAFC to try a variety of approaches “including (but 
not limited to) application of our decisions in Benson, Flook, and Di-
ehr.”336 
 Such approaches cannot rely solely on the machine or physical-
transformation test, however. The Court admonished the CAFC that 
the test “is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a pat-
ent-eligible ‘process.’”337 Tracking earlier Supreme Court patent sub-
ject-matter jurisprudence, the Court asserted that the test “is a useful 
and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether 
some claimed inventions are processes under §101.”338 The Court went 
on to explain that while it may have been sufficient for evaluating proc-
esses “similar to those in the Industrial Age,”339 they doubted its useful-
ness for the “Information Age”340 in which “new technologies may call 
for new inquiries.”341  Therefore, rather than approving the CAFC’s 
gutsy attempt to curtail business method patent claims—or taking a 
similarly bold step to provide clarity—the Court cautiously relied on its 
Benson, Flook, and Diehr decisions to reject Bilski’s claims as unpat-
entable abstract ideas.342 Without articulating a clear test, the Court 
concluded that “[t]he concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and 
reduced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable ab-
stract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook.”343 
 Justice Stevens and the concurring justices would have drawn a 
clearer line in the sand. Relying on interpretation of “process” as a 
term of art anchored in historical practice, the concurrence concluded 
that “[a] business method is not a ‘process’” under Section 101, and 
therefore not patentable.344 Justice Breyer, while agreeing with Stevens 
that business methods are not patentable processes, wrote a separate 
                                                                                                                      
335 See id. at 3226–27, 3231 (majority opinion). 
336 Id. at 3231. 
337 Id. at 3227. 
338 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. 
339 Id. 
340 Id. 
341 Id. at 3227–28. 
342 See id. at 3229–30. 
343 Id. at 3231. 
344 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3249–50 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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concurrence to “highlight the substantial agreement among the many 
Members of the Court.”345 
 Nevertheless, the case narrows the scope of patentable subject mat-
ter from the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test articulated in 
State Street Bank.346  Rather than completely rejecting the machine or 
physical transformation test, all three opinions agree that the test has 
been a “useful and important clue” but not the “sole test” for determin-
ing patentability.347 This previously discarded test has thus regained the 
stature it had under Benson, Flook, and Diehr. Although Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion does not expressly reject the useful, concrete, and tangible test, 
Kennedy’s opinion indirectly rejected past CAFC patent process subject-
matter decisions.348 Indeed, five justices in the two concurring opinions 
went even further by explicitly rejecting the State Street Bank standard.349 
 Following Bilski v. Kappos, U.S. patent process subject-matter law 
has thus returned to the 1980s, perhaps with a revitalized exclusion for 
abstract ideas. Any mixed process claim that does not solely claim a law 
of nature, physical transformation, or abstract idea meets the initial pa-
tent subject-matter threshold.350  Until the CAFC provides additional 
guidance, however, the USPTO must apply the amorphous standards of 
Benson,351 Flook,352 and Diehr.353 If the claim provides a physical trans-
formation of matter, then the decisions agree that the claim is pat-
entable.354 Otherwise, it is unclear whether and under what conditions 
process claims will escape the abstract idea exclusion. Regardless, a 
claim to a business method patent must also meet the other patent re-
quirements of novelty and non-obviousness.355 Thus, as the majority 
opinion obliquely suggests, the CAFC may shift the critical patentability 
                                                                                                                      
345 Id. at 3257–58 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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standard to these tests rather than to the subject-matter requirement of 
Section 101.356 
III. The European Patent Office Treatment of Software Patents 
 Direct comparison of U.S. and European patent law in the area of 
software and business method patents is difficult for both systemic and 
substantive reasons. The systematic reasons involve the lack of jurispru-
dential uniformity in Europe. Within Europe, the EPO as well as the 
national patent offices and courts of the contracting states interpret 
and apply the EPC.357 Each nation, in transposing EPC requirements 
into national legislation, altered its own substantive and procedural law 
to approximate its laws to the EPC.358 Although this has harmonized 
the law to some extent, national patent offices and courts can and do 
interpret the requirements of the EPC differently than the EPO and 
other national courts.359 
 The substantive reasons for difficulty involve the “technical” re-
quirement for patentability that exists at the heart of European patent 
law.360 U.S. patent law does not have a direct corollary. The exact na-
ture of the technical contribution requirement as it relates to computer 
programs and business methods is chimerical. Not only have the tests 
for technicality been a moving target, often conflicting within and 
among jurisdictions, but the EPO has never provided a clear and work-
able legal definition of “technical” as it relates to software and business 
method patents.361 
                                                                                                                      
 
356 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229–31. This is similar to the approach taken by the EPO in 
determining whether business methods and software patent claims should be granted. See 
Keith Beresford, Patenting Software Under the European Patent Convention 116 
(2000); European Patent Office, Patents for Software? European Law and Prac-
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357 See infra notes 679–682 and accompanying text. 
358 See, e.g., infra Part III.A. 
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forcement of granted patent presents a weakness in the current debate over software pat-
ents in Europe. Andreas Grosche, Software Patent—Boon or Bane for Europe? 14 Inter. J. L. & 
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Strategic Limitations of the IP Systems, 9 J. World Intell. Prop. 344, 344–46 (2007). 
361 See Greg Aharonian, Why All Business Methods Achieve a Technical Effect?, Internet Pat-
ent News Service (Oct. 2001), http://www.bustpatents.com/aharonian/bzmtdtch.htm 
(citing an EPO decision from September 2000, which recognizes that the meaning of the 
term “technical” is not very clear). Aharonian subsequently quotes a private communication 
between himself and an EPO official on the meaning of “technical”: 
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 In this Part, we begin with an introduction to the European patent 
system to highlight the systemic difficulties in creating a unified law on 
software and business method patents.362 We then examine the evolu-
tion and present state of patentability of computer programs and busi-
ness methods in the European Patent Office.363 Part IV then addresses 
the United Kingdom.364 The United Kingdom serves as an apt Euro-
pean comparative jurisdiction because of its recent history of patent 
practice and EPC interpretation that is at odds with the EPO. Part IV 
also includes a brief analysis of Germany’s patent practice in this area 
due to Germany’s significance as the largest European Union state.365 
A. The European Patent System 
 In the United States, the USPTO examines applications and de-
cides whether to grant a patent.366 Only federal courts decide issues of 
patent infringement and validity and only the CAFC hears patent ap-
peals, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of patent law.367 As a 
result, patent law is arguably one of the more unified areas of law in the 
United States because there exists no possibility of conflicting interpre-
tations of patent law among the circuits. The EU experience of patent 
law over the last half century is fundamentally different. Unlike copy-
right and trademark law, the European Union has no directive or other 
legal instrument harmonizing substantive patent law across the mem-
ber states.368 Although pan-European agreements have developed for 
patents, these agreements, including the EPC, are not instruments of 
                                                                                                                      
Technical. I’m glad you asked me about that. It’s a wonderful word, fuzzy and 
yet sounds meaningful. We love it. Until 2001, it had no basis whatsoever in 
the EPC, just a passing mention in a couple of rules. . . . I agree that we’ve 
never defined ‘technical’. It’s deliberate and allows us to fine-tune as a con-
sensus develops on what should be patentable. Yes, I do know the correct way 
to do that is by amending the law, but have you any idea how hard it is to get 
consensus on amending the EPC? 
Id. 
362 See infra Part III.A. 
363 See infra Part III.B–D. 
364 See infra Part IV.A.–C. 
365 See infra Part IV.D. 
366 See, e.g., Russel Burke Hill & Vince Cangolosi, United States of America § 2.1, in 
Global Patent Litigation (Willem A. Hoyng & Frank W.E. Eijsvogels eds., 2006). 
367 See, e.g., id. §§ 5.4.1, 5.4.5–6. 
368 See Bakels & Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 6 (“The only existing directive in this area 
is the Biotechnology Directive adopted in 1998.”) The Proposed EU Directive on Patents 
for Computer-Implemented Inventions failed. Ford, supra note 52, at 49. 
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the European Union.369 Although each EU Member State is a contract-
ing party to the EPC, it is a sui generis European convention developed 
from efforts to harmonize both European and EU patent law. Within 
the European Union it has been characterized as a “stop-gap approach 
to a more far reaching harmonisation.”370 
 Currently, a person wishing to protect an invention in a particular 
European Union member state has the option of filing an application 
for a national patent or for a European patent.371 For the former, the 
applicant files with the national patent office in the member state.372 
For the latter, application is made to EPO under the terms of the EPC, 
which provides a mechanism for obtaining a “European patent” using 
one central application procedure.373 The applicant then designates the 
EPO contracting states in which he or she wants patent protection.374 
 Once the EPO grants the European patent, the patent holder must 
register it in the appropriate contracting states, where it receives the 
same rights that would be conferred by a patent granted in that coun-
try.375 The European patent becomes a “bundle of national rights.”376 
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Id. 
375 EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 64. 
376 Grosche, supra note 359, at 269. 
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Theoretically, there is no difference between a European patent and 
one granted by a national patent office, with the exception that the Eu-
ropean patent may be subjected to a post-grant opposition procedure at 
the EPO in Munich.377 Whether the patent is granted by the EPO or a 
national patent office, the patent holder must enforce it in the national 
courts in the countries in which the patent is registered.378 National 
courts have the power to revoke a European patent on a number of 
grounds, including invalidity, but the EPO does not have jurisdiction to 
revoke a nationally granted patent.379 National courts interpreting their 
substantive and procedural rules are not obligated to follow EPO cases 
as precedents.380 Likewise, national court decisions have no direct con-
sequence on EPO decisions, although EPO cases have considered na-
tional decisions and vice versa.381 A major implication of this structure is 
that patent application, validity opposition, and litigation practice re-
quires very sophisticated planning. It also opens the possibility of differ-
ing interpretations of the law and patentability standards among the 
various entities charged with interpreting and applying the law. 
 Technical Boards of Appeal within the EPO interpret the EPC 
through its case law.382 If an applicant is dissatisfied with a non-award, 
or if a third party wishes to oppose the grant of a patent, that party may 
appeal to the EPO Technical Board of Appeal.383 The Technical Boards 
of Appeal are highly centralized as to subject matter and expertise, with 
the same board deciding cases within a given technical area.384 Techni-
cal Board of Appeal 3.5.01 decides cases involving computer programs 
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and business methods as computer-implemented inventions.385 Techni-
cal Boards of Appeal have “interpretive supremacy” for the EPC.386 In 
the majority of cases, a particular Technical Board functions as the 
body of final appeal on matters of patent law.387 In narrowly defined 
circumstances, a legal question may go to the Enlarged Board of Ap-
peal “to ensure uniform application of the law, or if a point of law of 
fundamental importance arises.” 388  The President of the EPO or a 
Technical Board of Appeal on its own motion or in granting a party’s 
request, may refer questions on points of law to an Enlarged Board of 
Appeal.389 The EPC substantially constrains the nature of questions the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal may decide. It may only review Technical 
Boards of Appeal decisions in narrowly defined circumstances and only 
on narrowly defined legal issues.390 Therefore, the Enlarged Board of 
Appeal does not function in the same manner as the CAFC or the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
 These limitations mean that the Enlarged Board has provided little 
guidance for subject-matter questions. To date, despite a recommenda-
tion from an English judge,391 a request for a referral from a party to a 
Technical Board of Appeal case,392 and a referral from the EPO Presi-
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pdf. 
387 See id. at 23. 
388 EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 112(1). 
389 Id. The Enlarged Board may also initiate a referral. See Leith, supra note 370, at 
113–114. 
390 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 112(1). 
391 See Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [75–76], [2007] 1 
All E.R. 225 (A.C.) at 236 (Eng.). 
392  Case T-154/04, Estimating Sales Activity/DUNS LICENSING ASSOCS., [2008] 
O.J.E.P.O. 46, 46 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://archive.epo. 
org/epo/pubs/oj008/02_08/02_0468.pdf. 
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dent,393 the Enlarged Board of Appeal has not directly addressed ques-
tions on law relating to computer software.394 On May 12, 2010, after 
eighteen months of deliberation, the Enlarged Board of Appeal de-
clined to rule on the questions referred by the EPO President.395 The 
Enlarged Board rejected the referral on grounds that the questions 
were inadmissible or not subject to review because they did not meet the 
narrow requirements for review under the EPC. The Enlarged Board 
concluded that the EPC allows a review only when it is necessary to en-
sure uniform application of the law and when two Technical Boards of 
Appeal have given “different decisions” on the question referred.396 
 After reviewing the relevant case law, the Enlarged Board deter-
mined that the cases identified as “different” did not meet EPC re-
quirements.397 The Enlarged Board interpreted the EPC as requiring a 
“conflict in the case law making it difficult if not impossible for the Of-
fice to bring its patent granting practice into line with the case law of 
the Boards of Appeal.”398 The implications of this “non-ruling” are im-
mense. The Technical Board of Appeal 3.5.01 remains the body of last 
resort within the EPO for decisions concerning computer programs 
and business methods and determines examining practice within the 
EPO. Once a Technical Board of Appeal or Enlarged Board has de-
cided a case, there is no recourse for review to a national or multina-
tional court.399 Thus, it is unlikely that any judicial or quasi-judicial Eu-
ropean entity will soon provide any software subject-matter guidance. 
 One objective of the EPC is for patent examination and patentabil-
ity decisions to produce the same result whether the patent is examined 
or opposed in the EPO, a national patent office in France or Germany, 
or in an invalidity action in the United Kingdom or the Netherlands.400 
                                                                                                                      
 
393 Referral by the President of the European Patent Office to the Enlarged Board of 
Appeal dated 23 October 2008 Regarding Divergent Decisions of Two Boards of Appeal, 
[2009] O.J.E.P.O. 142, 142, available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj009/03_09/ 
03_1429.pdf. 
394 Leith, supra note 370, at 26. 
395 Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 30. 
396 Id. at 23. 
397 See id. at 30. 
398 Id. at 25. 
399 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 112(3); Tritton et al., supra note 23, at 181 (ex-
plaining that national courts of Member States only have the right to try infringement ac-
tions). 
400 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, at pmbl. Prior to implementation of the EPC, substantive 
differences existed in national patent offices. See Leith, supra note 370, at 105. For example, 
the United Kingdom was known for a very strict view of claim interpretation while the prac-
tice in Germany and the Netherlands extended to undefined inventive concepts. 1 Char-
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To facilitate harmonization of patent law through EPC implementation, 
national examining offices and courts do not possess broad discretion to 
interpret claims in accordance with what had been national practice 
prior to the EPC. Instead, they should interpret according to EPO prac-
tice.401 Nevertheless, the structure of the system has precluded complete 
harmonization. Variances between approaches to EPC substantive law in 
national patent offices, which generally rule in accordance with national 
decisions, mean that substantive differences remain.402 Under the cur-
rent system, it is possible that an application for the same invention may 
be granted by the EPO or the German patent office but denied by the 
U.K. Intellectual Property Office, and a claim for invalidity of the same 
European patent may be interpreted differently in different coun-
tries.403 These factors contribute to a lack of uniformity in the substan-
tive law. 
 Furthermore, the absence of a multinational reviewing court to 
rule on inconsistencies between national courts and the EPO interpreta-
tions has impeded harmonization. Because national courts decide cases 
within their own legal traditions, they interpret provisions of the EPC 
differently, as implemented into their national law. Thus a patent may 
be revoked in one country that remains valid in another.404 This has led 
to particular problems in the area of computer software and business 
methods. In difficult cases, national courts applying national law do not 
decide consistently.405 Furthermore, because the courts in the United 
Kingdom are required to follow their precedents,406 and the EPO does 
not recognize stare decisis, the possibility of differing results is magnified. 
B. Origins of the “Technical” Requirement 
 The U.S. patent statute and EPC take differing approaches to pat-
entability. U.S. law defines patentable inventions positively, as “any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof,”407 and leaves exclusions 
                                                                                                                      
tered Institute of Patent Agents, European Patents Handbook § 2.6.17 (Tim Roberts 
et al. eds., 2d ed. Supp. 2009) [hereinafter CIPA]. 
401 Cf. Leith, supra note 370, at 111–13 (discussing the rise of courts in the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany adjusting to EPO jurisprudence). 
402 See Tritton et al., supra note 23, at 86–87. 
403 CIPA, supra note 400, § 2.6.17. 
404 See Bakels & Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 39. 
405 See id. 
406 See infra note 513 and accompanying text. 
407 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). In a rather circular manner, the code defines invention as an 
“invention or discovery” and process as “process, art, or method.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(a), (b). 
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to judicial interpretation. The EPC—while setting out the general re-
quirements of novelty, 408  inventive step, 409  and industrial applica-
tion410—defines invention negatively, according to what is excluded. Ar-
ticle 52 presents a non-exclusive list of things not considered inven-
tions, including: “discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical 
methods”;411 “aesthetic creations”;412 and “schemes, rules and methods 
for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and pro-
grams for computers.”413 The EPO’s “Guidelines for Examination” in-
dicate that the items listed in Article 52(2) are those that are either ab-
stract or do not have a technical character.414 The list of excluded non-
inventions, however, must be read in conjunction with Article 52(3), 
which narrows the exclusion of these items and activities to the extent 
that the patent application relates to excluded subject-matter “as 
such.”415 This means that a claim to a business method or computer 
program is not allowed, but “claims to physical entities or processes re-
lating to such items may be allowable.”416 The exclusions and their limi-
tations are understood to reinforce the requirement that “invention” 
means technical invention.417 
 “Technical character” does not present a problem in traditional 
fields such as chemistry or engineering.418  The requirement resides 
deep in the origins of European patent law and has been “part of the 
European legal tradition since the early days of the patent system.”419 
According to the EPO, in order to be patentable, the subject matter 
                                                                                                                      
408 EPC 2000, supra note 14, arts. 52(1), 54. 
409 Id. arts. 52(1), 56. Under U.S. law, this requirement is known as the “non-obvious” 
condition for patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
410 EPC 2000, supra note 14, arts. 52(1), 57. 
411 Id. art. 52(2)(a). 
412 Id. art. 52(2)(b). 
413 Id. art. 52(2)(c). 
414 European Patent Office, Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, pt. C, ch. IV, § 2.1 
(Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/guiex/e/ 
c_iv_2_1.htm. 
415 EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52(3). 
416 CIPA, supra note 400, § 3.4. 
417 Tritton et al., supra note 23, at 91. 
418 Aloys Hüttermann & Ulrich Storz, A Comparison Between Biotech and Software Related Pa-
tents, 31 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 589, 589 (2009) (explaining that circumstances in which 
chemical compounds may be patented were resolved decades ago, but the technicality of 
biotech and software-related inventions are still in flux); see also Beresford, supra note 356, at 
v–vi (explaining that Boards of Appeal cases reveal that some patents are rejected based on 
the steps performed by an operator regardless of technical character); Grosche, supra note 
359, at 271 (explaining that whether software makes a “technical contribution” turns on how 
this term of art is defined). 
419 Patents for Software?, supra note 356, at 9. 
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must have “a ‘technical character’ or, to be more precise, involve a 
‘technical teaching.’”420 Discussions of the technical requirement were 
part of the earliest European harmonization efforts.421 The Strasbourg 
Convention, the Council of Europe instrument that began the process 
of harmonization of European patent law, did not mention a technical 
requirement or expressly define the term “invention.”422 It required 
signatory countries to grant patents “for any inventions which are sus-
ceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an 
inventive step.”423  When the Strasbourg Convention was adopted in 
1963, the six members of the European Economic Community—the 
precursor to the European Union—were working toward both a single 
patent legal system for the common market and a single system for 
granting patents.424  During the first phase of the negotiations from 
1961 to 1964, the delegations debated whether to follow the language 
of the Strasbourg Convention or to adopt a new, positive definition of 
inventions.425 The delegations rejected a proposal to make “technical 
progress” an explicit requirement of patentability, reasoning that it was 
unnecessary because the term “inventions” implies a contribution to 
technical knowledge and technical progress.426  Therefore, including 
“technical” in the language of the convention would be redundant.427 
As a result, no positive legal definition of “technical” emerged from the 
                                                                                                                      
420 Id. 
421 See id. As early as 1959, differences in national patent regimes acted as a barrier to 
trade and movement of goods, so the members of the European Economic Community 
convened a working group to discuss a unified patent system. See Cornish & Llewelyn, 
supra note 18, at 127 (noting that efforts were set aside when Britain failed to enter the 
EEC, because member states desired having Britain’s expertise in the matter). Such a sys-
tem would include not only uniform substantive law, but a judicial system through the 
European Union courts, as arbiter of European patent disputes. See id. at 127–29. Neither a 
Community patent nor a patent court has been established within the European Union. 
See id. at 128–29. 
422 See Strasbourg Convention, supra note 369, arts. 1–6. The Convention was not lim-
ited to members of the Council of Europe. See id. at pmbl n.1. The Convention’s purpose 
was to unify certain points of substantive patent law to assist European industry and, more 
ambitiously, to contribute “to the creation of an international patent.” Id. at pmbl. 
423 See id. art. 1. 
424 See Justine Pila, Article 52(2) of the Convention on the Grant of European Patents: What 
Did the Framers Intend? A Study of the Travaux Preparatoires, 36 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & 
Comp. L. 755, 757–58 (2005). 
425 See id. at 758–59. 
426 See Beresford, supra note 356, at 13; Pila, supra note 424, at 759. 
427 See Beresford, supra note 356, at 13; Pila, supra note 424, at 759. 
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conference and the travaux preparatoires provide no assistance in deter-
mining the framers’ intent on the issue.428 
 At the time the EPC was negotiated, computer programs existed, 
but the software industry did not.429 The delegates feared that fixing 
definitions of “invention” and “technicality” would impair the flexibility 
of the EPC to accommodate developing technology.430 The EPC also 
does not define “programs for computers” or the other exclusions.431 
Although some delegations strongly opposed including “programs for 
computers” in the list of Article 52(2) exclusions, the EPC ultimately 
included it.432 The delegates concluded that any attempt to define this 
term would be futile, and that interpretation should be left to the 
EPO.433 Leaving interpretive decisions to the EPO has far from clarified 
the legal definitions of “technical character,” “computer programs,” 
and the “as such” limitation on exclusions. 
 In 2000, the contracting parties adopted a new version of the EPC. 
Currently, Article 52(1) of the EPC mandates that European patents 
shall be granted “for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided 
that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are susceptible of in-
dustrial application.”434 It has been suggested that the addition of lan-
guage “in all fields of technology,” which did not appear in the original 
EPC, codifies the technology requirement.435 Although commentators 
characterize this change to Article 52 as one of the most significant 
                                                                                                                      
428 Pila, supra note 424, at 760. In examining Professor Pila’s work, Justice Jacob found 
that her analysis of the Travaux Preparatoires led to this result. Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 232. 
429 See Martin Kretschmer, Software as Text and Machine: The Legal Capture of Digital Inno-
vation, J. Info. L. & Tech., pt. 1 (July 4, 2003), http://www.cippm.org.uk/pdfs/JILT%20 
kretschmer%2011_03.pdf. 
430 Reinier B. Bakels, Should Only Technical Inventions Be Patentable, Following the European 
Example?, 7 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 50, 55 (2008). 
431 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52(2). In addition to “programs for computers,” 
the EPC excludes the following from patentability: “discoveries, scientific theories and 
mathematical methods”; “aesthetic creations”; “presentations of information”; and 
“schemes, rules, and methods for performing mental acts, playing games, or doing busi-
ness.” Id. 
432 See Pila, supra note 424, at 769. 
433 See id. 
434 EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52(1) (emphasis added). The EPC 2000 applies to all 
patent applications filed on or after December 13, 2007. The European Patent Convention, 
Eur. Patent Office ( Jul. 1, 2011), http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/epc.html. 
Most of the cases considered infra Part VI.B. were decided under EPC 1973, unless other-
wise noted. See id. 
435 See Bakels & Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 54. EPC 2000 was adopted by decision on 
June 28, 2001, in part to incorporate obligations imposed by the Agreement on Trade Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). Id. 
at 54–55 (citing explanatory document from the Munich conference). 
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changes in the EPC,436 they do not expect it to impact substantive law 
as it relates to patentability.437 As discussed, under EPC 1973, technical 
character acted as an implicit requirement of patentability.438  More-
over, although a technical requirement is not expressly mentioned in 
the EPC 1973, it is at the heart of Article 52 jurisprudence.439 
                                                                                                                     
 Commentators have also suggested that the technical requirement 
originates from the Article 57 requirement that inventions be “suscep-
tible of industrial application.”440 The meaning of this phrase, however, 
differs in various European translations.441 For example, the French 
and Dutch languages use the term “industrie” only when referring to 
manufacturing businesses. In comparison, the English language uses 
“industry” more broadly.442 The German requirement of “gewerblich 
anwedbar” (commercially applicable) is broader than technical manu-
facturing, but not as broad as the English meaning of industry.443 
C. The EPO Technical Board of Appeal Decisions 
 Originally EPO examiners routinely denied any applications re-
lated to software inventions and programs under EPO examination 
guidelines in place at the time.444 Since its first decision in 1986, how-
ever, the Technical Board of Appeal 3.5.01 has taken what could be 
characterized as an expansive view of these inventions’ patent eligibility. 
Once the board took the position that examiners should not deny an 
application simply because it involved a computer program, the EPO 
started down a slippery slope.445 The Technical Board of Appeal has 
articulated various tests to delimit the contours of the technical charac-
 
436 CIPA supra note 400, § 2.7.2. 
437 See Stefan Steinbrenner, The European Patent Convention 41–42 (Supp. 3 Aug. 2009), 
in 1 Software Patents Worldwide (Gregory A. Stobbs ed., 2008). 
438 See supra text accompanying notes 415–417. 
439 See Steinbrenner, supra note 437, at 31–39 (discussing the development of Boards of 
Appeal decisions relating to Article 52: each decision requires a computer program to have 
a technical feature to be patentable). 
440 Bakels & Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 4. 
441 Id. 
442 Id. at 4–5. 
443 Id. at 5. 
444 See Leith, supra note 6, at 11. 
445 Id. at 8–11. Because “any good patent attorney . . . could transmute a software in-
vention into a hardware one,” once the decision was made that the inventions were not 
automatically excludable, “any attempt to hold the line becomes untenable because the 
definition of protectable technology changes under the continual assault of perceptive 
patent attorneys who locate logical contradiction and push the examiners towards remov-
ing that logical weakness.” Id. at 9. 
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ter requirement for computer-implemented inventions. 446  The tests 
and results have often been contradictory, allowing a broader spectrum 
of inventions to meet the technical requirement while never providing 
a solid legal definition of “technical contribution.”447 The concept of 
“technical,” although central to European patent subject-matter deter-
minations, is a difficult legal concept to define. Scholars,448 judges,449 
and more recently, the EPO president,450 have noted that the Technical 
Board of Appeal tests, arguments, and justifications vary from case to 
case. Moreover, the meaning of “as such” has been “anyone’s guess dur-
ing the past two decades.”451 The scope of what is excluded from patent 
subject matter based on 52(2) and (3) has progressively narrowed, 
leading to a more liberal granting of software-related patents, and mov-
ing toward an approximation of U.S. practice.452 
 In its 2009 publication, Patents for Software? European Law and Prac-
tice, the EPO stated that it “does not grant patents for computer pro-
grams (‘software patents’) or computer-implemented business methods 
that make no such technical contribution.”453 The EPO uses the term 
“computer-implemented inventions” to describe inventions that involve 
the use of a computer, a computer network, or a programmable appara-
tus, with features that are realized by a computer program.454 Despite 
this assertion, a 2000 study indicates that the vast majority of software 
patent applications up to that time proceeded through the EPO without 
objection and the vast majority of appeals were granted, provided that 
the claims were appropriately drafted.455 According to the EPO, com-
puter-implemented inventions—whether claimed to a physical product 
or apparatus or to a process or method—are patentable so long as they 
involve an “inventive technical contribution to the prior art.”456 In addi-
                                                                                                                      
446 See id. 
447 See id. 
448 See id. at 30; Aharonian, supra note 361, at pt. 3. 
449 See Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 232. 
450 Referral by the President of the European Patent Office, [2009] O.J.E.P.O. at 144–45. 
Aharonian characterizes the various definitions of technical as “pornographic,” or “I know 
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453 Patents for Software?, supra note 356, at 3. 
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455  Beresford, supra note 356, at v (explaining that in some cases, patents were 
granted after amending the wording of the claims to meet the requirements of the EPC 
and implementing regulations). Beresford’s book has been characterized as the “leading 
study” on patenting under the EPC. Kretschmer, supra note 429, at 12–13. 
456 Patents for Software?, supra note 356, at 10. 
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tion, the EPO will grant claims to “computer program” products, such as 
those stored on some kind of a carrier like a CD or DVD, provided they 
cause a “further technical effect” beyond the “normal physical effects,” 
such as the flow of electric current through a computer.457 
 EPO computer software patent subject-matter decisions have 
shaped European law concerning business methods.458 Nevertheless, 
business method examinations produce results that are markedly dif-
ferent from similar examinations of non-business related computer 
programs. 459  Very few computer-implemented business methods are 
successfully prosecuted in Europe.460 The EPO has recently stated that 
computer programs that “implement business, mathematical or similar 
methods and do not produce technical effects (e.g. because they solve 
a business problem rather than a technical one) are not patentable.”461 
Although the EPO considers technical innovations associated with 
business methods, it does not conduct searches of business method 
art.462 
1. The Technical Contributions Approach 
 The 1987 decision Vicom/Computer Related Invention, 463  the first 
Technical Board of Appeal 3.5.01 decision concerning computer-
implemented inventions, is still central to the meaning of the term 
“technical effect” in Europe.464 The Vicom Board considered whether a 
CAD program—a mathematical method465 for improving digital images 
by increasing processing speed—or a machine for carrying out the me-
thod were excluded from patentability “as such.”466 Following EPO Ex-
                                                                                                                      
457 Id. at 11. 
458 See Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 829. 
459 See Beresford, supra note 356, at 183. 
460 Nicholas Fox & Alex Rees, A European Perspective on Business Method Patents, Land-
slide, July/August 2010 at 30, 30 (confirming that the examining division dealing with 
business methods currently rejects approximately 95–97% of the applications). 
461 Patents for Software?, supra note 356, at 12. 
462 Gregory A. Stobbs, Business Method Patents §14.03[A] (Supp. 2004). Fox & 
Rees assert that the applications for the three to five percent of business method patents 
granted have avoided classification as a business method, emphasizing technical advan-
tages and minimizing business benefits. Fox & Rees, supra note 460, at 35–37. 
463 Case T-208/84, Computer-Related Invention/VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. 14 (Tech-
nical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, July 15, 1986) available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj 
1987/p001_046.pdf. 
464 Leith, supra note 370, at 27. 
465 VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 14. The EPO cases are more likely to use the term 
“method,” whereas U. S. cases use “process,” as a result of differing statutory language. See 
EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52(2)(a); 35 U.S.C. § 100(b). 
466 VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 14. 
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amination Guidelines in place at the time, the examiners had rejected 
the claim as a mathematical method “as such.”467 The Technical Board 
of Appeal, which was not bound by the Examination Guidelines, found 
the method to qualify as patent subject matter and not be excluded “as 
such.”468 
 In delineating the difference between an excluded mathematical 
method or algorithm and a technical process, the Technical Board of 
Appeal stated that a mathematical method produced no direct techni-
cal result, being “an abstract concept prescribing how to operate on the 
numbers.”469 But, the Board went on to note: 
[I]f a mathematical method is used in a technical process, 
that process is carried out on a physical entity (which may be a 
material object but equally an image stored as an electric sig-
nal) by some technical means implementing the method and 
provides as its result a certain change in that entity.470 
Further, the Board of Appeal noted, “[t]he technical means might in-
clude a computer comprising suitable hardware or an appropriately 
programmed general purpose computer.”471 As one scholar observed, 
“[t]he Board held that where the claims relate to a technical process, 
patentability may arise from novelty in the mathematical algorithm 
employed for a technical benefit, and it was immaterial whether the 
algorithm was to be implemented in hardware or software.”472 
 The Board’s reasoning failed to provide clarity. The Technical 
Board of Appeal explained that even if the idea for the invention resides 
in the non-patentable mathematical method, the applicant will not be 
considered to seek protection for the mathematical method “as such” so 
long as the claim is directed to a technical process in which the method 
is used.473 The most oft-quoted Reason for the Decision provides: 
Generally speaking, an invention which would be patentable 
in accordance with conventional patentability criteria should 
not be excluded from protection by the mere fact that for its 
implementation modern technical means in the form of a 
computer program are used. Decisive is what technical contribu-
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472 Beresford, supra note 356, at 24; see VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 20. 
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tion the invention as defined in the claim when considered as a whole 
makes to the known art.474 
 Vicom established the importance of the overall technical contribu-
tion of the invention as the baseline for examining computer-related 
inventions. This remains European law.475 Under Vicom, the invention as 
a whole must provide some technical contribution over the state of the 
art to be considered an invention within the meaning of Article 52.476 
The overall reasoning is similar to the holistic approach taken in the 
1981 U.S. Supreme Court decision Diamond v. Diehr, which produced a 
similar result.477 
 The Technical Board of Appeal remitted the claim back to the ex-
aminers, holding that “[a] claim directed to a technical process which 
process is carried out under the control of a program (whether by 
means of hardware or software), cannot be regarded as relating to a 
computer program as such.”478 Before the Board, Vicom had agreed to 
amend its original patent claims to a multipurpose algorithm and a me-
thod of digital filtering, and to direct the claims more specifically to the 
processing of digital images.479 Applying Vicom’s technical contribution 
approach, the examiner allowed the amended and limited claims be-
cause they were amended for “the general functioning of the computer, 
rather than to an application designed to execute particular tasks.”480 
In taking this holistic approach, the form of the patent claim is not im-
portant; the examiner should “disregard the form or kind of claim and 
concentrate on its content in order to identify the contribution which 
the subject-matter claimed, considered as a whole, adds to the known 
art.”481 As one scholar has noted, “[n]o distinction should be drawn 
between implementation of a computational task in software or in 
hardware since this does not affect the inventive concept.”482 Another 
scholar adds that if the “contribution is not of a technical character (i.e. 
if it falls exclusively within one of the excluded areas), then there is no 
                                                                                                                      
474 Id. at 21–22 (emphasis added). 
475 Leith, supra note 6, at 28–29. 
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invention.”483 Vicom opened the door to computer-related inventions 
being patentable “within the realms of computer science.”484 
 Vicom stands for the proposition that subject matter for controlling 
or carrying out a technical process is patentable, regardless of whether it 
is implemented on hardware or software.485 The involvement of a com-
puter program is not sufficient grounds to deny patentability. 486  Al-
though the Technical Board of Appeal drew a line concerning “techni-
cal contributions” in Vicom, its reasoning is not compelling. The Board 
used the term “technical” sixteen times without defining it; likewise, it 
used the term technical “features” twice,487 technical “process” on six 
occasions,488 technical “means” on four occasions,489 and technical “sub-
ject matter,” “result,” “considerations,” and “contribution” once each.490 
The Technical Board of Appeal neither identified the particular techni-
cal contribution made by the invention in Vicom, nor did it discuss the 
exact nature of that technical contribution. Thus, after Vicom, the mean-
ing of technical contribution remained “a little elusive.”491 
 In 1987, the same year as Vicom, the second leading Technical 
Board of Appeal decision, Koch & Sterzel, appeared. Koch & Sterzel con-
cerned a patent claim to the use of a computer program to control an 
X-ray machine to ensure optimal performance without overloading the 
X-ray tube.492 In the opposition to this claim, Siemens and Philips ar-
gued that the only difference between the claim’s subject matter and 
the state of the art was the use of a new program for a known com-
puter.493 The essence of the invention was a computer program that 
only produced a technical effect at the very end of the computing op-
eration.494 Because the invention involved both a mathematical method 
in the form of a computer program and a technical apparatus, the op-
                                                                                                                      
483 Shemtov, supra note 7, at 507. 
484 Kretschmer, supra note 429 at pt. 2.5. For example, procedures at the operating sys-
tem level to improve machine functionality or generic algorithms at the application level 
would normally be patentable. Id. 
485 VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 14; Patents for Software?, supra note 356, at 11. 
486 Patents for Software?, supra note 356, at 11. 
487 VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 14, 16. 
488 Id. at 14, 19. 
489 Id. at 19–21. 
490 Id. at 18–19, 21. 
491 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 249. 
492  Case T-26/86, X-ray Apparatus/KOCH & STERZEL, [1988] O.J.E.P.O. 19, 22 
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ponents argued that the X-ray apparatus and the computer program 
had to be considered separately for purposes of determining whether 
the claim involved an invention.495 The opposition cited the German 
Federal Court of Justice, which ruled as follows: 
[A teaching in a claim is not technical if] in its essence it 
states a rule that can be carried out without employing con-
trollable natural forces other than human brainpower, even 
if the use of a technical means appears expedient or indeed 
the only sensible and hence the necessary procedure, and 
even if reference is made to these technical means in the 
claims or description.496 
 The Technical Board of Appeal rejected this approach and drew a 
line of distinction between unpatentable computer programs on gen-
eral purpose computers, in which the electrical signals produced 
amounted to no more than a reproduction of the information, and 
those that technically altered the functioning of the unit, which may be 
patentable.497 Affirming Vicom, the Technical Board of Appeal held that 
the invention must be assessed as a whole, because the EPC does not 
prohibit patenting of inventions consisting of a mix of both technical 
and non-technical means.498 Further, the Board held that there need 
not be a constant interaction between the program and the apparatus: 
“[w]hen the technical effect occurs is irrelevant to the question of 
whether the subject matter claimed constitutes an invention under Arti-
cle 52(1) EPC. The only fact of importance is that it occurs at all.”499 
 Therefore, under the technical contribution approach, it does not 
matter that the contribution to the prior art is a mathematical algo-
rithm so long as there is a technical effect in the apparatus beyond the 
normal functioning of the computer.500 Neither the magnitude of the 
effect, nor the point in the process at which the effect occurred, are 
determinative.501 This reasoning is analogous to the line of reasoning 
used in Diehr, which concluded that it was erroneous to take a point of 
novelty approach.502  Rather, if the invention as a whole is different 
                                                                                                                      
495 Id. at 21. 
496 Id. at 22–23. 
497 Id. at 23. 
498 KOCH & STERZEL, [1988] O.J.E.P.O. at 24. 
499 Id. at 22–23. 
500 Id. at 24. 
501 See id. at 22–23, 24. 
502 See 450 U.S. at 189. 
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from the prior art, it is irrelevant that the source of novelty resides en-
tirely in a mathematical algorithm or computer program.503 The Diehr 
dissent had predicted that this approach would open the floodgates to 
the patentability of computer software.504 Indeed, patenting strategy in 
the United States shifted towards “indirect drafting” of software claims 
following Diehr, subverting the algorithm exclusion to practical nul-
lity.505 One commentator has observed that the USPTO Guidelines ac-
knowledged the practice, providing that “the utility of an invention 
must be within the ‘technological’ arts. A computer-related invention is 
within the technological arts.”506 Thus, the novelty of a patent claim 
may arise in the software itself, not only through some physical trans-
formation brought about by software.507 The EPO developed a similar 
approach post-Vicom.508 
                                                                                                                     
2. The Further Technical Effect Approach 
 Toward the end of the 1990s, the technical contribution approach 
met criticism.509  Applicants claimed that when software is run on a 
computer, there is always a machine involved and the invention was, 
therefore, automatically technical.510 Another problem emerged. Vicom 
and Koch & Sterzel dealt with apparatus claims and process or methods 
claims.511 The EPO still disallowed direct patent claims to “computer 
program products,” or software.512 This created an enforcement issue. 
The only way to infringe a process or method patent on a computer 
system solution in Europe was to run the patented program directly.513 
 
503 See id. at 183. 
504 See id. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
505 Kretschmer, supra note 429, at pt. 2.5. 
506 Id. (citing Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 
7478, 7479 (Feb. 28, 1996)). 
507 See id. 
508 Id. 
509 Steinbrenner, supra note 437, at 37. 
510 Laub, supra note 7, at 348. 
511 KOCH & STERZEL, [1988] O.J.E.P.O. at 19 (involving the patenting of inventions 
consisting of a mix of technical and non-technical features); VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 
14 (involving a claim by which a technical process is considered to reside in a mathemati-
cal method). 
512 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52(2)(c) (barring computer programs from con-
sideration as inventions eligible for patents). 
513 But see Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Patentabil-
ity of Computer-Implemented Inventions, Eur. Parl. Doc. (COM 92) 27 (2002), available 
at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0092:FIN:EN:PDF 
(proposing that a computer program infringes only if it fulfills a certain patented function 
in the way defined in the patent claim). 
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Unlike the patent on the hardware component of the invention, puta-
tive infringers copying and distributing the process could only be liable 
for indirect infringement, a much more difficult claim.514 
 In 1997, an IBM appeal clarified the issue concerning direct claims 
to computer software and articulated what became known as the “fur-
ther technical effect” approach. 515  IBM/Computer Program Product in-
volved a method claim and claims directed to “computer program 
products directly loadable into the memory of the computer” and to a 
“computer program product stored on a computer usable medium.”516 
In a second unreported case decided by the Technical Board of Appeal 
at the same time, IBM appealed an EPO examining division decision 
refusing a patent application for a computer program. 517  Following 
EPO Examination Guidelines in place at the time, the examining divi-
sion refused the computer program products claims, drawing a clear 
line between patentable and unpatentable subject matter by disallowing 
the computer program products claim to preclude the possibility of a 
program written on a sheet of paper from patentability.518 The Techni-
cal Board of Appeal did not agree and considered whether and under 
which circumstances a computer program product could be valid sub-
ject matter.519 
 The Board in IBM I interpreted the language of the EPC to mean 
that the drafters had not intended to exclude all computer programs 
from patentability, but only computer programs “as such.”520 Because 
computer programs must be patentable when they have a technical 
character, not all computer programs are prima facie excluded from pa-
tentability. 521 In delineating between patentable and non-patentable 
programs, the Technical Board of Appeal again excluded from pat-
entability programs causing common physical modifications to the 
                                                                                                                      
514 Steinbrenner, supra note 437, at 62. 
515 See Case T-1173/97, Computer Program Product/IBM (IBM I ), [1999] O.J.E.P.O. 
609, 620 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Jul. 1, 1998), available at http://archive.epo.org/ 
epo/pubs/oj99/10_99/10_6099.pdf. 
516 Id. at 610, 611. 
517 See Case T-935/97, IBM/Computer Programs (IBM II ), [1999] E.P.O.R. 301, 303 
(Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Feb. 4, 1999), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/ 
case-law-appeals/pdf/t970935eu1.pdf. 
518See id. 
519 See id. at 309. One commentator even suggests that IBM colluded with the EPO by 
drafting its claims for direct patentability of the computer program, and not indirectly to a 
system or method for inventions that would have “clearly” been patentable as method 
claims in line with previous EPO decisions. See Kretschmer, supra note 429, § 2.5. 
520 See IBM I, [1999] O.J.E.P.O. at 618–19. 
521 See id. at 619. 
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computer, such as electrical currents carrying out program instruc-
tions.522 The Board of Appeal held that a computer program may not 
be excluded from patentability “[i]f the program, when running on a 
computer or loaded into a computer, brings about, or is capable of 
bringing about, a technical effect which goes beyond the ‘normal’ 
physical interactions between the program (software) and the com-
puter (hardware on which it is run).”523  The Board found that the 
technical character in the “further effects” derived from the hardware’s 
execution of the instructions given by the computer program.524 This 
further technical effect beyond the normal functioning of the com-
puter may occur when the software manages an industrial process or 
the working of a machine.525 A “further technical effect” also occurs in 
cases where the computer is a necessary means to obtain the further 
technical effect,526 although the Board neither defined nor provided 
examples of when a computer might provide the necessary means.527 
In reaching its decision, the Technical Board of Appeal cited Vicom’s 
reasoning that it was illogical to grant a patent for the process, but not 
for the apparatus for carrying out the method.528 The IBM I Board util-
ized the reasoning of Vicom in concluding as follows: 
                                                                                                                     
[It would be illogical to] grant a patent for both a method 
and the apparatus adapted for carrying out the same me-
thod, but not for the computer program product, which 
comprises all the features enabling the implementation of 
the method and which, when loaded in a computer, is in-
deed able to carry out that method.529 
 The Board distinguished its holding from the practice in U.S. 
and Japanese patent offices, which allow patent claims to computer 
 
522 See id. at 620. 
523 Id. at 632 (emphasis added). The Technical Board of Appeal defined “running on a 
computer” to mean that “the system comprising the computer program plus the computer 
carries out a method or process.” Id. “Loaded into a computer,” according to the Board, 
means that the programmed computer is capable of carrying out a method that consti-
tutes a system, device, or apparatus. Id. Professor Kretschmer characterizes this reasoning 
concerning further technical effect as “sailing close to the wind” and puts the reasoning in 
plainer language: “software is not a computer program ‘as such’ if it is innovative and it 
works.” See Kretschmer, supra note 429, § 2.5. 
524 IBM I, [1999] O.J.E.P.O. at 620. 
525 Id. 
526 Id. at 620–21. 
527 See id. 
528 VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 21–22. 
529 IBM I, [1999] O.J.E.P.O. at 626. 
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programs, acknowledging that while these foreign practices repre-
sented a “useful indication of modern trends,” those legal systems did 
not contain exclusions to patentability similar to those in Articles 
52(2) and (3).530 
 Prior to IBM I, the EPO had focused on putting computer-
implemented inventions into the framework of tangible, physical ma-
chines.531 After IBM I, the focus shifted to the nebulous “further tech-
nical effect” caused by the computer program.532 One scholar suggests 
that this transition provides evidence that the Board changed from its 
previous machine metaphor to an analogy that the software itself is 
“machine-like” and that the Board thus “dropped the fiction that a pat-
entable invention was in the machine which was part hardware and 
part software.”533 Nevertheless, the IBM I case narrowed the scope of 
the exclusion so that more inventions achieved patentability. The re-
quirement of a “further technical effect” is not a bar to patentability: 
“[a]ny computer program that works is not a computer program” as 
such if a carefully drafted claim refers to technical considerations.534 
 Despite the Board’s statement to the contrary, it is difficult to avoid 
speculating that the U.S. treatment of software influenced the EPO to 
liberalize its treatment of computer program patent validity questions. 
By the time of the IBM I decision, the CAFC had largely removed pat-
ent subject-matter restrictions with respect to computer software and 
business methods.535 In light of this real or apparent pressure, it is not 
surprising that the EPO may have been motivated to loosen constraints 
in order to allow European inventors to compete more evenly with U.S. 
inventors. 
 Ultimately, the reasoning in IBM I is unsatisfying and does little to 
advance the meaning of either technical contribution or the bounda-
ries of the “as such” exception. The circular reasoning that computer 
programs “as such” are not patentable because they are not technical, 
and that programs with technical character are valid patent subject 
matter because they are not programs “as such,” is not illuminating. 
Without further articulating the nature of the “further technical effect” 
test, the IBM I decision failed to delineate the exact nature and scope 
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of the computer program exclusion.536 To many, IBM I formally ended 
the computer program exclusion in the EPC and the fiction of a limita-
tion based on technical character, technical contribution, or technical 
effect.537 
3. The Any Hardware Approach 
 Until 2000, the EPO applied three concepts in evaluating the pat-
ent eligibility of computer-implemented inventions: first, there must be 
a technical contribution (Vicom); second, in determining technicality, 
the invention must be evaluated as a whole (Koch & Sterzel ); and third, 
the contribution must cause a further technical effect (IBM). 538  In 
2000, however, the EPO clearly departed from requiring a technical 
contribution as part of the Article 52 analysis in a series of cases begin-
ning with PBS Partnership.539 
 PBS, decided one year after IBM I, did not involve a patent claim to 
a computer program, but claimed a method and an apparatus, where 
the apparatus was a computer programmed to run the method.540 The 
method used data processing to control pension benefit programs for 
subscriber employers by using standard factors, such as actuarial life 
spans, for calculating pensions.541 The Technical Board of Appeal de-
nied the method claim as a method for doing business “as such,” and 
accordingly, relied on Article 52(2) and (3) to preclude the claim.542 
The Board acknowledged the technical effects test and found that all of 
the steps involved in processing and producing the information had a 
“purely administrative, actuarial and/or financial character.”543 It re-
jected the appellant’s argument that referring to data processing and 
computing means in the claims conferred technical character on the 
                                                                                                                      
536 See Leith, supra note 6, at 33. 
537 See Kretschmer, supra note 429, § 2.5. Nevertheless, Beresford’s work demonstrates 
that the exclusions on patentability under the EPC were almost equivalent to United States 
practice by 2000, and that the “technical effect” criterion, which applies to all EPO exami-
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method, and concluded that “[a] feature of a method which concerns 
the use of technical means for a purely nontechnical purpose and/or 
for processing purely non-technical information does not necessarily 
confer a technical character to such a method.”544 There is nothing in 
PBS’s holding regarding the method claim that departed from previous 
EPO cases.545 
 By contrast, the Board treated the apparatus claim differently, sig-
naling a “substantial departure from previous case law.”546 The Techni-
cal Board of Appeal found that an apparatus programmed for use in a 
particular field was an invention within the meaning of Article 52(1), 
even if the field was business, because it involved a physical entity.547 If 
the patent claim was directed to the apparatus, the formal category of 
the claim implied physical features which could qualify as technical fea-
tures of the invention.548 Therefore, use of any physical entity would 
bring the claim outside the Article 52(2) and (3) exclusions.549 Lord 
Justice Jacob in Aerotel coined the descriptive nomenclature “any hard-
ware” to refer to this approach.550 
 The PBS reasoning appears formalistic rather than substantive. 
Article 52(2)(c) excludes “methods” of doing business, but not “appa-
ratuses” or “products.”551 Although the claim proceeded as an Article 
52 invention, the Technical Board of Appeal ultimately found that the 
apparatus was nonetheless not patent subject matter because it did not 
meet the requirements of “inventive step” under Article 56.552 In mak-
ing this determination, the Board found no non-obvious improvement 
over the identified prior art of “existing private pension plans,” because 
the improvement was essentially economic and not technical.553 The 
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claimed invention did not provide a technical solution to a technical 
problem.554 
 Hitachi/Auction Method, the next EPO case decided using the “any 
hardware” approach, is the more important of the two cases in that it set 
the standard for EPO examination of business method and business sys-
tems patents.555 Hitachi involved a method claim for the automated auc-
tion method, an apparatus claim for running the auction via a network, 
and a computer program claim.556 The Hitachi Board, following PBS, 
explained that the technical contribution approach was incorrect in that 
an invention’s technical contribution was more appropriately consid-
ered for determining novelty and inventive step rather than subject mat-
ter.557 The Hitachi board instructed that “[a] mix of technical and non-
technical features may be regarded as an invention within the meaning 
of 52(1) EPC and that the prior art should not be considered when de-
ciding whether the claimed subject matter is such an invention.”558 
 The Hitachi Board found that the apparatus claim was outside of 
the Article 52 exclusions because it possessed technical features, such as 
a “service computer,” “client computer,” and “network.”559 The claim 
thus met the requirements of technicality.560 This conclusion was con-
sistent with the PBS finding that “[a]n apparatus constituting a physical 
entity or concrete product, suitable for performing or supporting an 
economic activity is an invention within the meaning of Article 
52(1).”561 In this reasoning, both Hitachi and PBS depart dramatically 
from the technical contribution requirements of Vicom and Koch & 
Sterzel. Rather than achieving technical character by making a com-
puter run better or faster, the claimed inventions in Hitachi and PBS 
achieved technical character by virtue of being loaded onto the ma-
                                                                                                                      
554 See id. at 456–57. 
555 Case T-258/03, Auction Method/HITACHI, [2004] O.J.E.P.O. 575, 587 (Technical 
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chine. Therefore, the claimed inventions escaped classification as a 
computer program or a business method “as such.”562 
 Hitachi also changed course from PBS in finding that the method 
claim was not excludable as a business method “as such.”563 The PBS 
Board had found that use of a technical means for purely non-technical 
purposes did not confer technical character on the method.564 A dif-
ferent Technical Board of Appeal panel, roughly forty months after 
PBS, found that it was inappropriate to quantify or weigh the technical 
aspects of the method claim as part of the Article 52 analysis.565 Doing 
so would require consideration of possible novel or inventive contribu-
tions to the prior art, which the Article 52 analysis of invention does not 
allow.566 The Hitachi Board mandated that method claims and appara-
tus claims be treated the same for purposes of Article 52 analysis.567 In 
both instances a physical feature of the entity, or the nature of the activ-
ity, could imply technical character.568 Therefore, what examiners and 
practitioners had previously considered a non-technical activity now 
achieved technical character and could not be dismissed as a non-
invention “as such.”569 This interpretation of Articles 52(2) and (3) sub-
stantially broadened the concept of “invention.” The Technical Board 
of Appeal acknowledged this expansion, noting that technical acts as 
familiar as writing with pen and paper would meet its Article 52 techni-
cal criteria.570 Under the Hitachi analysis, then, the first step in deter-
mining patentability was whether the claimed subject matter has a 
prima facie technical effect.571 A business method passes the Article 52 
test as long as it is attached to “any hardware.”572 But such inventions 
must also pass the Article 56 inventive step test. 
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 Article 56 provides that “[a]n invention shall be considered as in-
volving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not 
obvious to a person skilled in the art.”573 The EPC follows a “problem-
and-solution” approach to the inventive step analysis. For there to be an 
inventive step, there must be an objective technical problem with a 
technical solution, and the EPC considers whether the claimed inven-
tion would have been obvious to a skilled person starting from the clos-
est prior art.574 Patent examiners often break this approach into four 
steps: first, determine the closest prior art;575 second, determine the 
distinguishing technical feature and its technical effect;576 third, formu-
late the objective technical problem;577 and fourth, determine whether 
a skilled person would have solved the technical problem by the solu-
tion specified in the patent claim. 578  The problem-and-solution ap-
proach requires analysis of the prior art, but only takes into account 
features of the invention that contribute to the technical character of 
the invention.579 Thus, it is the second step, technical effect, at which 
most business methods fail.580 The central feature of Hitachi’s auction 
method automatically increased the auction price if more than one 
bidder offered the same “desired price.”581 Although Hitachi argued 
that the technical effect resided in the claimed invention’s ability to 
overcome delay between bidders and the server,582 the Board found the 
invention claimed was “a mere automation of the non-technical activity 
of performing a Dutch auction.”583 The Board also acknowledged that 
the invention might have contained a technical feature that went be-
yond how a human auctioneer would perform the auction without 
technical support.584 Because the programming measure required to 
rank such bids “would have been obvious” to anyone skilled in data 
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processing, however, the invention did not meet the requirements of an 
inventive step.585 
 EPO boards have continued to refine their approach. Less than two 
years after deciding Hitachi, the Technical Board of Appeal decided a 
third case. Microsoft/Clipboard Formats involved an appeal from the exam-
ining division’s refusal of claims to a method that improved the func-
tionality of Windows 3.1, including a computer program to execute the 
method.586 The Technical Board of Appeal set aside the appeal, remit-
ting the claim to the examining division to grant the patent.587 Follow-
ing Hitachi’s approach that a method using technical means is an inven-
tion within the meaning of Article 52, the Board found the clipboard 
method claim eligible for patent protection because a “computer system 
including a memory is a technical means.”588 Rather than moving to the 
Article 56 analysis, however, the Board took the opportunity to distin-
guish a patentable method implemented in a computer system from 
non-patentable programs. The former “represents a sequence of steps 
actually performed and achieving an effect”589 while the latter “just have 
the potential of achieving such an effect when loaded into, and run on, 
a computer.”590 The Board further explained that even though a me-
thod of operating a computer may use a computer program, a claim to 
the method is not a claim to the computer program “as such.”591 
 In applying their reasoning to the claim in question, the Microsoft 
Board delineated their divergent approach. Claim 5 covered a “com-
puter-readable medium having computer-executable instructions (i.e. 
computer program)” to perform the method.592 Citing Hitachi, the Mi-
crosoft Board found that the computer software passed the Article 52 
hurdle because it “relates to a computer-readable medium, i.e. a tech-
nical product involving a carrier.”593 The Board cited IBM I to support 
its finding that: 
                                                                                                                      
585 Id. 
586  See Case T-424/03, MICROSOFT/Clipboard Formats I, [2006] E.P.O.R. 414, 417 
(Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/ 
case-law-appeals/pdf/t030424eu1.pdf. 
587 Id. at 422. 
588 Id. at 419–20. 
589 Id. at 420. 
590 Id. 
591 Id. 
592MICROSOFT, [2006] E.P.O.R. at 420. 
593Id. (finding that the software possessed the technical character necessary under Ar-
ticle 52). 
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[The] computer-executable instructions have the potential of 
achieving the . . . further technical effect of enhancing the 
internal operation of the computer, which goes beyond the 
elementary interaction of any hardware and software data 
processing . . . The computer program recorded on the me-
dium is therefore not to be considered a computer program 
as such.594 
This conclusion does not follow from IBM I, however, because IBM I de-
termined that a computer program could not be considered a technical 
means unless it produced a “further technical effect.”595 Thus, Microsoft 
seemed to carve out a sui generis category for computer programs.596 As 
one scholar summarized the Microsoft holding, “a computer-reusable 
medium, including a program stored on it, has technical character be-
cause the computer-readable medium is a technical product.”597 
 The Technical Board of Appeal subsequently determined that the 
method claim met the Article 56 requirement of inventive step. Refer-
ring to Windows 3.1, the closest prior art, the Board found the method 
“solves the problem of how to facilitate a data exchange across different 
data formats, in particular when transferring non-file data.” 598  The 
Board never identified the problem-solution approach, but merely 
concluded that there is a problem, there is a solution, and that the in-
vention “does not derive in an obvious manner from the pre-existing 
operating system.”599 The Microsoft Board found that the method thus 
met the requirement of inventive step because the method “solves the 
problem of how to facilitate a data exchange across different data for-
mats.”600 The Board also found that the method met the novelty re-
quirement.601 The Board noted that the method “solve[d] a technical 
problem by technical means . . . in order to enhance the internal op-
eration of a computer.”602 
 Although Microsoft followed PBS and Hitachi in the “any hardware” 
approach to Article 52 analysis, it departed in its Article 56 analysis of 
inventive step. The Microsoft Board did not treat the computer program 
                                                                                                                      
594 Id. 
595 See IBM I, [1999] O.J.E.P.O. at 621. 
596 Steinbrenner, supra note 437, at 66. 
597 Id. 
598 MICROSOFT, [2006] E.P.O.R. at 421. 
599 Id. at 421–22. 
600 Id. 
601 Id. at 421. 
602 Id. at 420. 
294 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:227 
as excludable prior art, as the business methods had been in the previ-
ous cases.603 The Technical Board of Appeal examined the computer 
program along more conventional lines without explaining why the 
approach was different.604 Without explaining what made the method 
and computer claims different from those in PBS and Hitachi, the 
Technical Board of Appeal directed the Examining Board to grant the 
patent.605 This order “opens the way to the patentability in principle of 
any computer program in Europe,”606 and indeed, the Technical Board 
of Appeal and national courts have recently moved in this direction.607 
The difference in analysis and results in the recent “any hardware” tril-
ogy of Technical Board decisions depends on whether the prior art is a 
“business method,” as in PBS and Hitachi,608 or a computer program, as 
in Microsoft. 609  Although neither is excluded from patentability “as 
such” if they are present on any hardware, there appears less hostility to 
the patentability of computer programs than to business methods.610 
Thus, the Technical Board of Appeal provided a much higher exclu-
sionary bar for business methods under Article 56.611 Nonetheless, even 
with this refinement, subject-matter boundaries remained unclear. 
 Confusion persisted after Microsoft. Duns Licensing, decided months 
after Microsoft, is significant not only for applying the any hardware test, 
but for addressing differences between the EPO and English Court of 
Appeal approaches to the “technical” requirement.612 Duns Licensing 
claimed a research method of estimating sales activity by correlating 
sales activities at reporting outlets according to certain criteria, and 
claimed an apparatus for maintaining inventory based on the method’s 
results.613 The Technical Board of Appeal articulated the EPO’s pro-
                                                                                                                      
603 See id. at 420–21. 
604 Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567. 
605 MICROSOFT, [2006] E.P.O.R. at 422. 
606 Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567. 
607 See Steinbrenner, supra note 437, at 66 (citing a number of cases in which computer 
programs have been patented, including software to control a car radio module—the only 
case to meet the prior art hurdle—a garbage collection in a computer memory, and a data 
retrieval method). 
608 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 566–67. 
609 See id. at 567. 
610 See id. (claiming that the scope of patent protection for computer programs has 
narrowed to the requirement of technicality). 
611 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 56; Fox & Rees, supra note 460, at 32. 
612 DUNS LICENSING, [2008] O.J.E.P.O. at 70–71 (showing EPO characterizing the di-
vergent U.K. software subject matter approach as “not consistent with a good-faith inter-
pretation of the European Patent Convention” in part because the U.K. approach relied 
on the technical contribution approach that the EPO had previously abandoned). 
613 See id. at 51–52, 54. 
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patent approach, stating that Article 52(1) presents the “fundamental 
maxim of the general entitlement to patent protection for any inven-
tion in all technical fields.”614 The Board continued on to explain that 
EPC 52(2) and (3) embody the technical character requirement. De-
spite acknowledging that Article 52 presented interpretive problems 
because there was no legal or commonly accepted definition of “inven-
tion,”615 the Board insisted that by not defining “invention” the EPO 
had allowed new technologies to develop.616 
 Reviewing the legislative history of EPC 52(2), the Duns Licensing 
Technical Board of Appeal found that the EPC introduced Article 
52(3) to prevent a broad interpretation of Article 52(2) excluded mat-
ter.617 The Board considered the revised language in Article 52 in EPC 
2000—requiring examiners to grant patents “in all fields of technol-
ogy” —as expressly confirming technical character as a legal require-
ment for an invention.618 Citing the Basic Proposal for EPC 2000, the 
Board asserted that claimed subject matter is reserved for inventions 
“with ‘technical character’ or to be more precise—[inventions that] 
involve a ‘technical teaching’, i.e. an instruction addressed to a skilled 
person as to how to solve a particular technical problem using particu-
lar technical means.”619 In the same paragraph, the Board emphasized 
that creations in engineering and technology are entitled to protection 
under the EPC.620 
 The Duns Licensing Board then explained the relationship between 
the Article 52 and Article 56 tests. The first question is whether the 
claimed subject matter meets the Article 52 requirements for inven-
tion.621 This analysis should be “strictly separated from and not mixed 
up with” the other patentability requirements, including inventive 
step. 622  When evaluating claims with a mix of technical and non-
technical features, Article 56—the inventive step requirement—is key 
to distinguishing between valid patent subject matter and claims not 
                                                                                                                      
614 Id. at 62. 
615 Id. at 60, 62. 
616 See id. at 62 (“[T]he EPO has not developed any such explicit definition . . . for 
good reasons.”). 
617 Id. at 63. 
618 DUNS LICENSING, [2008] O.J.E.P.O. at 62. 
619 Id. at 65. 
620 Id at 64. 
621 See id. at 67 (quoting an earlier decision where the Technical Board of Appeal first 
determined whether the claim constituted an invention within the meaning of Article 
52(1)). 
622 Id. at 68. 
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entitled to patent protection.623 Only technical features of a claimed 
invention are relevant when assessing inventive step because the inno-
vation must be in a technical field, not in an unpatentable field.624 
 Based on this framework, the Duns Licensing method claim failed 
the Article 52 analysis. The Board determined that “gathering and eva-
luating data as part of a business research method do not convey techni-
cal character to the business research method if such steps do not con-
tribute to the technical solution of a technical problem.”625 The method 
claim had referred to a database, which did not confer technical charac-
ter because it was not a technical system.626 Therefore, it did not solve a 
technical problem and the claim was not eligible for patent protec-
tion.627 The Technical Board of Appeal was explicit in its conclusion 
that business research activities do not solve a technical problem related 
to a technical field: “interaction with and exploiting information about 
the physical world belongs to the very nature of any business” and ac-
cepting those features as technical would “render the exclusion for 
business methods under Article 52(2)(c) EPC meaningless.”628 
                                                                                                                     
 The Duns Licensing analysis differed in addressing the claim to a 
central processor to perform the individual steps of the method.629 The 
Board concluded, without analysis, that under Hitachi the claim to the 
technical apparatus qualified it as an Article 52 invention.630 In line 
with Hitachi, however, the claim failed on the inventive step analysis. 
The Board found that the new algorithm used and the method of esti-
mating sales activity on a known system were “part of a business re-
search method and do not contribute to the solution of any technical 
problem.”631 Therefore the examiner should not consider such meth-
ods in assessing inventive step because they were inherently non-
technical, as well as being known.632 
 These cases illustrate both the difficulty in drawing a line in the 
patent subject-matter sands, and the shifting of the line when applying 
 
623 See id. at 61 (stating principles of patentability, one of which is that an “inventive 
step” can only be based on technical features and that non-technical features “as such” do 
not provide a technical contribution and are ignored when assessing the “inventive step” 
element of the analysis). 
624 See DUNS LICENSING [2008] O.J.E.P.O. at 61, 65, 73–74. 
625 Id. at 46. 
626 Id. at 75–76. 
627 Id. 
628 Id. at 75. 
629 Id. at 76. 
630 DUNS LICENSING, [2008] O.J.E.P.O. at 76. 
631 Id. at 78. 
632 See id. at 77–78. 
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the “technical” requirements test. More than two decades of patent case 
law demonstrate that the technical character tests draw a somewhat ar-
bitrary line.633 The primary reason to stick to the requirement of tech-
nicality appears to be that it has “always existed in Europe.”634 Never-
theless, considerable consensus exists that the rule in Europe is nebu-
lous and that clarification is needed.635 
 The EPO, in seeking to define the relevant criteria for determin-
ing patent subject matter, began by focusing its Article 52 analysis on 
whether there is an invention and whether that invention is technical in 
nature and makes a technical contribution.636 The EPO then changed 
course, with claimed inventions perfunctorily passing the technicality 
requirement under Article 52 if the claim explicitly included any hard-
ware.637 Evaluation of technicality shifted to the problem-and-solution 
approach under the Article 56 inventive step analysis.638 Difficulty in 
defining the terms “technical contribution” and “as such” has resulted 
in various and inconsistent approaches which have undermined pre-
dictability in the field, as the “any hardware” approach has shown.639 
Furthermore, the EPO draws the line differently when the excluded 
category is a “business method” as opposed to a “computer program.”640 
Although Article 52(2) expressly excludes both claim types,641  post-
Microsoft it appears that a computer program is more likely to clear the 
inventive step hurdle, whereas computer-implemented pension benefit 
systems, auctions, and sales estimating activities will not.642 Regardless 
of which “technical” test reviewing bodies employ, or whether they 
conduct the analysis under Article 52 or 56, such reviews do not yield 
clear and satisfying results.643 
                                                                                                                      
633 Bakels & Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 33. 
634 Id. 
635 See id. 
636 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567. 
637 See id. 
638 See Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, supra note 414, Part C, ch. IV, § 11.5. 
639 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567, 570. 
640 See id. at 566–67. 
641 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52. 
642 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567 (observing that, in Microsoft, the Board was able 
to avoid the Article 52 “as such” exclusion and set the stage for future computer program 
patentability in Europe, although the Board had excluded, for example, pension benefit 
systems in Pension Benefits Systems and auctions in Hitachi). 
643  See id. (“[T]he difficulty in pinpointing . . . a criterion [for assessing the pat-
entability of computer programs] has caused the Boards to embrace various and inconsis-
tent approaches, leading to a general lack of legal coherency in the field.”). 
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D. Decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal 
 On October 22, 2008, Alison Brimlow—then President of the 
EPO—referred questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal under Arti-
cle 112(1)(b), asking for clarification on a number of issues concerning 
the patentability of computer-implemented inventions.644 Her referral 
was not the first request for clarification. Although national court jus-
tices have no standing to refer cases to the EPO, Lord Justice Jacob of 
the English Court of Appeal had suggested in Aerotel that certain issues 
needed clarification through a referral to the Enlarged Board.645 The 
EPO did not agree. In an informal letter dated February 22, 2007, the 
EPO President, Alain Pompidou, found the request for referral unnec-
essary.646 During oral arguments, the appellant in Duns Licensing sub-
mitted Justice Jacob’s questions for referral to the Enlarged Board of 
Appeal.647 The Duns Licensing Board rejected the request, explaining 
that diverging decisions were allowable in the EPC legal system as part 
of the “evolution of the jurisprudence,” unlike “‘case law’ in the strict 
Anglo-Saxon meaning of the term.”648 
 Eighteen months after President Brimlow’s referral, the Enlarged 
Board of Appeal issued what amounted to a non-decision and did not 
reach the merits of the questions referred, finding the referral did not 
meet the requirements of EPC 112(1)(b).649 When an EPO President 
refers questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal, the EPC has two re-
quirements for admissibility: first, either the questions must be an-
swered to ensure uniform application of the law, or the questions con-
cern points of law of fundamental importance; and second, two Boards 
of Appeal must have promulgated different decisions on the question 
referred.650 Addressing the first requirement, the Enlarged Board ob-
served that the general subject of the patentability of computer-
implemented inventions is of fundamental importance, noting the 
“heated debate in administrative and judicial practice” and the prob-
                                                                                                                      
644 See Referral by the President of the European Patent Office, [2009] O.J.E.P.O. at 142–43. 
645 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 236. The questions were different from those ultimately 
submitted by the EPO president to the Enlarged Board of Appeal. Justice Jacob specifically 
asked for clarification on the key characteristics of the method of doing business exclu-
sion. See id. at 236, 241. This was a question not addressed by the Enlarged Board. See Re-
inier B. Bakels, Software Patentability: What Are the Right Questions? 31 Eur. Intell. Prop. 
Rev. 514, 520 (2009). 
646 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 12. 
647 See DUNS LICENSING, [2008] O.J.E.P.O. at 53. 
648 Id. at 59. 
649 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 59. 
650 EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 112. 
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lem of EPC contracting states applying different reasoning.651 The En-
larged Board noted internationally “increasingly convergent deci-
sions,”652 which included Duns Licensing,653 the 2008 English Court of 
Appeal decision Symbian Ltd v. Comptroller-General of Patents,654 and the 
CAFC case In re Bilski.655 The Enlarged Board also noted that the fail-
ure of the European Union to harmonize EU patent law for computer-
implemented inventions was evidence that where to “draw the dividing 
line between applications relating to programs for computers as such” 
and “applications related to patentable technical solutions, in the form 
of [computer-implemented inventions], still cannot be assumed.” 656  
Nonetheless, despite worldwide disharmony, the Enlarged Board did 
not consider the worldwide debate on the patentability of computer-
implemented inventions, and diverging national decisions, relevant to 
their resolution of the referral.657 
 In addressing the second part of the test, the Enlarged Board con-
cluded—without deciding the issue—that existing EPO case law pro-
vided for a consistent approach.658 In construing the meaning of “dif-
ferent decision” in the context of the EPC second requirement,659 the 
Enlarged Board stressed the “interpretative supremacy” of the Techni-
cal Boards of Appeal and noted that the Enlarged Board cannot de-
velop law as do the Technical Boards of Appeal.660 The Enlarged Board 
found “different decisions” to mean a “conflict in case law making it 
difficult if not impossible for the Office to bring its patent granting 
practice into line with the case law of the Boards of Appeal.”661 In mak-
ing this determination, the Board stated: 
                                                                                                                      
651 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 15. 
652 Id. at 16. 
653 See DUNS LICENSING, [2008] O.J.E.P.O. at 78. 
654 See Symbian Ltd v. Comptroller-General of Patents, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1066, [2009] 
R.P.C. 1 (A.C.) at 15–18 (Eng.). 
655 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 997–98 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
656 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 15–16. 
657 Id. at 17. 
658 See Computer-Implemented Inventions (CII) in Europe–G 3/08, Fish & Richardson (May 
20, 2010), http://www.fr.com/Computer-Implemented-Inventions-CII-in-Europe---G-308-05- 
20-2010/. 
659 Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 20–21 (finding that the provision for 
“different decisions” was ambiguous in the English, French, and German versions of the 
EPC, and resorting to the guiding principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties to determine the intent of the EPC framers). 
660 Id. at 22. 
661 Id. at 25. 
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[T]he Enlarged Board must also consider whether the diver-
gent decisions might not be part of a constant development, 
possibility still ongoing, in jurisprudence on recent patent law 
issues, in the course of which older decisions have lost their 
significance and so can no longer be considered in connec-
tion with newer decisions. Such putative differences do not 
justify presidential referrals, legal development being one of 
the principal duties of the Boards of Appeal, in particular in 
new territory.662 
The Enlarged Board then proceeded to review decisions in light of the 
referred questions to determine whether a conflict existed. The only 
inconsistencies the Enlarged Board found related to the referred ques-
tion, “[c]an a computer program only be excluded as a computer pro-
gram as such if it is explicitly claimed as a computer program?”663 The 
only “divergence” in case law the Enlarged Board identified was be-
tween the IBM I and Microsoft cases. In IBM I, the Technical Board of 
Appeal had determined that a claim to a computer program itself is 
patentable if it produces a “further technical effect” while it runs.664 
The definition of “further technical effect” did not mention the state of 
the art, so that the Article 52(2) and (3) determination did not con-
sider the prior art.665 The further technical effect does not have to be 
new. 666  The Enlarged Board affirmed that IBM I consciously aban-
doned the “contribution approach,” and observed that the Technical 
Board of Appeal has not contested this shift in any decision since.667 
 The Enlarged Board subsequently discussed PBS and Hitachi, not-
ing that neither case addressed whether a claim to a program on a com-
puter readable medium avoided exclusion. 668  The Enlarged Board 
found that Microsoft had extended the reasoning of Hitachi to decide 
that such claims have technical character because they relate to a com-
puter readable medium.669 Although the positions taken in IBM I and 
Microsoft were different, the Enlarged Board found the differences re-
flected development in the case law over seven years, not different opin-
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663 Id. at 32. 
664 Id. at 35, 37. 
665 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 37. 
666 Id. 
667 Id. 
668 See id. at 39. 
669 See id. 
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ions meriting a referral.670 To support this conclusion, the Enlarged 
Board indicated that although IBM I remained seminal on the further 
technical effect requirement for claims directed to computer software, 
no Technical Board of Appeal had followed IBM I on its technical con-
tribution approach, and no Technical Board of Appeal had challenged 
the Microsoft approach.671 
 In addition to acknowledging that the law in the EPO is in a state 
of development, the Enlarged Board expressly declined to define the 
term “technical.”672 Addressing the question of whether the activity of 
programming a computer includes technical considerations, the En-
larged Board conceded that computer algorithms can genuinely be 
viewed as either a pure mathematical-logical exercise or as defining a 
procedure to make a machine carry out a certain task.673 The Enlarged 
Board found that the EPC takes the former view: abstract formulations 
of algorithms do not belong to a technical field, but require “further” 
technical effects to be patentable.674 
 The Enlarged Board’s decision neither advances the law nor clari-
fies where to draw the line in these cases.675 Although it did not ex-
pressly address the issue of business method patents, the Enlarged 
Board cited Duns Licensing as laying out the “elaborate system” devel-
oped by the EPO for taking the list of excluded subject matter in Article 
52(2) into account in assessing the inventive step. 676  The Enlarged 
Board did not “judge whether this system is correct.”677 Rather, it found 
that “it is evident from its frequent use in decisions of the Boards of Ap-
peal that the list of ‘non-inventions’ in Article 52(2) EPC can play a very 
important role in determining whether claimed subject-matter is inven-
tive.” 678  Therefore, the problem-and-solution approach of Article 56 
now determines whether a computer-implemented invention achieves 
the technical character required for patentability, and the Article 56 
                                                                                                                      
670 Id. at 45. 
671 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O at 41–42. 
672 Id. at 31. 
673 See id. at 58. 
674 See id. at 58–59. 
675 See id. at 31, 45. Nevertheless, the decision’s impact may be persuasive in shifting 
the practice in the U.K. Patent Office to a more favorable approach to computer-
implemented inventions. See Chris Benson, United Kingdom: Business as Usual for Software 
Patents at the EPO, Mondaq Business Briefing (May 18, 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/ 
article.asp?articleid=100752. 
676 See Programs for Computers, [2010] O.J.E.P.O. at 47. 
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hurdle is higher for computer-implemented business methods than for 
computer programs. 
IV. The U.K. and German Judicial Treatment of Software Patents 
 In this Part, we consider national treatment of software and busi-
ness method patent subject-matter questions in the United Kingdom 
and Germany. Not only are the United Kingdom and Germany two of 
the most influential countries in Europe, the two countries have the 
most developed patent law jurisprudence in Europe.679 The U.K. pat-
ent jurisprudence in particular is well-developed, and its patent subject-
matter approach to software and business method claims has clashed 
with EPO rulings.680 German practice, while not as divergent as U.K. 
practice, is likely to differ from EPO approaches in at least some re-
spects.681 We start our national analysis with a discussion of U.K. patent 
subject-matter practice. 
A. U.K. Patent Subject-Matter Treatment of Software and  
Business Method Claims 
 In 1977, the United Kingdom transposed the EPC into law.682 The 
Patents Act altered both substantive and procedural law so extensively 
that it caused the “largest culture shock in [U.K. patent] history.”683 
Although one purpose of the EPC is harmonization of substantive pat-
ent law among the contracting states, the United Kingdom chose statu-
tory language different from EPC Article 52.684 Differences in the word-
ing in the U.K. statute may contribute to differing interpretations of 
                                                                                                                      
679 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567 (referring to the United Kingdom and Germany 
as European Patent Convention “major players”). 
680 See infra text accompanying notes 679–690. 
681 See infra text accompanying notes 843–860. 
682 Patents Act, 1977, c. 37 (U.K.); Robin Jacob, The Herchel Smith Lecture 1993, 15 Eur. 
Intell. Prop. Rev. 312, 312 (1993). 
683 Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 113–14, 124 (explaining that the culture 
shock was due in part to subjecting national and EPO patents to the same substantive re-
gimes, and also because there was no international patent system prior to 1977). In addi-
tion to the EPC, the Patents Act implemented the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the 
Community Patent Convention. Patents Act, c. 37, §130(7); Jacob, supra note 682, at 312. 
684 Compare Patents Act, c. 37, §1(2) (excluding, among other things: discoveries; aes-
thetic creations; methods for performing mental acts, doing business, or a computer pro-
gram; and the presentation of information), with EPC supra note 14, art. 52(2) (excluding: 
discoveries; aesthetic creations; methods for performing mental acts, doing business, and 
computer programs; and presentation of information). 
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what constitutes an invention.685 English courts have resorted to bypass-
ing the Patents Act, instead directly interpreting the EPC.686 The Eng-
lish courts have also demonstrated a strong preference for construing 
the substance of a claim over its form.687 As a result, the United King-
dom’s approach to excluded subject matter is much stricter than that 
of the EPO. One scholar noted that a “UK-based applicant for a com-
puter-implemented invention, if he is interested solely in the British 
market, would be well advised to apply for such a patent at the EPO 
level, designating the UK as the relevant jurisdiction.”688 This diver-
gence in practice may be partially due to the nature of the legal system 
in the United Kingdom where stare decisis constrains judicial decision 
making.689 Although English courts make an effort to defer to EPO de-
cisions, Technical Board of Appeal decisions are not binding.690 Rather, 
British patent examiners must follow English court decisions.691 Thus, 
unless the courts have expressly approved a Technical Board of Appeal 
decision, the decision will have only persuasive effect before the U.K. 
Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO).692 The differences in policy re-
garding software patent protection have resulted in a “deep rift” be-
tween EPO and British practice.693 The following section traces the de-
velopment of the differing tests and standards in one of the most im-
portant patent-granting jurisdictions in Europe, and its convergence 
with and divergence from EPO standards. 
                                                                                                                      
685 Disaster Pending? EPO v. English Court of Appeal on Excluded Subject Matter, 21 World 
Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 25, 26 (Aug.1, 2007). 
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689 See id. at 510. 
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B. Early English Cases 
 Before implementing the EPC, English courts had shown a “dis-
tinct readiness” to allow patent claims for computer programs even if 
such claims did not affect the production of a distinct product.694 After 
the United Kingdom became a signatory of the EPC, its patent Court of 
Appeal cases initially tracked Technical Board of Appeals law. Neverthe-
less, the approaches have diverged. 
 Merrill Lynch’s Application,695 decided a few years after Vicom, was 
the first English Court of Appeal case to address excluded subject mat-
ter under the Patents Act Section 1(2). Merrill Lynch claimed “an im-
proved data processing based system for implementing an automated 
trading market for one or more securities.”696 The program automati-
cally executed stock transactions against a customer’s orders using 
known data-processing equipment. Both the Patents Office and the Pa-
tents Court (High Court) rejected Merrill Lynch’s claim.697 The Court 
of Appeal agreed and by taking judicial notice of the EPO’s Vicom deci-
sion,698 made the technical contribution approach part of U.K. prece-
dent. The court interpreted the approach as requiring a technical ad-
vance over the prior art in the form of a new result.699 The court ex-
plained: “it cannot be permissible to patent an item excluded by 
Section 1(2) under the guise of an article which contains that item—
that is to say, in the case of a computer program, the patenting of a 
conventional computer containing that program. Something further is 
necessary.”700 The court did not find the “something further,” like the 
substantially increased processing speed of the CAD program in Vi-
com.701 
 The approach taken in Merrill Lynch indicated a preference for the 
substance of the patent claim over the claim’s form. In determining 
whether the claim was eligible for patent protection, the court consid-
ered both the nature of the invention and the nature of the result.702 
Although a data processing system may be valid patent subject matter, if 
                                                                                                                      
694 Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 823 n.94. 
695 Merrill Lynch’s Application, [1989] R.P.C. 561 (A.C.) 561 (Eng.). 
696 Id. at 562. 
697 Id. at 561. 
698 Id. at 567 (stating that “[t]he decision of the board is a matter of which we are re-
quired, by section 91(1) of the Patents Act 1977, to take ‘judicial notice’”). 
699 See id. at 569. 
700 Id. 
701 See Merrill Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. at 569. 
702 See id. 
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Patents Act Section 1(2)(c) excludes what it produces, the invention is 
not valid subject matter.703 Even if a computer program itself is non-
obvious, Section 1(2)(c) excludes the claim as a whole unless it con-
tains non-excluded subject matter which is also non-obvious and con-
tains an inventive step.704 The excluded subject matter is not consid-
ered for purposes of establishing inventive step.705 The court found the 
Merrill Lynch claim to a “data-processing system . . . making a trading 
market in securities” to be an excluded business method.706 Commen-
tators have criticized the English approach as “applying a convoluted 
decision process” of determining whether a purported invention is ex-
cluded subject matter, rather than applying section 1(2) as a self-
contained filter.707 The methodology adopted in Merrill Lynch has led 
to what some commentators describe as an “undue level of exclusion” 
in the U.K. patent system.708 
                                                                                                                     
 The English courts consistently employ the approach of disallow-
ing software inventions cloaked as machines or technical inventions.709 
In 1991, the English Court of Appeal in Gale’s Application addressed 
whether a ROM containing a computer program is valid subject mat-
ter.710 The claim described the invention as an improved iterative algo-
rithm for computing a square root stored on the Read-Only-Memory 
(ROM) of a computer.711 The applicant argued that the characteristic 
distinguishing the claim from a pure abstract idea was its storage in the 
electronic circuitry of the computer.712 The examiner rejected the ap-
plication as excluded subject matter because it was a computer pro-
gram “as such.” The Patents Court reversed, however, on the grounds 
that the claim was not disqualified under Section 1(2) because the 
claim related to a new technical product.713 Distinguishing between a 
non-patentable program loaded on a disk from a program loaded on 
the ROM, the court reasoned that “[t]here is a difference between a 
claim which relates to a disc containing a program and a ROM with 
 
703 See id. 
704 See Franks, supra note 692, at 41. 
705 See id. 
706 Merrill Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. at 569. 
707 Franks, supra note 692, at 40. 
708 Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 826. 
709 See e.g., Gale’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. 305 (A.C.) 316, 325, 328 (Eng.); Merrill 
Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. at 569. 
710 See Gale’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. at 307. 
711 See id. at 308. 
712 See id. at 308–09. 
713 Id. at 306. 
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particular circuitry.”714 According to the court, the key difference was 
that the disk carried the program, whereas the programmed ROM’s 
structure was altered by the program such that it became a “dedicated 
piece of apparatus.”715 
 The Court of Appeal did not agree. It characterized a “program 
for a computer” as “essentially a series of instructions capable of being 
followed by a cpu to produce a desired result.”716 The Court of Appeal 
accurately recognized that the disk and ROM were merely different 
kinds of artifacts on which a program may be carried.717 Comparing 
programs on these media to different pieces of music loaded onto 
compact disks, the court found the differences in storage media imma-
terial for purposes of determining patent eligibility.718 The music was 
the same regardless of the chosen storage media.719 Similarly, the in-
structions stored on a disk or ROM were also the same.720 The court 
noted that deciding otherwise would exalt “form over substance.”721 
 Following the reasoning of Vicom, the English Court of Appeal 
questioned whether the instructions contained on the ROM include 
more than disqualified subject matter.722 The court found Gale’s claim 
not eligible subject matter because “the claim is in substance a claim to a 
computer program, being the particular instructions embodied in a 
conventional type of ROM circuitry, and those instructions do not rep-
resent a technical process outside the computer or a solution to a tech-
nical problem within the computer.”723 Even though the program ar-
guably made the computer more efficient, the Court of Appeal rejected 
the claim because it only provided the CPU with a different set of calcu-
lations for determining a square root.724 The program was not valid pat-
ent subject matter because it did not define a new way of operating the 
computer.725 Therefore, the claim was to the instructions, a computer 
program “as such.”726 Both Merrill Lynch and Gale’s Application illustrate 
the English courts’ early attempts to avoid the problem of clever draft-
                                                                                                                      
714 Id. at 316–17. 
715 Id. 317. 
716 Gale’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. at 324. 
717 Id. at 325. 
718 Id. 
719 See id. 
720 See id. 
721 Id. 
722 Gale’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. at 327. 
723 Id. at 328. 
724 See id. at 327–28. 
725 See id. 
726 See id. 
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ing to avoid exclusion, by directly addressing the issue of substance over 
form in determining the nature of the invention claimed.727 
 In 1997, the English Court of Appeal heard a case involving a pat-
ent granted in Japan and submitted to the UKIPO as a matter of prior-
ity. 728 The invention in Fujitsu involved both a “method and apparatus” 
for modeling synthetic crystal structures used for designing semicon-
ductors and superconductors.729 The court noted that ordinarily a per-
son would assemble plastic models of the structures by hand to model 
the new crystal structure.730 The claimed invention used a computer 
programmed to allow a human operator to “select an atom, a lattice 
vector and a crystal face in each of two crystal structures.”731 The pro-
gram converted the data representing the two crystal structures into 
data representing the physical layout of the combined structure and a 
pictorial display of the new structure.732 Both the UKIPO and the trial 
court rejected the application as a computer program and “a method 
for performing a mental act” excluded under Section 1(2) of the 1977 
Patents Act.733 The Court of Appeal, applying the technical contribu-
tions approach, also rejected the application.734 Following English prac-
tice of construing the invention as a whole, the court concluded as fol-
lows: “[c]learly the whole operation revolves around the computer pro-
gram and the question for decision is whether there is a technical 
contribution so that it cannot be said that the invention consists of a 
computer program as such.”735 
 The result—rejecting an “invention” that used computer imaging 
to make the process of assembling crystal structures faster—seemed to 
contradict the EPO’s Vicom decision. The Court of Appeal in Fujitsu 
distinguished the computer imaging found patentable in Vicom by the 
way it enhanced the image produced.736 The court noted that the only 
advance made by the invention was to “enable[] the combined struc-
ture to be portrayed quicker.”737 The operator was still required to pro-
duce two displays of the crystal structures and the appropriate way for 
                                                                                                                      
727 See id. at 315. 
728 Fujitsu Ltd.’s Application, [1997] R.P.C. 608 (A.C.) 610 (Eng.). 




733 Id. at 610; see Patents Act, c. 37, § 1(2). 
734 Fujitsu, [1997] R.P.C. at 614–19. 
735 Id. at 618. 
736 Id. at 618–19. 
737 Id. at 619. 
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them to be superimposed.738 The Court of Appeal found that Fujitsu’s 
use of computer imaging simply made the computer function more 
rapidly, but did not change the computer’s ordinary function.739 The 
court concluded that a claim to a method for carrying out a calcula-
tion, or a method of performing a mental act, cannot be valid subject 
matter merely because the process is completed on a computer unless 
there is a technical contribution present.740 The fact that the computer 
performed the operation more quickly is not sufficient.741 
 During the first decade of English jurisprudence regarding com-
puter programs, English courts tracked the jurisprudence of the 
EPO.742 By requiring the invention to be construed as a whole, how-
ever, English application of the technical contribution test resulted in a 
stricter review of claims, and thus fewer patent grants.743 Of the three 
English Court of Appeal cases applying Patents Act Section 1(2), none 
found the claimed invention to have sufficient technical character to 
fall outside the exclusions.744 The different results from the English 
Court of Appeal in Fujitsu and the EPO Technical Board of Appeal in 
Vicom are particularly difficult to reconcile.745 Both cases used a com-
puter program that caused computer images to be completed more 
rapidly and efficiently than could be done manually.746 
C. Recent Jurisprudence (Divergence and Convergence) 
 Nearly a decade had passed since Fujitsu when the English Court 
of Appeal issued its next EPC Articles 52(2) and (3) patent subject-
matter decision. 747  During that period, EPO jurisprudence had re-
                                                                                                                      
 
738 Id. at 619–21. 
739 See id. at 621. 
740 Fujitsu, [1997] R.P.C. at 621. 
741 See id. 
742 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 568. 
743 See id. 
744 See Fujitsu, [1997] R.P.C. at 614, 619; Gale’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. at 316–17 
(Aldous J.); Merrill Lynch, [1989] R.P.C. at 569. 
745 See Fujitsu, [1997] R.P.C. at 618 (attempting to distinguish the facts of Vicom from 
the facts of Fujitsu in order to reach a different outcome). 
746  See id. at 612, 618; T-208/84, Computer-Related Invention/VICOM, [1987] 
O.J.E.P.O. 14, 17 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, July 15, 1986), available at http://archive. 
epo.org/epo/pubs/oj1987/p001_046.pdf. 
747 Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [75–76], [2007] 1 All 
E.R. 225 (A.C.) at 229 (Eng.); Fujitsu, [1997] 114 R.P.C. at 608. In Aerotel, Justice Jacob 
referred directly to the EPC, rather than to the similar language that had been imple-
mented in the U.K. Patents Act 1977. See Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 230. Various reasons 
contributed to this decision: differences in wording could lead to erroneous construction; 
the EPO Technical Board of Appeal decisions have strong persuasive authority; and the 
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jected Vicom’s “technical contribution approach”748 in favor of the “any 
hardware approach” of PBS, Hitachi, and Microsoft.749 In 2006, a Court 
of Appeal decision rejected the EPO’s “any hardware” approach in 
Aerotel, affirming the rupture between U.K. and EPO practices which 
began in 2002 with PBS.750 Aerotel was actually two cases joined together 
on appeal: Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd. and Re Macrossan’s Applica-
tion.751 In the first case, Aerotel sued Telco for infringing its U.K. patent 
on a telephone system that provided prepayment for telephone calls.752 
Telco counterclaimed for revocation on the basis that the invention was 
excluded as a method for doing business.753 The trial court agreed with 
Telco and revoked the patent. Aerotel appealed.754 In the second con-
solidated case, Macrossan, the court considered a computerized method 
of obtaining the forms needed for incorporating a company.755 The 
examiner rejected the application as a method of doing business.756 
The High Court affirmed that merely automating a general purpose 
computer to produce documents necessary to incorporate an entity, 
where there is no underlying technical improvement, was not valid sub-
ject matter because the essence of the invention was the automation of 
a mental act.757 Macrossan also appealed.758 
 Despite acknowledging the weight properly placed on EPO board 
decisions, the Court of Appeal declined to follow the trilogy of PBS, 
                                                                                                                      
language of the EPC creates greater potential for harmonization, as there can be more 
consistency in interpreting national laws that implemented the EPC. See Franks, supra note 
692, at 65–66. 
748 See VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. at 21; Laub, supra note 7, at 346 (describing the tech-
nical contribution approach). 
749 See Case T-424/03, MICROSOFT/Clipboard Formats, [2006] E.P.O.R. 414, 419–20 
(Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/ 
case-law-appeals/pdf/t030424eu1.pdf; Case T-258/03, Auction Method/HITACHI, [2004] 
O.J.E.P.O. 575, 584 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Apr. 21, 2004) available at http://archive. 
epo.org/epo/pubs/oj004/12_04/12_5754.pdf; Case T-931/95, Controlling Pension Benefit 
Systems Partnership/PBS PARTNERSHIP, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. 441, 448–49 (Technical Bd. 
Appeal 3.5.01, Sept. 8, 2000) available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj001/10_01/ 
10_4411.pdf. 
750 Aplin, supra note 7, at 380, 381. 
751 See Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 228–30. 
752 Id. at 229, 241–42. 
753 Id. at 229. 
754 Id. Although the parties settled prior to the substantive hearing and Telco did not 
take part in the appeal, Aerotel continued to have an interest in the patent, having sued 
another party for infringement. Id. 
755 Id. at 243. 
756 Franks, supra note 692, at 63. 
757 Id. at 63–66. 
758 Id. at 64. 
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Hitachi, and Microsoft, characterizing them as the “‘any hardware ap-
proach.’”759  In a lengthy opinion and appendix, Justice Jacob high-
lighted the differences and inconsistencies of the approaches articu-
lated in those cases. 760  Key in his criticism was that the EPO cases 
treated the various categories of Article 52(2) exclusions as being lim-
ited to “something abstract or intangible.”761 The English Court of Ap-
peal disagreed, noting that the categories “are disparate with differing 
policies behind each.”762 Taking computer programs as an example, 
the court observed that the trio of cases takes a “narrow view” of the 
Article 52 computer program exclusion in only excluding abstract sets 
of instructions.763 The court implicitly found that such a broad defini-
tion of valid subject matter encompassed the instructions on a disk or 
hard drive which “causes a computer to execute the program.”764 The 
court determined that the framers meant to exclude computer pro-
grams “in a practical and operable form . . . not just an abstract series 
of instructions.”765 Thus, the court declined to adopt the EPO’s nar-
rower view of the exclusion into English law.766 
 The court went on to emphasize that it was bound by its own pre-
cedents and obligated to follow the technical contributions approach 
from Vicom as interpreted in previous English Court of Appeal cases.767 
Justice Jacob synthesized the English approach, which he labeled the 
“technical effect approach with the rider,” as a structured four-step ap-
proach to analyzing claims. The steps include: “(1) properly construe 
the claim; (2) identify the actual contribution; (3) ask whether it falls 
solely within the excluded subject matter; (4) check whether the actual 
or alleged contribution is actually technical in nature.”768 
 Applying the four-step approach to the Aerotel claim, the court re-
versed the trial court and found for the patentee.769 In construing the 
system claim, the court found that the system was “actually a claim to a 
physical device consisting of various components.”770 Although the in-
                                                                                                                      
759 Aerotel, [2007]1 All E.R. at 237–38. 
760 See id. at 238, 254–63. 




765 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 238. 
766 Id. 
767 Id. at 236–37, 239. 
768 Id. at 239–40. 
769 Id. at 241–43. 
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vention used conventional telephone exchanges, the patentee added 
an extra piece of equipment called a “special exchange.”771 The actual 
contribution made was a new system requiring a new physical combina-
tion of hardware—more than a method of doing business.772 Aerotel’s 
use of hardware, even though it was known digital communications ex-
change hardware, provided the technical contribution.773 Justice Jacob 
stated, “it is true that it could be implemented using conventional 
computers, but the key to it is a new physical combination of hardware. It 
seems to us clear that there is here more than just a method of doing 
business as such.”774 
 By contrast, Macrossan’s invention did not fare as well. The court 
found the invention ineligible for patent protection because it was both 
a method of doing business as such and a computer program as 
such.775 In applying the third step, determining whether the claim’s 
contribution was to excluded subject matter, the claim failed.776 Justice 
Jacobs reasoned that “Mr. Macrossan’s method is for the very business 
itself, the business of advising upon and creating appropriate company 
formation documents.”777 The court thus rejected Macrossan’s method 
as a quintessential business method.778 The court distinguished this re-
sult from Aerotel, in which a free standing device implemented the busi-
ness method. 779  The court found that the contribution under step 
two—providing a computer program, or interactive website, to carry 
out the method—was a contribution exclusively to excluded matter, 
and therefore was not a technical contribution. 780  Additionally, the 
claim failed the fourth step in that there was no technical contribution 
“beyond the mere fact of the running of a computer program.”781 
                                                                                                                     
 The divergence from EPO approaches in Aerotel may be due to 
weak logic and inconsistencies in EPO jurisprudence rather than U.K. 
idiosyncrasies. One scholar suggests that the primary reason the Aerotel 
court chose to follow Vicom was not strict adherence to English prece-
 
771 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 242. 
772 Id. 
773 See id.; Leith, supra note 6, at 151. 
774 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 242 (emphasis added). 
775 Id. at 245 (disagreeing in part with the trial court that found the claim to a method 
of performing mental acts “as such,” not a method of doing business, and a computer 
program “as such”). 
776 Id. at 245–47. 
777 Id. at 247. 
778 Cornish & Llewelyn, supra note 18, at 828. 
779 See id. 
780 Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 247. 
781 Id. 
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dent, but because the court found none of the EPO “any hardware” 
approaches valid in light of EPC text.782 On this reading, the Court of 
Appeal found it impossible to reconcile PBS, Hitachi, and Microsoft. Al-
though PBS had addressed and rejected the method claim on fairly 
conventional grounds, the apparatus claim signaled a “substantial de-
parture from previous case law” in holding “that a computer pro-
grammed to carry out the unpatentable method was not within the cat-
egories of art[icle] 52(2).”783 In Hitachi, the Board of Appeal held that 
the apparatus claim was neither a business method nor a computer 
program as such because it “comprise[d] clearly technical features, 
such as a ‘server computer’, ‘client computers’ and ‘a network.’”784 Ac-
cording to Justice Jacob, the Hitachi logic “most dramatically articulates 
the departure from earlier [EPO] reasoning—a computer when pro-
grammed to conduct a business method is not excluded by Art[icle] 
52(2).”785 
 The Aerotel court was also highly critical of treating excluded mat-
ter as part of the prior art. The court used an example outside the con-
text of computer programs and business methods to illustrate the 
point: “Consider for instance . . . a claim to a book . . . containing a 
new story the key elements of which are set out in the claim.”786 Justice 
Jacob characterized deeming the story part of the prior art by applying 
the PBS or Hitachi case reasoning as “simply not intellectually hon-
est.”787 He also seemed “puzzled” as to why the EPO rejected applica-
tions for non-compliance with Article 56 particularly when doing so led 
to the same outcome as applying the test from Vicom at the stage of Ar-
ticle 52(2) analysis.788 The court criticized Microsoft on a number of 
points, but in particular targeted its very narrow definition of exclud-
able computer programs as “just the abstract set of instructions” rather 
than a broader view that the term covers instructions on any medium 
that causes the computer to execute the program. 789  Justice Jacob 
found this result inconsistent with decisions in both the United King-
dom and the EPO, and stated that this result would “seem to open the 
way in practice to the patentability in principle of any computer pro-
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gram.”790 Hence, the court’s real concern with the any hardware ap-
proach was the elevation of form over substance.791 
 Following Aerotel, patent practices employed by the EPO and the 
UKIPO diverged significantly.792 The Aerotel court did not intend its de-
cision to be a radical departure from prior case law. Nevertheless, in ap-
plying the four-part test, the UKIPO rejected most claims directed to 
computer programs, even if the claim would have been valid patent sub-
ject matter prior to Aerotel.793 In summarizing the differing approaches 
between the UKIPO and EPO in a guide for patent practitioners, one 
scholar posits that the difference in current subject-matter treatments 
reveals different policy approaches to the subject-matter analyses.794 In 
the United Kingdom, the policy enshrined in the third step of the Aerotel 
test requires that if the computer-related invention falls within an ex-
cluded category, then the examiner must reject the entire claim even if 
parts of the claim are novel, achieve an inventive step, and make a tech-
nical contribution.795 By contrast, EPO policy favors granting patents for 
computer-related inventions if these requirements are met.796 In prac-
tice, applicants for computer program patents in the United Kingdom 
favor the EPO because the probability of receiving a patent for a com-
puter-implemented invention in the United Kingdom remains low.797 
But this divergence in approaches creates the possibility that a patent 
examined and granted by the EPO and registered as a patent in the 
United Kingdom could be invalidated under U.K. law. 
 Since Aerotel, the EPO Technical Board of Appeal has issued sev-
eral decisions reaffirming the approach in Hitachi. Duns Licensing798  
responded directly to the Aerotel court’s criticism of EPO case law and 
condemned the four-step approach as not “consistent with a good-faith 
interpretation of the European Patent Convention.”799 In light of the 
increasing tension between U.K. and EPO law and practice, the English 
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Court of Appeal took a second case only two years after Aerotel.800 The 
composition of the appellate panel in Symbian Ltd v. Comptroller-General 
of Patents indicated the importance of the decision.801 Two of the three 
justices, Justice Jacob and Justice Neuberger, sat on the Aerotel panel.802 
Lord Neuberger took the third spot on the panel as a special visitor to 
the Court of Appeal from the supreme judicial body of the United 
Kingdom, the House of Lords.803 The tone of the Symbian case, while 
markedly more deferential to European Patent Office precedent than 
Aerotel, ultimately did not change English patent law.804 
 The claim in Symbian covered a computer program for a method 
of “[m]apping dynamic link libraries in a computing device.”805 Link 
libraries are a package of small programs relating to general computer 
functions.806 Providing libraries allows function programs to be called 
up when needed, rather than replicated by each computer program.807 
For instance, when a word processing program needs to use a printing 
function, the function can be called up from the library so that it does 
not need to be included in the word processing program.808 Dynamic 
link libraries in the prior art could be either “linked by name” or 
“linked by ordinal” systems. 809  The patent application claimed that 
Symbian Ltd.’s invention would avoid difficulties and potential unreli-
ability of prior art linked by ordinal systems.810 The UKIPO denied the 
claim as a claim to a computer program “as such.”811 The English High 
Court ruled that by providing a technical contribution, the invention 
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was not precluded from registration under Section 1(2) of the Patent 
Act and Article 52(2) of the EPC.812 The Court of Appeal affirmed.813 
  The Court of Appeal began with a recitation of the statutory pro-
visions and articulated its obligations to follow previous decisions as 
precedent.814 The court also noted that it had the freedom to depart 
from its previous decisions in the field of patent law if the EPO Board 
had formed a settled view on that point of law that differed from previ-
ous decisions, but that it was not bound to do so.815 The Court of Ap-
peal concluded that “we should try to follow previous authority, we 
should seek to steer a relatively unadventurous and uncontroversial 
course, and we should be particularly concerned to minimise complex-
ity and uncertainty.”816 Nevertheless, despite three EPO cases decided 
after Aerotel applying the test from Hitachi,817 the Court of Appeal de-
clined to follow the approach.818 In part, the court chose to do so be-
cause the law still seemed to be in a state of flux; the Enlarged Board 
had not settled the issue, the post-Aerotel decisions by the EPO were in-
consistent, and the German judiciary also expressed doubts about the 
“any hardware approach.”819 
 Instead of following EPO cases, the Symbian court employed the 
“technical contribution approach” introduced in Gale’s Application.820  
Under this computer-targeted approach, a computer program must be 
more than just a “better program to qualify as patent subject matter.”821 
Something more is needed, for instance, a change in speed with which 
the computer works.822 The claim must also “solve a ‘technical’ problem 
                                                                                                                      
812 See de Mauny, supra note 7, at 149–50 (explaining the prior history of the case, the 
judge’s reluctance to grant permission to appeal to the Comptroller of Patents, and recog-
nizing that the appeal was expedited due to the impact it would have on pending British 
patent applications). 
813 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 18. 
814 See id. at 11–12 (“In principle the Court of Appeal is bound by one of its previous 
decisions unless that previous decision is inconsistent with a subsequent decision of the 
House of Lords . . . is inconsistent with an earlier Court of Appeal decision . . . or can be 
shown to have been arrived at per curiam (i.e. without reference to the relevant statutory 
provision or authority).”). 
815 See id. at 12. 
816 See id. at 16. The court reached its conclusion despite acknowledging, in the previ-
ous paragraph, that “the boundary between what is and is not a technical contribution is 
imprecise” and may not be soluble in a wholly satisfying way. Id. at 15. 
817See id. at 14. 
818 See id. 
819 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 14–15. 
820 See id. at 15. 
821 See id. at 16–17. 
822 Id. at 16. 
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lying within the computer itself.”823 The court concluded that a com-
puter with the claimed program operated better than the prior art and 
was thus valid patent subject matter.824 The court considered its conclu-
sion in light of the four-part test articulated in Aerotel and began with the 
second step because they had already sufficiently characterized the pat-
ent claim.825 The program’s actual contribution identified under the 
second step was that it made a computer operate faster and more relia-
bly than the prior art by virtue of the claimed feature.826 Addressing the 
third step of the analysis, the court found that the claim was not solely to 
excluded subject matter because it included the “knock-on” effect of a 
computer working better.827 The court concluded that the invention was 
technical “on any view as to the meaning of the word technical.”828 
 Despite acknowledging the inevitability of the EPO granting soft-
ware and business method patents where the UKIPO would not,829 the 
Court of Appeal minimized the differences in their approaches. What 
differs, according to the court, is where the “technical” determination 
is made. In the United Kingdom it remains part of the Article 52 analy-
sis,830 while in the EPO it is completed with reference to Article 56.831 
The court emphasized “the strong desirability of the approaches and 
principles in the two offices marching together as far as possible,”832 
concluding that “where there may be a difference of approach or of 
principle, one must try to minimize the consequent differences in 
terms of the outcome in particular patent cases.”833 
 Achieving a common result is exactly what the Symbian court ac-
complished. The EPO Examining Division had already indicated it 
would grant a patent for Symbian’s invention.834 Had the Symbian court 
found the invention not valid subject matter under previous precedents 
and the Aerotel test,835 the conflict in approaches between the United 
                                                                                                                      
823 Id. (quoting Gale’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. at 328) (noting that the Symbian in-
vention meets this requirement). 
824 See id. at 17. 
825 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 7. 
826 See id. at 16–17. 
827 See id. at 17. 
828 Id. 
829 Id. at 17. 
830 See id. at 7. 
831 See PBS, [2001] O.J.E.P.O. at 456 (denying a patent because it did not meet the in-
ventive step criterion defined in Article 56). 
832 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 7. 
833 Id. at 18. 
834 Id. at 17. 
835 See id. at 17–18; Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 240; de Mauny, supra note 7, at 151. 
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Kingdom and the EPO would have widened considerably. By ruling 
that software that improves the operation of a computer is valid patent 
subject matter, Symbian moderated the UKIPO practice of rejecting ap-
plications that did not have an external effect. 836  On December 8, 
2008, the UKIPO issued a Practice Notice837 based on Symbian that con-
firmed the four-step test.838 The Practice Notice concluded that “a pro-
gram that results in a computer running faster or more reliably may be 
considered to provide a technical contribution even if the invention 
solely addresses a problem in the programming.”839 Some commenta-
tors have concluded that Symbian will result in the UKIPO issuing more 
patents on computer-implemented inventions,840 particularly because 
patent attorneys will make sure to emphasize the “knock-on” technical 
effects in patent applications.841 
                                                                                                                     
 Although the U.K. and EPO results converged in Symbian, the saga 
is far from over.842 The approaches to determining technicality still dif-
fer. What might be a technical solution to a technical problem under 
EPO Article 56 analysis will not necessarily constitute a technical con-
tribution under U.K. Article 52(2) analysis.843 Because a European pat-
ent may be challenged for validity in an English court,844 courts could 
find themselves in a dilemma if one of those instances presaged in the 
Symbian decision845 occurred, in which the different approaches lead to 
divergent results. Further, at least one commentator describes the UKI-
PO Practice Notice as “a grudging concession” that computer-
implemented inventions may be patented if there is no external ef-
fect.846 The Practice Notice explicitly states that “examiners will object 
to the computerization of what would be a pure mental act if done 
without the aid of a computer as both a mental act and a computer 
program as such.”847 Nevertheless, it is possible the UKIPO may reject 
 
836 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 17; Intellectual Prop. Office, Practice Notices: Pa-
tents Act 1977: Patentability of Computer Programs ¶ 3 (Dec. 8, 2008) available at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-types/pro-patent/p-law/p-pn/p-pn-computer.htm [hereinafter IPO]. 
837 See IPO, supra note 836, ¶ 1. 
838 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 1. 
839 See IPO, supra note 836, ¶ 5. 
840 Wallis, supra note 7, at 4. 
841 Taylor, supra note 793, at 15. 
842 See de Mauny, supra note 7, at 151; Renao Marchini, Patently Better, 83 Eur. Law.14, 
15 (2008). 
843 See Shemtov, supra note 7, at 512. 
844 Patents Act, c.37, § 74. 
845 Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 14–15. 
846 See Symbian Legal Appeal, supra note 801; see also Wallis, supra note 7, at 4. 
847 IPO, supra note 836, ¶ 8. 
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applications based on the mental acts exclusion where it would have 
previously done so under the computer program exclusion. 
D. German Patent Subject-Matter Treatment of Software and  
Business Method Claims 
 A robust analysis of German law and practice in the area of com-
puter software and business methods is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Nevertheless, a brief discussion serves to highlight problems within the 
European patent community, accentuating the need for clear defini-
tions of the EPC exceptions and an appellate body to resolve interpre-
tive differences among the national jurisdictions. 
 The Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) has attempted to articulate an ap-
propriate test for technicality in the context of computer-implemented 
inventions over the last decade.848 Despite the BGH’s repeated asser-
tions that its decisions are in line with EPO case law, its interpretations 
may differ.849 Commentators have characterized Germany’s approach to 
software patents as more cautious than the EPO.850 As a result, the valid-
ity of EPO patents is frequently contested in infringement proceedings 
in the German Patent Court.851 The BGH has developed a two-part test 
that appears roughly equivalent to the general contours of EPO prac-
tice, in which technicality is assessed as part of both Article 52 and Arti-
cle 56 analyses.852 In German practice, the invention must possess tech-
nical character, which is assessed independently from novelty and inven-
tive step criteria. 853  The second step requires an objective technical 
contribution over the prior art and a solution to a technical problem.854 
This step mandates a technical teaching directed to the solution of a 
                                                                                                                      
848 See Hans Wegner, Germany, 12 in 1 Software Patents Worldwide (Supp.4 Dec. 
2009), supra note 437. Although, as a civil law system, these cases do not have the prece-
dential weight, examiners of the German Patent and Trademark Office typically refer di-
rectly to decisions of the Federal Patent Court and the BGH, giving these cases practical 
importance. See id. at 10. 
849 Id. at 11. But see Aerotel, [2007] 1 All E.R. at 269 (noting that the BGH did not con-
sider the computer program exclusion from EPO case law, and so neglected to take EPO 
case law into account). 
850 See Stephan Dorn, German Supreme Court Widens the Door for Software Patents, Intell. 
Prop. Expert Group (May 30, 2010), http://www.ipeg.eu/?p=1347. 
851 See id. 
852 See Wegner, supra note 848, at 6. 
853 Id. 
854 Id. at 6, 17 (describing a test for an objective technical contribution and summariz-
ing BGH case law requiring a solution to a technical problem). 
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specific technical problem.855 The two criteria have changed in impor-
tance over the last several years. Currently the latter step is more impor-
tant.856 
 The April 2010 decision, Dynamische Dokumentenverwetung (Siemens) 
is the most recent attempt to articulate the contours of German law.857 
As one scholar points out, the fact that the BGH has decided two cases 
in 2009 and 2010 indicates that the Federal Patent Court is “trying to 
understand the boundaries” of patent law in this area.858 The Federal 
Patent Court determines which appeals to send to the BGH,859 and only 
certifies appeals if there is “a legal question of fundamental importance” 
or a BGH decision is “needed for consistent interpretation” of the law. 
Thus, having the BGH decide two cases in this time span is signifi-
cant.860 Commentators and even legal practitioners are unable to agree 
on the impact of the Siemens decision. Whereas some commentators hail 
the Siemens case as a “landmark decision” that marks a break from past 
decisions and goes much further than EPO practice,861 other commen-
tators view the decision as “a continuation of a long line of thinking by 
the German courts” that is very similar to the EPO approach.862 
                                                                                                                     
 Regardless of Siemens’s impact, looking to German decisions for a 
definition of “technical” is not fruitful. In 2000, the BGH expressly ac-
knowledged that there is no objective definition of technology in the 
context of determining whether a particular claimed invention is tech-
nical.863 Therefore, “technical” has a dynamic meaning which can be 
 
855 See Klaus Melullis, Some Problems of Patent Law from a German Viewpoint, 13th European 
Patent Judges’ Symposium, [2007] O.J.E.P.O. (Special Edition 2), 184, 184–86. 
856 See id. at 186. 
857 Beschluss Xa ZB 20/08: Dynamische Dokumentengenerierung [Dynamic Document, Genera-
tion] Bundesgerichtshof (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/cln_134/DE/ 
Entscheidungen/EntscheidungenBGH/entscheidungenBGH_node.html (click on “Zugang 
zur Entscheidungsdatenbank des Bundesgerichtshofs”; in “Dokumentsuche” box on left, 
type “Xa ZB 20/08” in “Aktenzeichen” field; click “Suchen”; follow the hyperlink to “Xa ZB 
20/08”). 
858See Rob Harrison, Flooding Germany with Software Patents?, Tangible IP (May 23, 
2010), http://www.tangible-ip.com/2010/flooding-germany-with-software-patents.htm. 
859 Id. 
860 Wegner, supra note 848, at 9. 
861 German Federal Supreme Court Opens the Door for Software Patents, Kaye Scholer LLP ( June 
10, 2010), http://www.kayescholer.com/news/client_alerts/20100610/_res/id=sa_File1/IPCA 
20100610.pdf. 
862 See Harrison, supra note 858. 
863 See Case No. X ZB 15/98, Speech Analysis Apparatus, [2002] 3 Int’l Rev. Indus. 
Prop. Copyright L. 343, 344–45 (Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 
11, 2000) (Ger.); see also Ballardini, supra note 7, at 572. 
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treated differently in the context of technological developments.864 In 
extrajudicial comments, Judge Melullis of the BGH marginalized the 
word “technical” because “when assessing software as such, the pro-
gram’s interdependence with the technical device makes the technical 
content too hard to deny.” 865  Hence, in the context of computer-
implemented inventions, the meaning of technical as used by German 
courts remains unclear. 
Conclusion 
 In addressing Justice Ginsburg’s query about whether Europe pro-
vides a solution to the U.S. business method and software patent co-
nundrum, our analysis clearly answers in the negative. As the Bilski v. 
Kappos petitioner stated with respect to Europe’s technology require-
ment, “technology . . . can be a difficult term.”866 Technology is a diffi-
cult term, particularly as it relates to whether and under what condi-
tions business methods, computer programs, algorithms, and mental 
acts that are embodied in machines should receive patents as a matter 
of policy and practice. Instead of serving as a panacea for U.S. patent 
examiners and courts, the European technical requirement fails to 
provide a meaningful constraint for software patents and many business 
method patents on either side of the Atlantic. 
 Uncertainty and evolving standards characterize all patent systems 
examined in this Article. The United States treats all business methods 
and software as eligible patent subject matter, whereas the EPC, U.K., 
and German patent systems exclude all business methods that are not 
computer implemented.867 Beyond these basic observations, ambiguity 
about the nature and extent of patent subject matter permeates all 
these patent systems. Bilski injected significant uncertainty in a relatively 
settled area of law by rejecting State Street Bank’s “useful, concrete, and 
tangible result” test and inviting the CAFC to develop a new subject-
matter test based on the abstract ideas exclusion.868 In Europe, the cer-
tainty of the business method and software exclusions vanishes where 
patent claims include a computer or software component. For such ap-
plications, European patent courts analyze the technicality of the com-
                                                                                                                      
864 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 572. 
865 See Symbian, [2009] R.P.C. at 11 (quoting Judge Melullis of the BGH at a 2006 
Symposium for European Patent Judges). 
866 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-
964). 
867 See supra Parts II–IV. 
868 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3259 (2010) (Breyer, J. concurring). 
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ponent, where there is no commonly recognized definition of techni-
cal.869 Thus, in the United States uncertainty of subject-matter exclu-
sion exists for business methods only, whereas in Europe business 
methods and software are excluded unless they constitute parts of a 
mixed claim involving “something more.”870 
 It is this “something more” that is so difficult to characterize and 
that results in uncertainty. In the United Kingdom, the analysis of tech-
nicality is part of the subject-matter test, where English courts require a 
“technical contribution” or external “knock on” effect of a computer 
working better.871 The closest U.S. analog to the U.K. external effect 
requirement would be a weak physical transformation test.872 German 
courts and the EPO have moved the computer-implemented business 
method and software technicality determination to their inventive step 
or obviousness analysis.873 This test asks whether the invention provides 
a technical solution to a technical problem.874 This appears somewhat 
analogous to the now-discredited test proposed in Parker v. Flook, which 
required examiners to evaluate the novelty and non-obviousness con-
tributions of an invention only after completely discounting any contri-
bution due to a mathematical algorithm.875 In order to provide a closer 
analogy to tests used in Europe, the Flook test would need to treat the 
business method component of patent claims as contributions that are 
well known in the art.876 
 The European test—pejoratively labeled the “any hardware test” — 
has evolved to bar naked business methods and little else.877 Like the 
U.S. pattern, where incrementally more types of inventions receive sub-
                                                                                                                      
869  See supra text accompanying notes 359, 861; see also CFPH LLC’S Application, 
[2005] EWHC (Pat) [14], [2006] R.P.C. 259, 267 (Eng.) (“[T]he word ‘technical’ is not a 
solution. It is merely a restatement of the problem in different and more imprecise lan-
guage.”). 
870 See, e.g., Case T-208/84, Computer-Related Invention/VICOM, [1987] O.J.E.P.O. 
14, 21–22 (Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, July 15, 1986), available at http://archive.epo.org/ 
epo/pubs/oj1987/p001_046.pdf (reasoning that a traditionally patentable technical proc-
ess involving computer software and a computer apparatus should not be excluded solely 
by virtue of the fact that software is part of the claim, thereby suggesting that the hardware 
component of the claim was “something more”). 
871 See supra text accompanying notes 820–828. 
872 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962–63 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 
3218. 
873 See Wegner, supra note 848, at 6. 
874 See id.; Melullis, supra note 855, at 186. 
875 See 437 U.S. 584, 595–96 (1978). 
876 See id. 
877 See Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [75–76], [2007] 1 
All E.R. 225 (A.C.) at 237 (Eng.); Steinbrenner, supra note 437, at 66. 
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ject-matter treatment, following the 2006 EPO decision in Microsoft 
even computer programs are patentable provided they achieve a fur-
ther technical effect.878 The European analogy to U.S. patent law de-
velopment differs in two significant respects. First, there is no evidence 
that European patent law will continue expanding patent protection to 
business methods. No case in any of the examined jurisdictions has 
granted patent protection to “naked” business methods or business me-
thods “as such.”879 Second, English patent courts appear only grudg-
ingly to acquiesce to the EPO practice of granting patents on computer 
programs that lack an external effect.880 Hence, whereas European pat-
ent reviewing bodies are in consensus about business methods, there is 
considerable uncertainty surrounding the boundaries of software pat-
entability—and likely significant discord between patent jurisdictions 
over the proper treatment of software patents. Thus, other than Eu-
rope’s unified support for its business method exclusion—an exclusion 
that the Supreme Court in Bilski refused to embrace881—Europe has 
little to offer the United States that can enhance clarity and certainty in 
U.S. patent subject-matter practice. 
 Unfortunately, the U.S. approach to business method and software 
subject-matter review could use an infusion of outside guidance. Rather 
than increase clarity, Bilski has increased ambiguity and uncertainty 
about what inventions constitute eligible subject matter. By rejecting the 
machine or physical transformation test882 as the threshold requirement 
for patentability and likely rejecting the CAFC’s useful, concrete and 
tangible test,883  the USPTO and practitioners are left with no test—
other than the abstract ideas exclusion884—to provide guidance. Bilski 
provides neither a clear rule nor a prohibition on the patenting of na-
ked business methods unless they constitute abstract ideas. Further, as 
the Kennedy plurality observes, the suggestion that the “machine-or-
transformation test is useful ‘for evaluating processes similar to those in 
                                                                                                                      
878  See Case T-424/03, MICROSOFT/Clipboard Formats I, [2006] E.P.O.R. 414, 420 
(Technical Bd. Appeal 3.5.01, Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/ 
case-law-appeals/pdf/t030424eu1.pdf; Laub, supra note 7, at 351–54. 
879 See supra Parts III–IV; see also Bakels & Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 21–22 (“To 
many European observers business method patents represent a horrific prospect—yet 
another example of unwanted ‘Americanisation’. Even those who are in favour of software 
patenting usually are vehemently opposed to patenting business methods.”). 
880 See supra text accompanying note 846. 
881 See 130 S. Ct. at 3229. 
882 See id. at 3225. 
883 See id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
884  See id. at 3229 (majority opinion) (“In searching for a limiting principle, this 
Court’s precedents on the unpatentability provide useful tools.”). 
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the Industrial Age,’ but is less useful ‘for determining the patentability 
of inventions in the Information Age’” indicates that the courts may 
employ different subject-matter tests for new technologies.885 
 This Article contends that such movement is in error. Information-
age technology is not qualitatively different from industrial-age tech-
nology. It still must qualify as either a process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter.886 Pre-information-age patent jurisprudence 
is capable of providing the clarity sorely lacking in current U.S. patent 
jurisprudence. Rather than rendering cautious decisions based on fu-
ture unimagined and unimaginable technological developments, U.S. 
courts should rely on legislative bodies to address gaping legal deficien-
cies with respect to new technologies if such technologies develop. 
 Ironically, both the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal and the U.S. 
Supreme Court fail to provide or increase clarity concerning the sub-
ject-matter treatment of software and business method patents in their 
recent opinions.887 What prevents the finding of a consistent approach 
to patent subject-matter determinations is the absence of any signifi-
cant policy guidance in a highly politicized arena. This absence has 
been particularly problematic in Europe due to the plethora of na-
tional patent systems governed predominantly by a civil-law tradition 
that does not adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. The result has been 
a multiplicity of approaches to the software patent subject-matter ques-
tion in the EPO and national courts, with no clear definition of what is 
“technical” over the last twenty years.888 The absence of sufficient po-
litical willpower to provide policy guidance is evident from the failure 
of the European Union to implement a directive harmonizing the 
treatment of computer-implemented inventions. Moreover, the inability 
to remove “programs for computers” from the list of excluded subject 
matter in EPC 2000, despite years of granting patents for computer 
software products, further evidences this inertia.889 
                                                                                                                      
885 Id. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing the plurality’s suggestion). 
886 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
887 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228–30 (declining to adopt general principles of patent pro-
tection and issuing a narrow holding for the case at hand); Case T-154/04, Estimating 
Sales Activity/DUNS LICENSING ASSOCS., [2008] O.J.E.P.O. 46, 66 (Technical Bd. of 
Appeal 3.5.01, Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj008/02_ 
08/02_0468.pdf (“Thus it will remain incumbent on office practice and case law to deter-
mine whether subject-matter claimed as an invention has a technical character.”); see also 
Ballardini, supra note 7, at 563. 
888 See Ballardini, supra note 7, at 567. 
889 Cf. EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52 (maintaining computer program exception in 
the amended provision). 
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 By contrast, changes in the U.S. approach have spanned a much 
greater time period and have not suffered the European problem of 
conflicting contemporaneous treatments of the patent subject-matter 
question. The U.S. constitutional mandate is to grant patents that pro-
mote the useful arts.890 The legislative mandate includes patent protec-
tion for “new and useful processes.”891 No inventions or advances are 
explicitly excluded under U.S. law. This approach differs sharply from 
the EPC. EPC Article 52 explicitly excludes business methods and com-
puter programs from patent subject matter.892 Nonetheless, the Article 
52 exclusion includes the cryptic “as such” modifier.893 The meaning of 
this terse phrase is the root of the controversy in Europe. 
 In the absence of legislative guidance, U.S. common law developed 
a seemingly sound approach to dealing with subject-matter issues for 
patent process claims. This case law excluded claims for abstract ideas, 
laws of nature, and mathematical expressions and algorithms.894 The 
machine or physical transformation test was a product of this case 
law.895 Due to the absence of clear standards, however, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has been hesitant to extend these principles to new, and 
ostensibly different, information-age technology. In the past, this reti-
cence facilitated the expansion of patent subject matter to include all 
new inventions regardless of application or type.896 
 In Bilski, the Court also failed to provide clarification or guidance 
in this area, by “not commenting on the patentability of any particular 
invention, let alone holding that any of the above-mentioned technolo-
gies from the Information Age should or should not receive patent pro-
tection.”897 Whether or not the Court’s reticence is warranted, its reluc-
tance to act emphatically is likely due to the legislative nature of the 
requested decision. The task of drawing patent subject-matter bounda-
ries is a policy decision that the courts have been uncomfortable mak-
ing. In Bilski, the Supreme Court continued its practice of asking Con-
                                                                                                                      
890 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
891 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
892 See EPC 2000, supra note 14, art. 52. 
893 See id. art. 52(3). 
894 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (acknowledging the existence of only three exclusions 
from patent subject matter: laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas) (cit-
ing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–73 (1972) 
(finding mathematical formulas and algorithms to be non-patentable). 
895 See, e.g., Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876). 
896 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (acknowledging “broad patent-eligibility principles” 
with relatively few exceptions). 
897 Id. at 3228. 
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gress to address “the great challenge in striking the balance between 
protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that 
others would discover by independent, creative application of general 
principles.”898 Thus far, Congress has not responded to such entreaties. 
In fact, other than adding a section to the Patent Act that provides a 
prior-use defense for business method patents, Congress has not ad-
dressed business method or software patent claims at all.899 
 Europe has lagged in this seemingly inexorable march to remove 
most restrictions on patent subject matter, but may not be far behind. 
The trend in Europe is toward recognizing claims as valid patent sub-
ject matter as long as they are computer implemented.900 The United 
Kingdom—with its strong common law tradition of limiting patent sub-
ject matter—has offered the most resistance to this trend, but may be 
forced to yield under pressure to make its patent law consistent with 
EPO practice.901 It is telling that the Enlarged Board of Appeal recently 
ruled that there is no conflict in patent subject-matter treatment under 
the EPC, despite multiple Technical Board of Appeal decisions with 
seemingly conflicting approaches. 902  First, nothing but the elusive 
“technical” requirement is left to prevent EPO case law from continu-
ing its evolution in the direction of the more lax U.S. approach to pat-
ent subject-matter treatment. Whereas Europe is unlikely to adopt the 
complete absence of restrictions characteristic of U.S. patent practice, 
the dissipation of any remaining restrictions on software patents in Eu-
rope is a real possibility. Second, it is clear that the United States will 
not find any answers to its software and business method patent co-
nundrum from the European patent system. 
 The curious reference to In re Bilski in the Enlarged Board of Ap-
peal decision903 suggests that the EPO may have been looking to the 
United States for leadership and that it approved an approach that 
demonstrated a movement toward harmonization. The type of judicial 
leadership that Europe would most likely accept is an unequivocal pol-
icy statement that provides concrete and practical restrictions to busi-
ness method and computer-implemented inventions. Bilski did not pro-
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vide such a clear elucidating standard.904 It is thus unlikely that Euro-
pean courts will consider anything in the decision worth emulating. 
 U.S. courts, including the Bilski Court, erroneously suggest that 
case law is inadequate to deal with rapidly changing technology.905 The 
Supreme Court’s final two statutory subject-matter decisions of the 
twentieth century ruled on cutting edge patent claims. In Diamond v. 
Diehr, the Court validated a computer-controlled rubber curing proc-
ess.906 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court validated a patent for a ge-
netically engineered microorganism capable of oil decomposition 
processes.907 Although the technology in the two cases was pioneering, 
both claims fit into categories that were clearly envisioned during the 
time of the first Patent Act. The Diehr claim covered an industrial proc-
ess908 and the Chakrabarty claim covered a manufacture,909 two types of 
innovation that are listed in Section 101 of the Patent Act.910 By con-
trast, the alarm limit and BCD processes invalidated in Flook and Benson, 
respectively, would not qualify as industrial processes.911 Bilski is in line 
with these results because the machine-or-transformation test remains a 
“useful and important clue” to patentability. The petitioners’ claims to 
the concept of “hedging,” and its reduction to a mathematical formula, 
were unanimously invalidated.912 Nevertheless, the plurality refused to 
draw a clear line for a case more difficult than Bilski.913 
 The Supreme Court missed the opportunity to bring U.S. patent 
law closer to that of the EPO by failing to resurrect the moribund busi-
ness method patent exclusion that the CAFC nullified in State Street 
Bank.914 Nevertheless, in holding that the machine-or-transformation 
test is “a useful and important clue” to the patentability of processes, 
and not endorsing the State Street Bank test,915 the Court moved toward 
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905 See id. at 3227; see also Benson, 409 U.S. at 72–73. 
906 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981). 
907 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305. 
908 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184. 
909 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
910 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
911 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 594–95; Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72. 
912 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231, 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring), 3257–58 (Breyer, J. con-
curring). The majority held that the claim was not patentable because it represented an 
abstract idea, but Justices Stevens and Breyer would have held that the method was not a 
process, and therefore not patentable. Id. at 3231–32, 3257–58. 
913 See id. at 3231(Stevens, J., concurring). 
914 See id.; State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
915 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227; State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375. 
2011] Software & Business Method Patents in Europe & the United States 327 
                                                                                                                     
limiting the patentability of naked business methods. Still, a more clear-
ly delineated test that could provide guidance in both the United States 
and Europe would be far better than the Bilski outcome. 
 This Article suggests that judicial bodies in the United States and 
Europe have weakened statutory subject-matter standards in favor of 
protecting business methods and software patent claims, due to the 
lack of clear policy mandates. Even the United Kingdom, perhaps the 
last holdout against the movement in favor of expansive coverage, has 
started to relent under pressure to be consistent with EPO practice. 
The U.S. Supreme Court had the opportunity to institute legal stan-
dards that provide welfare-enhancing innovation incentives and reduce 
the anti-competitive effects from broad recognition of business method 
and software patents. Although the Court recognized the need to bal-
ance protecting inventors with protecting the community against gov-
ernment-sanctioned monopolies, the Court declined to indicate “where 
that balance ought to be struck.”916 Unfortunately, the United States 
Supreme Court missed the opportunity to create clear limits to statu-
tory subject matter. Doing so may have encouraged Europe to reform 
its patent policy, and perhaps brought both sides of the Atlantic closer 
to a truly harmonized patent policy. 
 
916 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228. 
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